Graham Hovey -- letter from Italy No. 1
Recorded in Rome, October 13, 1954
Tape runs: 13:35

54-11-42

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(First of two programs on American Fulbright scholars in Italy).

This is Graham Hovey, recording the first in a new series of radio Letters from Italy for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- the NAEB Network.

My guide book calls Perugia "the empress of hill-set cities" in Italy and I'll settle for that designation. I fell hard for this empress at first sight on the mid-summer day in 1944 when she was liberated by the British army. And I have gone back to Perugia on every occasion when I could find an excuse for doing so. I am not the only American who feels this way. You will meet another in a few minutes.

The ancient heart of the city of Perugia rests at the top of a steep hill, some 1500 feet above sea level and close to the geographic center of the Italian peninsula. From this crest you can look out across hundreds of acres of the rolling countryside of the region of Umbria, of which Perugia is the capital.

Umbria is a lovely patchwork of hills and valleys in greens and browns, punctuated with slender elms and oaks and poplars -- and, of course, the cypress trees and umbrella pines which do so much for so much of the Italian landscape.

From Perugia's crest, on a clear day, without half trying, you can see Assisi, the city of St. Francis, white against the side of Mt. Subasio, 25 kilometers to the east. Off the other side you may glimpse the mirror that is Lake Trasimeno, where Hannibal won a battle, but not a war against the Romans in 217 B. C. At dusk, off this crest, you see sunets which critics would call exaggerated if ever a painter could capture them on canvass.

But its location is not all that makes Perugia the empress.

In some respects, Perugia is a modern city of nearly 100,000, sprawling ever farther down the hillside. But its main street runs for less than half a mile along the crest, through the ancient heart of the city.

That street must be one of the most remarkable in the world. They call it the Corso Vannucci, in honor of the great renaissance painter, Pietro Vannucci -- Raphael's teacher, who took the name Perugino, after the city where he lived and worked.

Along that short street of several hundred yards, if you stroll slowly and observe carefully and glance frequently down the vicoli, the side lanes that spin off the Corso, you can spot evidences of all the great periods in Perugia's known history: from Etruscan through Roman through medie val and renaissance to the up-to-date. And on the Corso Vannucci in Perugia, one can stroll slowly and observe leisurely.

In all parts of Italy you find pedestrians not convinced that the automobile is here to stay. But in Perugia every evening, the authorities make testament of their faith that people are more important than autos; that going "a spasso," as Italians say -- strolling for pleasure in a lovely setting -- is an essential part of the good life. For two hours they block off the Corso to all vehicles for almost its entire length. And by the thousands, the Peruginians come out in good weather to take the air before supper, strolling back and forth with their friends, unhurried and undisturbed.

Some of the strollers will linger for a while at one end of the Corso, where the hill drops away from the wall in sharp staggers. For this is the best spot from which to watch the elements gradually assemble, then gradually dissemble, those exaggerated sunsets over Lake Trasimeno way -- sunsets against whose crimson is always silhouetted a single, thin line of now-black trees on the rim of the western horizon.

Some strollers turn left at this end of the Corso and walk through a public park behind the government palace. There they may pause to watch the kids, darting around the base of a huge statue of the great master, Perugino, or under an arcaded passage of the palazzo, playing hide-and-seek, or Mafia and carabiniere, or even cowboy and Indian.

Other strollers reach the great square at the opposite end of the Corso. There they circle the 13th century fountain masterpiece of the illustrious Tuscan father and son, Niccolo and Giovanni Pisano. Or they cross the square and turn around for an always-rewarding look at the noble Palazzo Comunale, one of the finest Gothic palaces in Italy, inside and in front of which so much of Perugia's history was enacted.

But mostly the Peruginians stroll to and fro on the Corso, stopping to greet friends, or perhaps to take at one of the sidewalk cafes an aperitif or a tiny cup of that black coffee with authority that Italians call espresso.

If you prefer late afternoon to early evening strolling, and wish to see more of the city, you can hardly go wrong in exploring some of the vicoli -- those narrow streets and lanes that fork off the Corso and the crest. Some of them end in steps. A few end unexpectedly against a wall, from which hill abruptly becomes cliff.

But many of the vicoli twist and wind under graceful arches and tiny bridges; and alongside ancient walls and palaces and churches; and through market-places, as first they dip gradually, then plunge steeply, toward the Umbrian valleys below the city.

One such vicolo will take you under the arch of Augustus and through an Etruscan town gate and bring you out in front of the orange Gallenga palace, which houses an unusual institution; the Italian University for Foreigners.

And that, finally, brings me around to the subject of this Letter from Italy. For this is not intended to be a profile of the city of Perugia; not exactly, anyhow. It is intended to be part of the story of an annual invasion of this setting I have tried to construct in words; an invasion of Americans, more than a hundred strong.

They are the students, professors and research scholars who have come to Italy from all parts of America to study or teach for the academic year under scholarships provided by the so-called Fulbright program. And they have invaded Perugia for a month of intensive orientation and language study at the University for Foreigners.

In truth, it is unlike any orientation any of them ever got as matriculating freshmen at Old Siwash or the state university or one of the Ivy league colleges.

They are assigned rooms in Italian homes, rarely more than three or four of them to one house. And they take their meals with the families in whose homes they live. For most, this means that the day after they have left ship at Naples they must start to speak the Italian language, for purposes of ordinary, every-day living.

This is pleasant and helpful practice for Americans well advanced in their study of Italian. It is a rugged and, at times, exasperating workout for others, who were picked for Fulbright scholarships for demonstrated competence in their special fields, and in spite of a deficiency in the language.

But generally these latter Fulbrighters speedily pick up useful tools of the Italian language as the result of the seemingly constant drilling that starts for them at the University for Foreigners the day after their arrival.

Several Italian universities offer special summer courses for foreigners in the language and the culture, but Perugia's lovely Gallenga palace houses the only university devoted entirely to the needs of visitors from beyond Italy's borders.

The University for Foreigners actually started to function in 1921 but it was formally established by state law in 1925. That law said the purpose of the university was "to spread abroad the knowledge of Italy in all its manifestations, past and present."

The academic year at the University for Foreigners consists of three terms of three months each, and runs from April to December. There are three different sections -- for beginning, intermediate and advanced students. Courses include the study of the language, civil history, art history, philosophy, literature, and one devoted entirely to Dante's "Divine Comedy."

In the 33 years of its existence, the University for Foreigners has enrolled some 17,000 students from 78 different nations.

The biggest single group of students has come from Germany, with Americans second. But the annual invasion of American Fulbright grantees for their month of special orientation is closing the gap.

That American invasion this year came on Sunday, September 26. Most of the Fulbright granttes arrived in Naples aboard the SS Independence about noon on Saturday, September 25. After clearing customs, they climbed into buses and were taken up the Appian Way to Rome for the night, stopping en route for dinner at a seaside restaurant near Formia. They were up for an early departure from Rome on Sunday morning, andtheir buses slowly climbed the zig-zagging highway from the upper Tiber valley to the crest of Perugia about noon.

After a group luncheon at a hotel just off the Corso, the Fulbrighters scattered to the various Peruginian homes where they were to live for the next month. The next day, Monday, the vacations ended; the orientation program began.

Miss Ida Haubold is an attractive redhead from Brooklyn, U. S. A. She studied fine arts and painting at New York's Cooper Union and will study this academic year at the Institute of Fine Arts in Florence.

Just 48 hours off the boat at Naples, Miss Haubold finds herself in a classroom at the University for Foreigners, getting the drilling of her life in down-to-earth Italian from a tall, handsome man with a Roman nose; friendly but very persistent:

(COMINCIA IL NASTRO NUMERO UNO):

GUARNIERI: Cominciamo: Che cosa fa, ogni mattina?

HAUBOLD: Ogni mattina, leggo il mio giornale.

GUARNIERI: Ha letto il suo giornale stamattina?

HAUBOLD: Non ho ancora letto il giornale di questa mattina, perche' non ho avuto tempo.

GUARNIERI: Perche' no ha avuto tempo di leggere il suo giornale questa mattina?

HAUBOLD: Stamattina no ho avuto tempo di leggere il giornale perche' ho risposto alle lettere che ho ricevuto ieri sera.

GUARNIERI: Che cosa ho fatto stamattina?

HAUBOLD: Stamattina ho risposto alle lettere che ho ricevuto ieri sera e percio' non ho avuto tempo di leggere il mio giornale, come faccio ogni mattina.

GUARNIERI: Bene. Molto bene. Eh?

(FINISCE IL NASTRO NUMERO UNO).

HOVEY: "Well done," says the tall man with the Roman nose. "Very good." And Ida Haubold relaxes a bit while Professor Romano Guarnieri moves along to another Fulbright student in the beginning course.

I wonder how many teachers around the world have retained their enthusiasm for drilling the fundamentals of a language into students over as long a period as Romano Guarnieri has. His teaching career spans half a century. Many of those years he spent in Holland, serving as director of the Italian Cultural Institute at The Hague, as well as professor of Italian language and literature at Dutch universities.

But Romano Guarnieri's dashing figure is a fixture of the summer and autumn landscape at Perugia. For at least part of each of those 33 years the University for Foreigners has functioned, Professor Guarnieri has functioned, too, in that orange palace outside the Etruscan town gate. And he has directed the special intensive courses for the American Fulbrighters since their inception.

Under the Guarnieri method, nothing but Italian is spoken in the classroom. The emphasis is on the practical and one of the chief instruments is repetition! After the first session, you can usually hear one of the Fulbright students saying: "Well, if I can't get it this way it's a cinch I'll never get it at all."

Almost any evening you can see Professor Guarnieri striding along the Corso, going "a spasso" with some of his students: A remarkable man of 70-odd years, who looks more like 50; a man whose great zest for life and teaching seems almost matched by his passion for colorful sport shirts and casual tweed suits. At a dance in the student center of the University for Foreigners this fall, the Fulbrighters cleared the floor and applauded wildly while Guarnieri jitterbugged madly with one of their number.

As the reference to that dance indicates, there is a lighter side to the orientation. It is not all work at Perugia. And inevitably shomething of what Perugia is and something of what Perugia has been down the ages rubs off on the newly-arrived Americans. It would be difficult to get a consensus of Fulbrighter attitudes toward the whole thing, so I didn't try. I just asked one of them for his impressions.

Marshall Bialosky is a native of Cleveland, Ohio, who holds a master of music degree from Northwestern university. He is on leave from the music faculty of Milton college in Wisconsin, and under his Fulbright grant he will study composition in Florence with the Italian composer, Luigi dalla Piccolo:

(COMINCIA IL NASTRO NUMERO DUE):

BIALOSKY: At this moment, the word "Perugia" for me represents sharp contrast. On the one hand, Perugia means a cluster on an Umbrian hillside of ancient churches and walls and palaces. There they stand — patient, imperturbable, lovely. On the other hand, Perugia at the moment means a kind of controlled frenzy in which we newly-arrived Americans are caught up.

Inevitably, we try to see it all at once; to absorb in an hour the culture of the ages. And we imagine ourselves as medieval men — as a renaissance painter, for example.

But we also must fulfill strenuous commitments here at the University for Foreigners, and limber up for a year of work in our special fields. And these processes bring us back to reality again — citizens of a modern world, paradoxically profiled, for a brief time, against this ancient setting.

This contrast of the ancient and the modern makes Perugia for me a fascinating, and exciting, and significant place.

(FINISCE IL NASTRO NUMERO DUE):

HOVEY: Well, so help me, I didn't give Marshall Bialosky any coaching on the content of that statement. I hope to continue this story of the American Fulbrighters in the next Letter from Italy.

Graham Hovey reporting. This Letter from Italy was recorded in Perugia and Rome for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 2
Recorded in Rome, October 12, 1954
Tape runs: 13:

54-11-43

(Second of two programs on American Fulbright scholars in Italy).

This is Graham Hovey, recording another Letter from Italy for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- the NAEB Network.

If you had been sitting at a sidewalk cafe along the Corso Vannucci in the hill-set Italian city of Perugia on the bright autumn afternoon of September 26, you soon would have discovered something:

The fifth annual invasion of Perugia by American Fulbright scholars had taken place.

It wasn't that the Americans were dressed improperly or that they behaved badly. Almost without exception, they were dressed as they might be for a Sunday afternoon stroll in early autumn in their home towns in America. And they behaved well.

But dress and behavior nevertheless distinguished them from the thousands of Perugin-ians, who had come out to the Corso to take the air and greet their friends, while strolling the half-kilometer length of the city's main street.

Somehow the Americans seemed more casual -- in both dress and manner -- than even the most casual Italians on the Corso. For the men Fulbrighters the give-away characteristics could be the cuts of both their hair and their sport jackets; the hang of their grey flannels; or their loafer-style shoes. For the girls, too, the low-heeled loafers, the hair-does, and the generally more casual sweaters and skirts were distinguishing.

In addition, many of the Americans started out immediately to soak up in a hurry what-ever Perugia had to offer of historical or cultural value.

With guide books or without, they studied the great Pisano fountain, or gazed at the lovely Gothic communal palace, or wandered into the Cathedral of San Lorenzo, where they claim to have the wedding ring of the Virgin Mary.

Perhaps you remember, from the previous letter from Italy, the summary of these activi-ties of the newly-arrived Fulbrighters by the young composer, Marshall Bialosky, from Cleveland, Ohio, and the faculty of Milton college, Wisconsin:

(COMINCIA UN PEZZO DEL NASTRO NUMERO DUE):

BIALOSKY: Inevitably, we try to see it all at once; to absorb in an hour the culture of the ages. And we imagine ourselves as medieval men; as a renaissance painter, for example . . .

(FINISCE IL NASTRO NUMERO DUE).

HOVEY: So it was obvious that Sunday afternoon that the 1954 American Fulbright group had arrived in Perugia for its month of orientation, prior to scattering across the Italian peninsula for an academic year of work.

The Perugians now take this annual invasion in stride, and no doubt you could have heard many of them along the Corso, saying to one another: "The Americans have come again." And many would be smiling when they said it.

That American group this year numbered more than a hundred. Half a dozen were pro-fessors who would be visiting lecturers at Italian universities. Nine more were persons of professorial rank who had come to Italy to do research in their respective branches of learning.

For the Fulbright grantees in these two categories, the orientation was optional; they had elected to come to Perugia. In some instances they had wished to sharpen their usage of the Italian language in the practical courses at the University for Foreigners. Others had wished to broaden their knowledge of the whole range of Italian life and history -- in short, to get intellectually acclimated before starting the year's work.

After the month at Perugia, Miss Terese Anastasia, supervisor of physical therapy at Bellevue hospital in New York City, would lecture at the University of Rome medical school.

Professor Shepard Clough of the Columbia university history faculty would teach American economic history at the University of Turin. David Weeks, professor of agricultural economics at the University of California, would lecture on land economics at the University of Padua.

Among the research scholars, a Connecticut college history instructor, Miss Irene Neu, would go to the University of Catania, to carry on research on economic relations between Sicily and the United States in the 19th century. A Cornell economist, Professor Alfred Kahn, would conduct research on private and governmental capital formation in Italy since 1945, at the University of Rome.

Professor John Black of Ohio State university would do research in experimental phonetics at Catholic university of Milan.

But the vast majority of the Fulbrighters -- 91 in all -- were in the student category. These were generally younger persons -- many of them June graduates of American colleges and universities. They had competed for -- and won -- more modest Fulbright scholarships for a year of graduate-level work.

Their fields of learning ran the gamut from classics to criminology; from sculpture to physics; from geography to cinematography. Some would do research for masters' theses or Ph. D. dissertations. Others would engage in strictly professional training. In the latter group were 10 painters, 10 voice students and five pianists.

The group included two husband-wife teams. Dante Germino, an M. A. Graduage in political science from Harvard, had received a Fulbright scholarship to study relations between Italian state and party under fascism, at the University of Rome. His wife, Virginia, an M. A. in history from Radcliffe college, had received her grant to study the counter-reform and the Italian baroque, at the same institution. Thomas and Jane Morgan, Ph. D. and M. A., respectively, from the University of Illinois, had received their scholarships to do special research in physics at the University of Milan.

And there was a Catholic priest, Father Richard Schuler, from St. Thomas college of St. Paul, Minn., who would study musicology at the University of Rome.

Inevitably, some of these students would ask, as some of their predecessors had: Why are we brought together as a group for our orientation, given the wide range of our fields of interest? Why the decision to take all of us to Perugia, rather than dividing us into small groups and assigning us to several different Italian university centers?

The Italian Fulbright program is administered by an Italo-American group known as the American Commission for Cultural Exchange with Italy. Its executive secretary, Miss Cipriana Scelba, explains commission thinking about orientation and Perugia.

(COMINCIA IL NASTRO NUMERO TRE):

SCELBA: First, the Commission reached the basic decision that organized orientation was desirable. We thought it would provide quicker adjustment to a new environment; more rapid progress with language proficiency; and more accurate understanding of a foreign people.

It would be impractical and uneconomical to organize special intensive language courses in several different Italian cities. And it would be out of the question to ask distinguished Italian cultural leaders to make several appearances before Fulbright grantees in several different cities.

These were practical reasons why the Commission settled on a single site for the orientation program. In addition, we felt that inevitable hardships involved in a first experience on a foreign continent are better overcome in a group. Members of the Commission staff can become acquainted with all the grantees; assist them with their problems; and advise them on arrangements for their study after the orientation. Grantees meet each other and learn about each other's fields of interest.

Why Perugia? Perugia is a relatively small city. Grantees can come into closer contact with the local population. They can learn Italian ways more easily and have a more realistic idea of Italian life than they could obtain in a big city. Among smaller Italian cities, Perugia is one of the most beautiful and characteristic. It is a medieval town in a lovely landscape; yet, it is bustling with modern activities.

Finally, Perugia has its excellent University for Foreigners, unique in Italy. Its facilities, resources and faculty are available for this special orientation program. And this university's enthusiastic and efficient cooperation has turned what might have been a complicated venture into a smooth-running operation.

(FINISCE IL NASTRO NUMERO TRE).

HOVEY: By having all Fulbrighters together in one place, the Commission has been able to provide orientation lectures and panel discussions of a high order, as well as special intensive language courses. Last year, the Americans heard a discussion on the intellectual in Italian society which had, among its participants, the writer and painter, Carlo Levi, author of Christ Stopped at Eboli. This year, that panel included Italy's best-known theater critic, Silvio d'Amico; the novelist and movie director, Mario Soldati; and Miss Palma Bucarelli, director of Italy's National Gallery of Modern Art.

Dr. Lamberto Borghi, professor of education at the University of Palermo, gave a frank, revealing lecture on Italian education. An economist from the same university, Professor Gabriele Morello, gave two lectures on the Italian economic and social structure.

A highlight this year, as last, was the series of five lectures on the modern history and politics of Italy, by a young historian, Vittorio Gabrieli. Many Fulbrighters thought Professor Gabrieli hit his peak with the lecture devoted to the anti-fascist underground in Italy during World War II. And some guessed, correctly, that Vittorio Gabrieli himself had played a consistent role in that underground, having served time in Mussolini's jails as early as 1940. If you had been in the classroom at Perugia that day, you would have heard Professor Gabrieli say:

(COMINCIA IL NASTRO NUMERO QUATTRO):

GABRIELI: The resistance movement against the Fascist dictatorship culminated in the guerilla warfare of Italian patriots against the Nazi occupiers of the country and their Republican Fascist satellites. After the September 8, 1943, armistice with the Allies, the Italian regular army, betrayed and abandoned by the King, Marshal Badoglio and most of their commanding officers, did not put any resistance to the Germans and either went home or were taken prisoner.

The anti-fascist parties then assumed the leadership of the spontaneous and predominantly civilian movement in the war of national liberation. This was fought by bands of patriots or partisans which rose throughout Italy and, helped by Allied arms, engaged the Germans and the Fascists in frequent and bloody battles.

They numbered about 200,000 men, 47,000 of whom were killed. Moreover, the casualties of the resistance included 19,000 civilians and 35,000 soldiers and officers, who died prisoners.

The significance of the partisan guerilla movement can be assessed under three aspects:

First, psychological. The partisans restored self-confidence and self-respect to the demoralized nation, which went through a kind of new Risorgimento, or resurrection, and sealed with here best citizens' blood her reaffirmation of human and liberal ideals.

Second, military. They gave a substantial contribution to the Allied victory in Italy and to the general war effort by pinning down 12 of the 32 German and Fascist Republican divisions, thus enabling the Allied armies to divert large forces to other operational theaters and, finally, preventing the Germans from organizing their last stand in the Alpine redoubt.

Third, political. The partisan movement provided an inspired new leadership to postwar Italy. It exercised a decisive role in the repudiation of a Fascist-contaminated monarchy by the Italian people; in the setting up of a democratic republic, and regaining for Italy a respected place among the free nations of Europe.

(FINISCE IL NASTRO NUMER QUATTRO).

HOVEY: This year's orientation included lectures on contemporary Italian music, art and literature; one on the Italian press; and two on United States political and economic policy in Italy.

Extras included bus trips to nearby places of interest: Assisi, the city of St. Francis; Siena, Orvieto, Arezzo. Fulbrighters attended the famous sacred music festival, held annually in Perugia.

Inevitably, the whole experience had its impact. Americans learned that one can survive without a daily hot bath. They had to, because Perugia's old aqueduct was ailing and the water supply was short. They soon forgot about peeling Italian grapes, and decided it was safe to eat those wonderful Italian cheeses: Bel Paese, Gorgonzolam Mozzarella. Americans who hadn't walked for pleasure in years got the habit of taking the autumn air along with Peruginians in early evening along the Corso, blocked off for that purpose. Some of the Fulbrighters made great strides with the Italian language.

It was a good bet that most of the hundred-odd Americans would be sorry to have orientation month at Perugia come to an end.

Some would have a genuine impact on the Italian scene. One ex-Fulbrighter, Professor Frank M. Snowden of Howard university in Washington, had recently returned to Italy to be cultural attache at the United States embassy in Rome.

Pianist Aldo Mancinelli of Steubenville, Ohio, who played a concert for fellow Fulbrighters and Peruginians during 1953 orientation, was soloist with Rome's Santa Cecilia symphony orchestra this October, after winning Italy's coveted Busoni prize.

Fulbright singers who also performed at Perugia last year won high praise for their work in Puccini's "Madame Butterfly" in the 1954 autumn opera season at Spoleto. Critics called a Chicago soprano, Edith Lang, one of the season's discoveries.

A 24-year-old Pittsburgh conductor and 1952 Fulbrighter, Lorin Maazel, directed Florence's Maggio Musicale orchestra in its first broadcast concert of the fall season.

And so it probably would be with some 1954 Fulbrighters.

When Congress established the Fulbright scholarships it said their objectives were: "To promote better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries."

This reporter would guess that many of the hundred-odd Americans who invaded Perugia that afternoon of September 26 would contribute something toward those goals.

Graham Hovey reporting. This second of two Letters from Italy on the Fulbright scholars of 1954 was recorded in Perugia and Rome for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey — Letter from Italy No. 3
NAEB Network
Recorded in Rome, October 28, 1954 54-11-44
Tape runs: 13:40

(First in a series on the current Italian political scene).

This is Graham Hovey, recording in Rome a radio Letter from Italy for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters — the NAEB Network.

As I record these lines, the government of Italy, headed by Mario Scelba as prime minister, has just won its fourth parliamentary vote of confidence in as many weeks.

On none of those four occasions was the Scelba government in serious danger of being turned out of office. Three of the four votes — one in the senate and two in the chamber of deputies — gave Signor Scelba his biggest majorities since he formed his cabinet last February 10.

Those were not whopping majorities, to be sure. The party lineups in both chamber and senate since the national elections of 1953 make it impossible for any middle-road Italian government to count on comfortable margins. When the democratic parties backing the Scelba government can keep their ranks intact to a man they can muster sure majorities of only eight votes in the chamber and six in the senate.

In its least impressive showing in the four votes of confidence I have cited, the Scelba government had a margin of 17 votes in a senate of 237 members. And in each of its tests in the chamber, the government mustered 30 more votes than its combined opposition of political left and right.

This meant that the four parties supporting the government had kept their lines intact; that when the chips were down, the democratic coalition rebuilt by Signor Scelba under difficult circumstances nine months ago could still hang together and permit the government to function.

Thus, these four confidence votes should have been what the term implies: they should have bolstered the confidence of both government and country; they should have constituted entries on the credit side of the ledger for middle-road, democratic government.

This should have been true especially because two of those confidence votes directly concerned the settlement, at last, of the Trieste question, which is deeply felt by nearly all Italians.

It is true that few Italians are entirely satisfied with the settlement, which leaves so much of Istria and many Italian nationals under Yugoslav rule. But I think most Italians concede that the settlement was the best Italy could hope for under present circumstances.

Thus, the government had every right to hope that the return to Italy of the Adriatic port city would be regarded as a victory for the course of patience and firmness which it has followed. And this victory could hardly fail to embarrass the government's critics of the Communist-dominated left and the neo-Fascist and ultra-nationalist right.

The tub-thumpers of the political right were confronted with the hard fact that quiet, patient diplomacy had achieved something that the street riots and tough talk and bellicose postures of a year ago could not achieve.

As for the Communists, their position on Trieste had long ago become ludicrous, because of the compulsion to follow the twists and turns of the Moscow line. When Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito was the favorite son of the Kremlin in 1945, the Italian Communists urged workers of Trieste to greet Tito's troops as "liberators." When Tito was cast out by the Kremlin in 1948, the Italian Communists had to do a quick flip-flop, along with their

comrades in the other Cominform countries. And soon they were denouncing Tito as a dictator and howling indignantly about his persecution of Italian nationals in the Yugoslav zone of the Trieste Free Territory.

During the recent parliamentary debate, Communist orators up to the eleventh hour were denouncing the Trieste settlement as a "sellout" to the United States and the Atlantic community. Then once again by telling the United Nations the Soviet Union took "due note" of the agreement as one that would reduce tensions in that part of Europe. So the Italian Communists found themselves in an untenable position and their orators immediately stopped talking about Trieste.

For these reasons, as I say, one would have expected the Scelba government to emerge from these four votes of confidence at the peak of its popularity and prestige. And there were other factors in the Italian political picture which ordinarily would serve to strengthen the government at this point.

On the foreign policy front there were the London and Paris conferences of the nine Atlantic community nations, which produced more than many Italians expected, after the killing of the European Defense Community in the French National assembly.

These agreements, for giving sovereignty and eventually arms to West Germany, and for bringing that republic and Italy into the Brussels treaty seemed to be favorably received by Italians. They were something of a political victory for a new Liberal foreign minister, Gaetano Martino, who seems to be making a substantial impression on the Italian public.

On the domestic front, there were evidences this autumn of a gradual upturn in the Italian economy. It was nothing to be jubilant about, and economists doubted that it would make any substantial dent in the hard core of 2,300,000 unemployed in the near future. But there was a quickening of the economic pace in Italy and an alert government might have turned it to political advantage.

I have already cited the demonstrated ability of the four democratic parties to hang together to protect the government's narrow parliamentary majority. But there was a negative political factor this autumn that also served to ease the government's situation. During the summer, the long-anticipated split in the Monarchist party became a fact. The mayor of Naples, Achille Lauro, who had been president of the National Monarchist party and chief contributor to its treasury, resigned and formed a new group called the Popular Monarchist party. The bulk of the Monarchist members of parliament remained loyal to the old party and its secretary, Alfredo Covelli, Lauro's bitter enemy. But Lauro did manage to take a few Monarchist parliamentarians with him. This Monarchist split was reflected in the majorities achieved by Signor Scelba in those four confidence votes I have cited.

The old Monarchist party, as usual, took an official stand against the government. But when the senate voted on the Trieste issue, one Monarchist voted for the government and 14 others left the chamber to avoid taking a stand. Seven Monarchists abstained in one of the votes in the chamber of deputies and on the other occasion several of them supported Signor Scelba.

To sum up, while the democratic party lines were holding fast, the pressure against the government from the political right was lessening somewhat because of the split in Monarchist ranks.

These, then, were fairly impressive assets for a hard-pressed government: the return of Trieste; moderate new success for Italy's pro-European, pro-Atlantic community foreign policy; a slight gain in the Italian economy; concrete evidences of solid support from the middle-road democratic parties, and a weakening of the government's opposition from the political right.

Yet, this American reporter, returning to the Rome political arena after an absence of a couple of months, was immediately struck by the degree of uneasiness in government and democratic party ranks, in spite of these impressive political credits.

It seemed obvious to political men that the government was, overall, in a weaker position before the country than it had been when the parliament quit Rome for its summer recess.

Some of its best friends harbored grave doubts about the course the government had followed on certain matters.

It was obvious that all was not well within the democratic party coalition, despite the unity of the Scelba cabinet and the solidarity demonstrated in parliament.

Cabinet ministers of the Liberal and Social Democratic parties were still completely loyal to Premier Scelba. But they and their Republican party allies were having fresh doubts about the loyalty to the coalition government of Scelba's own Christian Democratic party.

It seemed evident, at one point, that Scelba shared these doubts. In speaking to Christian Democratic members of the chamber of deputies, the premier pointedly called for a stricter cooperation between party and government.

But in spite of repeated pledges for such cooperation by the party secretary, Amintore Fanfani, it was obvious that the Christian Democrats were again suffering from their chronic ailment, factional differences. The right wing of the party was again charging the government with laxity toward the Communists. Some members of Fanfani's left-center "Democratic Initiative" faction were saying that the party secretary was actually dissatisfied with Signor Scelba and would soon make another bid for the premiership himself.

And as though the internal troubles of Italy's biggest party were not enough, a deep-seated split in the government-supporting Liberal party came to the surface again, with the resignation of three left-wing Liberals from the party directorate.

There was not doubt in anyone's mind as to the beneficiary of this uneasiness, uncertainty and confusion. The beneficiary was the group that can always exploit conditions of uneasiness, uncertainty and confusion. The beneficiary was the Communist party.

There was striking unanimity among democratic party politicians on one thing: the belief that the Communists were stronger in Italy this autumn than ever before.

In light of the embarrassing political somersaults they had performed on the deeply-felt Trieste issue this might seem incredible. But some Italian democrats conceded gloomily that if new national elections were held now, the Communists and their left Socialist allies might poll as much as 40 per cent of the total vote, compared with 35 per cent in 1953. And all its supporters agreed that it would be perilous for the government coalition to call new elections at this time.

The Communists, of course, had created a part of that national uneasiness and confusion which they were now exploiting. By the incessant use of their powerful propaganda machine, they had turned the mysterious death of an obscure young woman into a case that shook the government. I refer to the celebrated Wilma Montesi case.

I would guess that this case has been covered thoroughly enough in American newspapers to eliminate the need for extensive summary here. The facts are these: Signorina Montesi's drowned body was found April 11, 1953, on a beach 20 miles south of Rome. It was subsequently charged that she had been thrown into the sea by friends who believed her dead after she had fainted at a drug orgy in a nearby hunting lodge. It was implied that persons high in government circles were involved.

A self-appointed "marquis" named Ugo Montagna was linked with the case — and the Communists promptly exploited a photograph of Premier Scelba with Montagna at a wedding reception. The chief of Italy's national police, Dr. Tomasso Pavone, was mentioned and resigned under fire. The Communists exploited the fact that for several years Pavone's boss had been Signor Scelba, who was — and is — minister of the interior, in charge of the national police and carabinieri. The 32-year-old son of Italy's foreign minister, Attilio Piccioni, was charged by a young woman with having been the "assassin" for a dope ring allegedly headed by Montagna. Signor Piccioni resigned from the cabinet September 18 and three days later his son, Giampiero, was arrested and charged with manslaughter, "aggravated by the use of drugs," in the Montesi case. Montagna and a former Rome police chief were also arrested.

That is where the matter stands at the time this program is recorded. It should be noted that not one shred of evidence has been introduced by anyone that links Premier Scelba with the Montesi case or any mishandling of the affair by the police. Not a shred of evidence has suggested any implication of Attilio Piccioni. But Scelba was interior minister, and thus head of the police, at the time the Montesi girl's body was found, and he had posed for a picture at a reception with Ugo Montagna. And Signor Piccioni was the father of the young man arrested for manslaughter in the case; a father who had publicly proclaimed his faith in the son's innocence.

That was all the Communists needed; that was a formidable political stick [illegible] with which to beat the government in a country where people have historic reasons for suspecting corruption in government. The Communists were not alone in this effort. In fact, some of the most sensational charges in the case originated with a magazine whose political orientation was ultra right-wing.

Persons who have known him well over many years say there is no more honest man in Italian public life than Mario Scelba. But even some of his friends and strong supporters believe his government could have handled the Montesi case with greater political skill.

Somehow, the government seemed to get itself on the defensive. There is no evidence that any government minister ever interfered in any way with the Italian judiciary's handling of the case. But somehow, the government failed to get across to the people its true attitude, which was, in effect: "This is a matter for the judicial handling, not the political arena. Justice will take its course and let the chips fall where they may." Some critics say that Signor Piccioni should never have taken the job of foreign minister at the time the Scelba government was formed last February, because his son's name had already been mentioned in the Montesi case.

It is evident that much damage has been done to the standing of the Scelba government and, therefore, to the Italian democracy by this affair. A Rome correspondent of the great Turin newspaper, La Stampa, remarked recently that neither the Trieste accord "nor the other great problems of international relations on tap have, in the least, distracted political attention from . . . the Montesi affair." And another writer for the same newspaper warned that in light of the Montesi case it would be "simple-mindedness" to conclude that the government had emerged, reinforced, from the votes of confidence.

But, as I indicated earlier, the Montesi case is not the only factor in the present degree of uneasiness in Italian government and democratic party ranks.

I hope to examine these other factors in subsequent Letters from Italy.

Graham Hovey reporting. This Letter from Italy was recorded in Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters — and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey — Letter from Italy No. 4
NAEB Network
Recorded in Rome, October 29, 1954
Tape runs: 13:40

54-11-45

(Second in a series on the current Italian political scene).

This is Graham Hovey, recording in Rome a radio Letter from Italy for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters — the NAEB Network.

There is an unoccupied desk in the center of the last row of the hemicycle in the Italian chamber of deputies these days. And as he sits at the ministerial bench in the well of the chamber, amid a rising political storm, Italy's premier probably ponders the significance of that empty desk for the fate of his government.

It was the desk of Italy's leading statesman of post-World War II years, Alcide de Gasperi. Its location seemed symbolic of the middle-road course which De Gasperi charted for the young Italian republic during eight years as premier.

That course was ever a rocky one, even for De Gasperi. It had become increasingly rocky for his successors since the 1953 elections failed to return a clear-cut majority for the middle-road democratic parties.

Since De Gasperi's unexpected death last August 19, that course has become rockier than ever for Italy's present premier, Mario Scelba.

Few of Scelba's present difficulties stem directly from the absence of De Gasperi. Most of Scelba's problems would still be with him, even if the tall, gaunt man were still there at his desk in the center of the last row.

For example, De Gasperi hardly could have eased the impact of the celebrated Wilma Montesi case on the Scelba government. It had figured in newspaper headlines and political gossip for months before he died.

His counsel might have aided Premier Scelba when Attilio Piccioni resigned as foreign minister to defend his son, who since has been arrested on a manslaughter charge in the Montesi death. But it is doubtful that De Gasperi could have helped the situation, beyond adding his own respected voice to those pointing out that no evidence had implicated Scelba, Piccioni, or any other government minister.

On the foreign policy front, the death of the European Defense community treaty in the French assembly had been a blow to the Scelba government. Perhaps more than any other nation involved, Italy had directed its foreign policy efforts toward an integrated Europe. Yet, De Gasperi could not have saved the EDC treaty. The fact is that on the day he died he was in a state of despair because he could see EDC going down the political drain.

Still, as Premier Scelba sits there in the chamber, absorbing verbal blows from left and right — and some from the sector of his own Christian Democratic party — he undoubtedly wishes often that he could look back and see that familiar lean figure with the hawk nose at the now-vacant desk.

There would be strong personal reasons for such wishes, of course. Although Scelba was 20 years younger than De Gasperi, the two men entered the Italian political picture at about the same time in the ranks of the Popular party, the forerunner of today's Christian Democracy. In the early 1920s, they worked together as lieutenants of the founder of the Popular party, the ~~XXXX~~ Sicilian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo. Both were active in the anti-fascist underground. Both helped build the new Christian Democratic party during and after World War II. And Scelba had served as interior minister in De Gasperi cabinets for six years.

So much for the personal ties between the two men. There would be equally strong political reasons why Scelba would miss De Gasperi. And these political factors would be far more important for the fate of the Italian democracy than any personal ones.

These political factors are related to the kind of party the Christian Democracy is and the kind of leadership necessary to hold it together. This is a subject to which a political reporter in Italy must return again and again. It goes far toward explaining the pattern of governmental behavior in Italy in these years since World War II. And it goes far toward explaining the uneasiness and confusion in the current political picture — uneasiness and confusion that menace not only the Scelba government, but the existence of the Italian democracy itself.

For it cannot be said too often that the Christian Democracy is a heterogeneous party of several sharply-divided factions. It might be more accurate to say that the Christian Democracy is really several parties grouped together under one banner. An outsider concludes that the chief ingredients of the cement that has held this remarkable party together have been three: first, not so much a common religion as a common religious-political attitude; second, effective leadership; and third, its striking early success at the polls, in postwar elections.

But in the weeks and months after its relative setback in the 1953 election, it seemed to this reporter that the Christian Democracy was held together mostly by the patience and prestige and political power of Alcide de Gasperi.

Not even De Gasperi could dictate to such a conglomerate party — a fact some of his critics often forgot. But he could prod and pacify, coax and cajole, soothe and scold. And on occasion, he could threaten some wayward faction with graphic reminders of the high cost to party and country of genuine defection.

Here was a measure of the man's deep concern for party and country: at the age of 72, in the wake of his humiliating defeat in an attempt to form a government after the 1953 election, De Gasperi took on the onerous job of party secretary. It was not immodesty that led him to tell friends privately that he might be the only man who could hold the party together.

It was De Gasperi who backed Scelba's contention last January that the way to resolve Italy's festering political crisis was by reconstructing the old De Gasperi coalition of the four middle-road democratic parties. This came after the fall of the government of Giuseppe Pella, based on cooperation with the Monarchist party, and the abortive attempt of Amintore Fanfani to form a cabinet composed solely of Christian Democrats.

There was a vivid illustration at that time of the fissures in the ranks of the Christian Democracy. For in spite of De Gasperi's strenuous efforts, the party's directorate approved this policy of democratic coalition government by a margin of only seven votes. There were 122 favorable votes to 115 opposed, and with four abstentions.

Scelba had to pay a substantial price for the participation in his cabinet of Liberals and Social Democrats, and for the 38 votes these two parties plus the Republicans could give him in the Chamber of Deputies.

It was only with the strong support of De Gasperi that Scelba could win grudging consent from his own party to give his minor partners key cabinet portfolios: public instruction and industry and commerce for the Liberals: finance, public works, labor and social welfare to the Social Democrats.

It was particularly galling to the Christian Democrats to surrender the public instruction ministry to a representative of the historically anti-clerical Liberal party. That was a concession most political observers doubted that the great Catholic party would ever make.

But Scelba, a devout Catholic himself, stood up to his party on these matters and, with the help of De Gasperi, he won its support for his coalition cabinet.

In writing a Letter from Italy last March about prospects for the new Scelba government, I said that the premier's number one political problem would probably be his own party.

On that occasion, I wrote: "Scelba's success, or lack of it, will certainly hinge to a great extent on how well De Gasperi . . . is able to hold the Christian Democracy in line for him."

Now De Gasperi is gone and there is no one who can replace him and lesser men are doing their best to hold the cover on a political pot that is simmering, if not yet boiling.

It is not only the Christian Democratic pot that is simmering, to be sure. The deep split in the government-supporting Liberal party came to the surface again this summer when three members of the left faction resigned from the directorate. Some left-wing Social Democrats are criticizing their leader, Vice Premier Giuseppe Saragat, for being too vigorous in his defense of the Scelba government. Even in the tiny Republican party there is dissension over whether it would be better actually to participate in the government or continue the present policy of remaining aloof but supporting Scelba in parliament.

But it is the Christian Democracy — still by far the largest of Italy's parties — that holds the real power of life or death over the Scelba government. And therefore it is the simmering in his own party that is causing Scelba his greatest concern.

The strong man of the Christian Democracy is now Amintore Fanfani, who belongs to a different political generation than Scelba. Fanfani's left-center "Democratic Initiative" faction took decisive control of the party machinery at the national congress in Naples in late June, not without leaving some political scars.

This development marked the end of one chapter in post-World War II Italian politics and the beginning of another. For the younger men of the "Democratic Initiative" had come to their majorities during the Fascist period and inevitably had been influenced by that fact. The older followers of De Gasperi, as I have said, came out of the old Popular party, with its anti-fascist tradition. Mario Scelba was one of the youngest members of this Old Guard and is virtually its only survivor still in high party and government position.

Fanfani took over the party secretaryship a month prior to De Gasperi's death, with the official blessing of the elder statesman. But De Gasperi remained by far the most influential figure in the party.

As labor minister, agriculture minister and, finally, interior minister in the cabinets of De Gasperi and Pella, the 46-year-old Fanfani demonstrated great energy and administrative ability. He has a flair for dramatizing causes and programs — and for not underplaying his own role in them. Thus, a public housing program for workers, launched while he was labor minister, became known as "the Fanfani program." And thus a 31-page booklet on the land reform program, issued while he was agriculture minister, contained no less than seven photographs of Signor Fanfani.

These qualities unquestionably stand Fanfani in good stead as he goes up and down the Italian peninsula, trying to spark new enthusiasm and new organizing efforts by the local units of the Christian Democracy.

But Fanfani has yet to demonstrate the patience and the knack for promoting cohesion that enabled De Gasperi to hold the party together. In fact, he has the reputation for being impatient — a young man in a hurry — and that has contributed to the current political uneasiness and confusion.

Unless something totally unforeseen happens, Fanfani one day will again [illegible] democratic la
Italy's premier. But it has been understood that he would not make his move until the election of a new president of the republic next April. In the meantime, he was expected to devote his efforts to strengthening the party organization and supporting the Scelba coalition.

Now political observers are not so sure Fanfani will wait. Some of Fanfani's followers have told newsmen that he is not impressed with Scelba's record to date and is critical of the government's handling of the Wilma Montesi affair. Fanfani's stock speech these days is a call for the democratic forces in Italy to regain the initiative. He has given it so often and with such emphasis as to suggest to some that he blames the Scelba government for losing the initiative.

Whether Fanfani himself holds this view or not, it is held strongly by prominent Christian Democrats who agree on little else. Thus, Premier Scelba finds himself being attacked openly and with increasing vigor by the right wing of his own party for not cracking down hard enough on the Communists, whose strength in the country seems still to be rising. And he finds himself assailed by a left wing faction of the party for not pushing ahead rapidly enough with social and economic reforms.

One of the leaders of the Christian Democracy's right wing bloc is a 50-year-old deputy from Tuscany, Giuseppe Togni. He is making it clear that he would welcome the assistance of the Monarchists and the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement in an all-out effort against the Communists. It was Togni who provoked the Communists to start the disgraceful riot in the chamber of deputies October 19. In the excitement over the riot it was often overlooked that the real objective of Togni's speech was to attack the Scelba government for not dealing vigorously enough with the Reds.

A few days after Togni's attack from the right, Scelba heard new thunder from the left sector of the Christian Democracy. Giulio Pastore, leader of the Christian Democratic labor union, charged that the government's slow progress on economic and social reforms was endangering the democratic system. Pastore said the Scelba ministry still had not proved that "the country was right in looking upon them as men capable of stopping a dangerous decline in the public's confidence in democracy."

The question is: Can Amintore Fanfani hold such rebellious — and opposed — factions as those led by Togni and Pastore in line behind the Scelba government? And a corollary question is: Does Fanfani actually wish to hold the party behind Scelba? Or does he share the dissatisfaction with Scelba to such an extent that he might risk bringing the government down; ending the democratic coalition; and trying to replace it with some other combination?

For the moment, Fanfani is still supporting the democratic coalition and Mario Scelba.

As for Scelba, he must be pondering once again the fickle aspects of political life. His government will be remembered as the one that negotiated the return of coveted Trieste to Italy. His foreign minister participated in the momentous decisions at London and Paris for bolstering the defenses of western Europe. He has been proved right in his contention that his partners of the other democratic parties would remain steadfast to the coalition cabinet which he heads. His eight months in office have witnessed a gradual upturn in the Italian economy. He has just won four consecutive votes of confidence in parliament by margins greater than the party lineups in senate and chamber would indicate are possible.

He must wonder, now and then, what political life in Italy might have been like this autumn had it not been for two things over which he had no control:

1. The death in Tyrhennian sea waters south of Rome of an obscure young woman named Wilma Montesi.

2 2. The death in Trentino in August of the gaunt, brooding man who occupied the now-vacant desk in the center of the last row in the chamber of deputies: the man called Alcide de Gasperi.

Graham Hovey reporting. This second of two letters from Italy on the Italian political scene was recorded in Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters — and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 1
Recorded in Rome November 18, 1953
Runs 14:07 minutes with NAEB signoff

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This is Graham Hovey, reporting from Rome and sending your way the first in a new series of Letters from Italy. These programs are being produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana, the Italian radio and television network.

When I left the United States to come to Italy a couple of months ago I had the distinct impression that the Italian government formed in August by Giuseppe Pella was only a caretaker cabinet; just a government formed to end the long summer political crisis; a cabinet to carry on the national administration and get the national budget through parliament by the October 31 deadline.

When I arrived in Italy, however, I found that many Italians were coming to regard Signor Pella as a mighty durable prime minister, and that they expected his government to last a long time. I found that Italians had been reading and hearing much about Signor Pella and that many of them liked what they read and heard. And I discovered something else that surprised me: Signor Pella's predecessor -- Alcide de Gasperi, who headed Italy's postwar governments for nearly eight years -- appeared to be very much out of the picture; definitely confined to the sidelines for the time being, at least.

So, I, too, got interested in Giuseppe Pella. I read everything I could find about him and interviewed political leaders of many different factions and viewpoints on what they thought and expected of him.

I am devoting this Letter from Italy to the head man of Italy's government for several reasons: first, barring always the possibility

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that the Trieste issue will backfire on him, Signor Pella seems likely to be the prime minister for some time; second, Pella has been very much in the news -- in America as well as in Italy -- in connection with the Trieste question; and third, and perhaps most important for the long-run, Pella's behavior in office; the political direction he takes may go far in determining the future of the eight-year-old Italian democracy.

Until he became prime minister, most Italians thought of Signor Pella as a rather colorless political figure. Perhaps it was because of the jobs he had held in De Gasperi cabinets since 1946; jobs having to do entirely with public finance, with the national budget, and with the control of inflation. Those are technical subjects, whose details are little understood by laymen, or even by legislators.

Pella always presented his financial problems and policies to the parliament in a rather non-political way. He was mostly explaining, rather than exhorting. There was no call for him to be a political orator, and he didn't choose to be one.

That helps explain the dilemma of an Italian journalist, Italo Pietra, who was assigned to do an article on Pella, when the latter was running for re-election to the Chamber of Deputies from a Piedmont district last spring. Signor Pietra finally started his article this way:

"Now that I am prepared to write something about him, I ask myself if it is possible to interest the man in the street in the figure of the Hon. Giuseppe Pella."

Well, as I have indicated, Signor Pietra would have less trouble

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today. It has been quite possible to interest the Italian man in the street in Signor Pella ever since August 24. That was the date on which Italy's long cabinet crisis was ended when the Chamber of Deputies gave a vote of confidence to a new government with Pella as prime minister, foreign minister and budget minister.

Actually, Giuseppe Pella was never the colorless figure many Italians thought him to be so long as he was cooped up in the melancholy palace on Rome's Via XX Settembre that houses the ministries of finance, treasury and budget.

In fact, since Pella's assumption of the premiership, many Italian journalists have discovered that his life history to date constitutes -- in their words -- a "typical American success story."

By that they mean that he was a poor boy who pulled himself up by his Piedmontese bootstraps, first to remarkable success in the business world, then to even more remarkable success in the political arena -- a kind of Italian Horatio Alger type.

If Pella was not born in a log cabin, at least he was born, 51 years ago, to poor farmer parents in the village of Valdengo in the Piedmont province of Vercelli. As a boy he helped in the fields, looked after chickens, and took the family's one cow out to pasture.

He was so brilliant in his elementary school work that his teacher -- one Don Ferrarotti -- convinced his parents they should make every possible sacrifice to enable him to get an education. So the parents left the land and both father and mother became textile factory workers to make this possible.

Working at odd jobs all the while, young Pella completed the work for his diploma in accounting at 18 and took his degree in economics and commerce from the University of Turin at 22.

Then he took a teaching job in a technical school at Biella, but simultaneously launched an independent professional career as a business consultant.

What happened immediately after that really is straight out of Horatio Alger. A few years after taking his university degree, Pella was consultant to the most substantial industries in his home city of Biella. Before he was 30 he had as clients the main textile industries of north Italy.

It has been said that from about 1930 until the outbreak of World War II there was no important European conference of woolen manufacturers which Pella did not attend.

While establishing himself in business, Pella apparently put aside an interest in politics he had developed as a university student. He served one term as vice-mayor of Biella in the mid-1930s, which indicates that at that point he was not openly and militantly anti-Fascist. But friends say he did this out of civic duty to straighten out the commune's finances.

The Catholic bishop of Biella generally gets the credit for persuading Pella to get into politics under the banner of the Christian Democratic party after the war. Pella got the most votes in a Biella city election in March, 1946, and was elected to the Italian constituent assembly that June.

As I have indicated, his political rise was even more spectacular than his business career. He was first chosen secretary of the parliamentary finance and treasury commission. In October of 1946 he became undersecretary of finance in the second De Gasperi cabinet, and in 1947 he was appointed finance minister.

It was in this period that Pella came under the wing of his fellow Piedmontese, Luigi Einaudi, who then was budget minister. Einaudi was a lifelong Liberal and Pella a Christian Democrat, but they got on famously with regard to Italy's financial problems.

Einaudi was elected the first regular President of the Italian republic in 1948. On his recommendation De Gasperi appointed Pella to replace him as treasury and budget minister. Pella has held this job -- which makes him a kind of czar over the Italian economy -- ever since.

Until President Einaudi summoned him in August and asked him to form a government, Pella was chiefly known in Italy for the policy known as the "defense of the lira." This was a hardboiled, hard currency, anti-inflation policy.

Its impact on parliament was softened to some extent by the calm manner and moderate language with which Pella explained and defended it. But the "Pella line," as it is known, brought some grumbling in the country and some criticism as being too rigid. In 1951 the policy seemed to be in serious danger, but Pella threatened to resign and, in the end, De Gasperi backed him up.

Abroad, Pella was known as Italy's representative on the Organizatinn for European Economic Cooperation, which determined Marshall Plan

allocations. He advocated a common European market and presented the "Pella plan" for achieving it. He served as Italy's governor on the International Monetary Fund.

So much, then, for the basic facts about the life of Italy's new prime minister. They have been embellished since he took office by anecdotes and legends which inevitably crop up around a successful politician.

Those of you who have been accosted by black market money changers in Rome might appreciate this one: Pella was approached in the Piazza Colonna one morning by one of these traders, who offered to sell him a hundred American dollars.

And the Italian minister of treasury and budget replied: "Thank you, no." Then he smiled and added, to the black marketeer: "You see, I also sell dollars."

To demonstrate Pella's shrewdness in fending off delicate questions they tell of a journalist who recently asked the prime minister bluntly: "Do you think it is possible that new elections will be held shortly?" And Pella replied: "Certainly I consider it possible -- if necessary."

An Italian political writer described Pella's ability in parliamentary debate in these words: "His dialectic is rather like fencing: closed guard, elegant feints, lightning poste and riposte that draw applause from a hostile Assembly and a smile from the Hon. Secchia (meaning Communist leader Pietro Secchia)."

But another journalist adds that Pella, while a skillful debater, "does not like to exasperate his adversaries." He invariably retains his amiability.

To illustrate this, Italians say that Pella always pays the most careful and respectful attention during the speeches of Socialist Deputy Riccardo Lombardi, often regarded as the most skillful and knowledgeable opponent of the Pella financial policies.

A whole host of homely Pella sayings somewhat reminiscent of Poor Richard's Almanac have circulated as the result of his years as the anti-inflationary budget minister. This is said to be one of his own favorites: "It is true that when prices go up, then wages must go up, too. But let us remember that while the prices take the elevator, wages climb up the stairs on foot."

By way of illustrating the Italian tendency to optimism to American Ambassador Clare Boothe Luce, Pella pointed to a half-empty pack of cigarettes on the table.

"The pessimist," Pella explained, "will say, I have only ten left; but the optimist will say, I still have ten left. This is our optimism."

In spite of all the information available about him and all these supposedly revealing anecdotes, Pella remains something of a political mystery man.

As I say, this is due partly to the fact that as budget minister he behaved in a conciliatory, non-political manner. It is also due to the fact that to date as prime minister he has shied away from decisions on most controversial Italian political questions.

His official viewpoints are well known. He has reiterated them since becoming premier. But how hard he would fight for anything except the "defense of the Lira" policy few Italian politicians profess to know.

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Even members of his own party are in doubt about this because Pella never has been clearly identified with the Left, Center or Right-wing factions that make up the Christian Democracy.

Pella appointed two prominent Left Wing Christian Democrats to important cabinet jobs -- Interior Minister Amintore Fanfani and Defense Minister Paolo Taviani. But he won his parliamentary majority with the help of the 40 Monarchist votes in the Chamber of Deputies -- and he knows these were not given for nothing.

Pella emphasizes that Italy's foreign policy is based on the Atlantic alliance and western European solidarity. But he has threatened to resign and has hinted that Italy might not ratify the European army treaty unless he gets satisfaction on the Trieste issue.

Pella stands for a western European federation, but those working most actively in this movement do not expect him to push it with anything like the vigor of De Gasperi.

Pella is officially for the "Cassa per Il Mezziogiorno" program -- the longrange agricultural reform and rehabilitation plan for Italy's south -- but many Italians interested in that program believe it will lag or come to a halt under Pella's administration.

His critics believe Pella has avoided decisive action on major Italian political questions because he is a compromiser and political manipulator motivated mostly by the desire to remain in office.

But an outsider is apt to be more impressed by the present delicate balance in the Italian parliament; a political fact of life which Pella cannot afford to forget for a moment.

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The question seems to be this: Could Pella in fact have behaved to date much differently than he has, given his slim majority?

It may well be that Pella has delayed meeting head-on some of the most controversial Italian political issues because he must depend on the support of conservative Monarchists for survival. But he must depend on that Monarchist support in part because the Social Democrats -- who are doing some of the criticizing -- withheld their 19 Chamber votes from Pella when his government was constituted.

It is a sad political fact that the parties of the Center and moderate Left -- the pro-western parties that made up the former De Gasperi coalition -- simply didn't get enough votes last June 7. So, Pella for the time being must depend on the Monarchists. That may account in part for his caution and for his desire to keep his government as non-political as possible.

And even his critics concede that the country would be in a genuine political crisis if Pella were to fall in the near future. That helps account for the duration of his political honeymoon with all parties, including even those of the far Left.

But that honeymoon now seems to be drawing to a close. Pella still seems to be very strong with the country. But political sniping has begun in parliament, where the fate of the new government will be decided.

The Communists and Left Socialists, who once praised Pella for sounding what they called a "new tone of national dignity," have discovered that the whole thing is not so new after all.

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Republican leader Randolfo Pacciardi, former defense minister, has charged that Pella's projection of the Trieste issue may weaken the Atlantic alliance and isolate Italy at a critical moment.

Mario Paggi, writing in the Liberal weekly, Il Mondo, has called Pella's government "a sphinx whose face no one attempts to decipher for fear of the worst."

And a fact perhaps not widely known outside Italy was that Pella's own party, the Christian Democracy, didn't want him for the job in the first place. He was chosen in fact, as well as officially, by President Einaudi.

Still, as I have indicated, no party seems to wish to provoke another cabinet crisis at present. Thus the end of the political honeymoon does not necessarily mean the end of Pella; not by any means.

Actually, Pella's fate probably will depend almost entirely on what happens with regard to the explosive situation in Trieste. I hope to examine this question in a subsequent Letter from Italy.

This is Graham Hovey reporting. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radio Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Tape Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 2
Recorded in Rome November 18, 1953
Runs 14:25 with NAEB signoff

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This is Graham Hovey, sending along another Letter from Italy under a Rome dateline. These programs are produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana.

In a previous Letter I reviewed the background and examined the political position of Italy's new prime minister, Giuseppe Pella. I concluded that Signor Pella's political honeymoon as premier was about over. But I added that the end of the honeymoon did not necessarily mean the end of the Pella government.

I believe, however, that the end of the Pella honeymoon could coincide with the end of the Pella government unless Italy gets some kind of satisfaction soon on the politically-explosive question of Trieste.

Let's be a bit more specific: Signor Pella will surely be in deep political trouble if it becomes apparent that the United States and Britain are unable to carry out, at least in part, their decision of October 8 to transfer Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste to Italy. And the young and delicate Italian democracy will be in trouble, too.

It is difficult to get across to most Americans how deeply most Italians feel about this matter of Trieste. It is a feeling that cuts across the lines of parties and factions; a feeling that seems to affect Italians from north to south and all the way up and down the social and economic scale.

It would be quite wrong for Americans to conclude from this that

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all Italians are ready to grab a gun and go off to fight for Trieste. They aren't.

It would be quite wrong to conclude that all Italians support the moves taken by the Pella government over the last few months to get satisfaction on Trieste. They don't.

Nevertheless, the feeling over Trieste goes very deep. Almost any Italian you meet on the street has that World War I casualty figure of 680,000 dead to throw at you as evidence of what Italy has sacrificed for Trieste. For Trieste over the years became a kind of symbol of the completion of the belated unification of the nation of Italy.

If you should think that this feeling is concentrated among ultra-nationalist Italians, then listen for a moment to words written recently by Carlo Antoni in one of the most responsible of Italian newspapers -- the middle-road Liberal weekly, Il Mondo. Signor Antoni wrote:

"The Italian people were able to lose, without batting an eyelash, those African colonies that were costly and also sentimentally dear; were able to renounce with serenity the Aegean islands; were even able, with grief, to endure the loss of Zara, Fiume, Pola, Rovigno and Parenzo -- all Italian cities. But Trieste? No, it was not possible to lose it."

"There are," said Antoni, "humiliations to the soul of nations that are not committed with impunity..." To lose Trieste, he said, would have forced Italians to disown, as an unpardonable error, their

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participation in World War I because "the most pure and deeply-felt reason" for that entry was the completion of the Italian Risorgimento; the unification of the nation.

The loss of Trieste, wrote Signor Antoni, would have signified the "definitive condemnation" of the idealism of Mazzini, with his goal of the liberation of oppressed nationalities. And finally, in Antoni's opinion, the loss of Trieste would have signified the renunciation by Italy of belief "in the values which anchor that western civilization, to which we belong and wish to belong."

I have quoted from Signor Antoni's article in Il Mondo at such length not to suggest that there is only the Italian side to the Trieste question, and not with the notion of publicizing the Italian case. I have cited this comment by a responsible journalist only to indicate the depth and breadth of this feeling of Italians about Trieste. I have quoted from this article because it helps to explain why the Pella government will have trouble surviving if it cannot get some satisfaction on the Trieste issue; and shy, if Pella should fall because of this issue, the eight-year-old Italian democracy will be in trouble, too.

For if it is true that most Italians feel deeply that Trieste belongs to Italy, it is also true that the present frustrating situation on the Trieste question plays into the hands of Italian political extremists.

It is the ever-bolder neo-Fascists and their occasional allies in the Monarchist party who are most ready and willing to fan the fires of Italian nationalism over issue of Trieste. And the Communists and their

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allies are quite willing, as unobtrusively as possible, to help stoke those flames. They are willing because they see in Trieste a possible means of wrenching Italy away from the policy of western European solidarity; away from the Atlantic alliance and the European Defense Community, the Schuman plan, and other policies of international cooperation that spell strength for the democratic west.

You can understand, then, why both Signor Pella and Italian democracy will be in trouble unless the prime minister can deliver something on Trieste.

But that is not the whole story. Not all of the original blame for the delicate position in which Signor Pella finds himself can be laid at the door of the political extremists. Some Italian democrats assign a large portion of the blame to the prime minister himself. They say his projection of the Trieste issue helped stoke the fires and thus gave the extremists their head. They say his own actions were not necessary to satisfy legitimate Italian concern over Tireste.

And every Italian with whom I have discussed the matter believes the British-American decision of October 8 -- however well-intentioned -- has also contributed to the uncomfortable spot which Signor Pella now occupies.

There is irony in this Italian political situation. It is obvious that the last thing the Americans and British wanted to do with their decision to turn over Zone A to the Italians was to put Signor Pella on a political hot spot. It is accepted as fact here in Rome that one of the major reasons for that October 8 decision was the desire in

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Washington and London to give Pella a political victory, and thus bolster his new government in its crucial early weeks. But instead, that decision over the long run could be instrumental in bringing Pella down.

There is irony in this situation because Pella deliberately took a hardboiled stand with regard to the Trieste question. Whether political pressures could have forced him to take it is a valid question. But Pella himself had originally described the government he formed in August as one of transition; a government to carry on national administration and get the national budget through parliament by the October 31 deadline. Such a government would hardly be expected to get itself embroiled in a major foreign policy dispute. Yet, Pella took his firm stand, and for a time Trieste seemed to be exactly the issue that could rally most Italians behind him and turn his "caretaker" government into the real thing. Instead, it may be the rock on which his ship of state founders, especially if he has to settle for substantially less than the Americans and British promised on October 8.

Let's examine that situation in greater detail.

The announcement of the Anglo-American decision constituted an immediate political victory for Pella -- no question about that. Here was at least half a loaf, so far as the Free Territory of Trieste was concerned. Here was something tangible; something about to happen, and not just another pledge of the kind the United States, Britain and France made on March 20, 1948, when they took a stand for return of both Zones A and B of the Free Territory to Italy.

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Pella's party moved quickly to claim credit for the decision. In campaign-type posters pasted on buildings and walls, the Christian Democrats declared triumphantly: "After long years of expectation and hope, Trieste returns to Italy!" And they added:

"The patient and tenacious work of the democratic governments that have directed the Italian policy from the catastrophe of the war to the revival of today, has gained its just victory..."

It did not occur to the Italians that Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito might be able to prevent or seriously delay the transfer of Zone A. They assumed Tito had been consulted in advance and had agreed. So Tito's bellicose stand put the first damper on Italian jubilation.

Then there was one aspect of the Anglo-American decision that may have been immediately apparent to Pella and his cabinet, but which sank in only gradually on the consciousness of the rest of the country:

The October 8 declaration in effect supplanted the American, British and French statement of 1948, which backed Italy's claim to both Zones A and B -- the entire Free Territory of Trieste. The Italian Communists were probably right for once when they insisted that the carrying out of the October 8 declaration would mean permanent loss by Italy -- permanent Yugoslav possession -- of Zone B.

This kind of solution on Trieste would hardly constitute a lasting political victory for the Pella government. It would not silence the ultra-nationalists of the neo-fascist party -- the Movimento Sociale Italiano, which now has 29 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. And it might not satisfy the Monarchists, who have 40 Chamber votes on which Pella must depend for a working majority.

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But if, after all the excitement, Pella could not even get Zone A -- if the Americans and British, because of Yugoslav belligerence, could not even deliver that much, regardless of the long term implications -- then Pella would be in even a worse position.

That is about where the Italian political situation stands at the time these lines are being recorded. Signor Pella may be wondering at times why he helped bring the Trieste issue to a head in the first place.

Pella's supporters say he had no alternative -- and many Italians would agree. First of all, these supporters cite the substantial losses suffered by the Christian Democratic party in the June 7 elections -- and they say these losses were due in part to the failure of former Premier Alcide de Gasperi to obtain anything concrete with regard to Trieste.

Pella's backers say that Italian and Triestine patiences were at an end and that the prime minister simply recognized that fact. They say the Americans and British had understood all along that Italy would have to get a substantial concession on Trieste in return for taking an advanced stand for western European unification and the European Defense community. They say the time for the pay-off had arrived.

But Pella's supporters add that even if he had wished to avoid the Trieste question on grounds that his was simply a caretaker government, he would not have been able to do so. They say the situation in Venezia Biulia was deteriorating too rapidly to permit postponement of the issue.

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And it had been deteriorating for weeks and even months before Pella ever raised the issue. These Italians say the Yugoslavs made the first provocative moves last summer and they cite Tito's speech of September 6 at San Basso as proof that Yugoslavia in fact has already annexed Zone B.

They remind Americans rightly that Pella at no time asked for the specific actions outlined in the October 8 resolution. And they point out that it was really that resolution which aroused Tito and brought on the present critical situation. Pella, in fact, had been standing on his September 18 proposal for a plebiscite in the whole Free Territory for a choice by the people between Yugoslavia and Italy.

Pella's supporters point out that the American-British decision was a flat declaration of intention to end the Allied Military Government of Zone A; to withdraw their troops and to turn the area over to Italy. It scarcely gave Pella even a take-it-or-leave-it choice. Under the circumstances, they say, any Italian government would have taken it.

But Pella's critics among the parties of the Center and moderate Left are not convinced that he had no alternative. Some of them believe Pella hoped to entrench his political position by a strong stand on Trieste. And they ask: What better issue could he have chosen if his objective was to gain support in the parliament and the country and turn his transitional government into a full-fledged one?

Even some political leaders who generally defend Pella are critical of his tactics on Trieste and especially of his threat to resign if the

United States and Britain should delay the carrying out of the October 8 decision. A Liberal party leader told me:

"That's something a prime minister doesn't do. He doesn't put the fate of his own government in the hands of other governments. He doesn't leave it up to London or to Washington or, in this case, to Tito, to decide whether he remains or resigns!"

A member of the Chamber of Deputies from the Social Democratic party was worried about this Pella threat from another standpoint: The grave political crisis that would ensue if Pella got to the point of carrying it out. This deputy asked:

"Who would then be willing to undertake the task of forming a new government? Who would take on such a thankless task under those circumstances?"

One leader of a moderate party feared that Pella's behavior on Trieste had drastically lowered Italy's international prestige which had been carefully rebuilt in these postwar years through the efforts of De Gasperi and the former foreign minister, the late Count Carlo Sforza.

But Pella's critics join his supporters in criticizing the United States and Britain for the way in which the Trieste matter was handled. Above all, they say, both Rome and Belgrade should have been consulted in advance and their official attitudes established beyond any doubt.

Some Italian politicians with whom I have talked believe it would have been better over the long run if the United States, Britain and France had simply renewed their 1948 pledge to work for restoration of

the entire Trieste Free Territory to Italy. They could have coupled this with the candid admission that it was a longrange goal that could not be realized for the present. And they could have promised in the meantime to continue the process of working more and more Italians into civil administration jobs in Zone A, as a step toward that long-range goal.

These Italians say this kind of declaration might have been sufficient to ease the pressure on Pella and, if so, would have left him in a stronger long-run position. But others doubt that Pella could have survived, with nothing more than another pious pledge to show for his efforts on Trieste.

Pella's position with the country still seems to be very strong. But it is on the floor of the parliament that he will survive or fall.

And it is there where the pressures from the strengthened parties of the political Right are building up. It is there where those pressures could become unbearable for the man from Piedmont in the coming weeks and months unless he can bring in something tangible on the issue that arouses Italian passions more than any other these days.

This is Graham Hovey, signing off another Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radio Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Tape Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 3
Recorded in Rome November 21, 1953
Tape runs 14:25 with NAEB signoff

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This is Graham Hovey with another Letter from Italy, datelined Rome. These programs are produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana.

It is one of my objectives in these Letters from Italy to fill in some of the gaps left in the spot news coverage of this country by the American press, periodicals and commercial radio networks. One advantage of this kind of program should be that the writer can afford to let the dust settle a bit and take a second, third of fourth look at an event, or series of events, in the interest of gaining perspective.

I have permitted the dust to settle a bit on a series of incidents that made a deep impression on me. I refer to the Rome student demonstrations on the Trieste violence of early November; the demonstrations of the 6th and 7th of November, including the massive protest by 10,000 persons in front of the United States embassy.

These demonstrations were organized in protest over the killing of a number of Italians by British-trained police during the Trieste rioting. I should like to speak about them because some intelligent Italians believe they are directly related to a much broader question: is Fascism on the way back in Italy?

I shall not attempt to answer that broader question. About all a visiting journalist should do at this point, in my opinion, is to find out what Italians think about it.

Student demonstrations, of course, have long been a standard feature of the European political scene. Some older European hands may not have been as impressed as I was with the manifestations of November 6 and 7.

Still, there were aspects that were profoundly disturbing to persons who have seen scores of demonstrations over the years. And I believe these aspects make the thing worth reporting.

I was having my shoes shined on the sidewalk of the Corso when the first storm broke on Rome on the morning of November 6. I call it a storm because it sounded exactly like one; a great, gathering thunderstorm, hurtling down on you in the teeth of a mighty wind.

Before I had time to ask the bootblack what was happening the storm was upon us: a storm of shouting, screaming, sometimes chanting students -- most of them 15 and 16-year olds from the media schools; thousands of them, completely jamming the Corso and the sidewalks, paralyzing traffic on one of Rome's busiest streets; stopping only long enough to chalk on walls, buildings, buses and streetcars insults about Marshal Tito and Gen. Sir John Winterton, the British military commander in Trieste; epithets about Anthony Eden and the U. S. A.; demands for the return to Italy not only of Trieste but of the whole Dalmatian coast.

They would stop and scribble frantically with chalk, and then they would rush on, pell mell and helter skelter, behind their leaders who added a shrill note to the great wave of sound by blowing constantly and furiously on police whistles.

They threatened to turn over a truck whose driver had edged out into the middle of the Corso, hoping to get across ahead of them. They screamed insults at policemen and bus drivers and pedestrians who got in their way. Still they came on -- and one wondered how many school children of that age Rome had.

"Death to Tito the pig," they scrawled on buildings along the Corso; "Go home, Winterton;" "Down with the English." And they also wrote: "Death to the U. S. A." Hardly a building escaped. Again and again one saw a youngster scratch, with chalk: "Scusa, Porco, se ti chiama Tito" -- excuse it, pig, if someone calls you Tito." Often they would add ~~xxxx~~ caricatures of Tito swinging on gallows. One easily cohcluded that Marshal Tito and General Winterton would not get very many votes in Rome. But the Americans weren't getting many at the moment, either.

On the crowd went to the Piazza Venezia, where Mussolini used to harangue students, along with others, from his balcony. And there these students were harangued by a couple of the political heirs of Il Duce.

One shouldn't overstate the case. The demonstration had its lighter aspects. Obviously, some of the kids were just celebrating the delicious prospect of no school on a lovely autumn day.

At one point an automobile carrying the sultry Italian motion picture actress, Silvana Pampanini, got involved with the crowd. And some Italian youths forgot for the moment about Trieste to whistle and crowd around the car and ask Signorina Pampanini for her autograph. And I saw one wall where some teen-ager had scrawled "death to Tito," but had added, just below it, a chalked heart and the legend, "Bianca is my love!" Some of the students were laughing and joking as they raced along toward the Piazza Venezia.

Yet, there was fanaticism on many of those young faces; faces of boys and girls who would have been only two or three years old when Mussolini took Italy into World War II.

I became fascinated with the face of a boy in his middle teens who stopped a few feet away from me just long enough to scribble an epithet furiously on the door of a stalled bus, keeping a wild eye out for the cops all the time.

There was fanaticism and in a way it was being harnessed. And that was impressive and frightening. I've called the flood of students pell mell and helter skelter. Yet, there was organization and the organizers were skilled. They knew where they were going and what they were going to do when they got there. The mob was not orderly, but it was ordered.

It was ordered by young men carrying the banners of the lily of Trieste or the flame of the neo-Fascist party or, perhaps, the tricolor of Italy. These young men knew what they were doing when they led the way to the Piazza Venezia and they knew what they were trying to do later in the day, when they stormed up Via del Babuino toward the Piazza di Spagna.

Via del Babuino is the narrow thoroughfare that connects two of Rome's best known squares -- the Piazza del Popolo and the Piazza di Spagna. The students had reformed in the Piazza del Popolo and started toward the Piazza di Spagna to demonstrate in front of the British consulate. Once again they jammed a narrow street with a raging sea of young humanity. It would have been hopeless to try to move down it against the tide.

But this time the Interior ministry's riot squads were on hand. By jeepload and truckload these national police pulled into the square, blocking all incoming traffic and taking positions where they could move quickly to cover any of the arteries leading into it.

Finding the Via del Babuino blocked, the students faded through alleys and minor streets with amazing speed and reassembled on the Via dei Condotti, which enters the Piazza di Spagna from another direction. An officer went forward to attempt to reason with them, but he was soon engulfed and the riot squads moved into action.

To their credit, in this encounter at least, they did not use guns or clubs. But they finally had to call up a fire engine with a big hose running the length of a water tank on top of it. Then something happened that was real Italian opera buffa. Something was wrong with the power system on the truck. And instead of playing a powerful stream of water down the Condotti, the hose sent only a pitiful drizzle some ten feet toward the students.

At that point the spectators, standing on the Spanish steps, joined the students in shouts of derision, while three riot squad men worked feverishly to get the hose in working order. At last the workmen succeeded in getting the power up and thx played the hose down the Condotti and dispersed the students, though many of them took refuge in office building entrances and continued to lean out and wave drenched Italian flags and shout defiance.

You can see why I say that the demonstrations did have their lighter side. They also had their grim side. The correspondent of an Austrian newspaper had his British-made automobile burned up -- totally ruined -- on one street. A University of Minnesota professor, Dr. Alan Tate, was roughly handled and his car damaged by angry students until friendly older Italians came to his rescue. The crowd xxx smashed in windows at the Anglo-American hotel in downtown Rome. And, as you may have read, the riot squads had to use tear gas as well as water to disperse the mob in front of the American embassy.

What did all this mean? One distinguished Italian political leader was deeply troubled as he pondered this question a day later. He paced up and down his office and said: "This is fascism. For the first time since the war we're really seeing something that looks like fascism." And he added: "You know, this was the way fascism got its foothold in Italy: the student demonstrations and riots, whipped up by the Fascists, played a big part in bringing on the March on Rome."

The Liberal weekly, Il Mondo, charged that adults had helped charge up the nationalism of the students by dispensing free cognac and rolls. This newspaper ran a picture of two members of parliament from the neo-fascist MSI being carried in triumph on the shoulders of students in the vicinity of the Piazza Colonna.

The Rome police were convinced that the Communists and their allies got into the act, too, especially to help direct the demonstrations against the British and American embassies.

But it is generally agreed that the original impetus for the demonstrations came from the ultra-nationalists of the MSI and the Monarchist party. It may help to explain why the students behaved the way they did if we take a look at what these ultra-nationalist groups have been saying in recent weeks.

The MSI -- the neo-Fascist party -- complained strenuously about the manner in which the Italian government protested to London and Washington after the fatal incidents in Trieste. The MSI said the Italian nation wanted an ultimatum dispatched to London, demanding the dismissal of General Winterton, the punishment of those responsible for what it called "the slaughter," and immediate return of Zone A of the Trieste Free Territory to Italian administration. And what if the British and Americans should not meet these demands?

Then, said the MSI, (and I quote directly from the party statement), "the Italian divisions arrayed on the borders of the bloody Trieste Free Territory should, without further ado, enter the martyred city to deliver the Italian population from the persecutions and the carnage."

It was not the only occasion on which the MSI had called for war, if necessary, to settle the Trieste issue in Italy's favor. Sen. Franz Turchi of the MSI declared that Italian divisions should intervene -- as he put it -- to "defend from fruther massacre the Italian people of Trieste." Senator Turchi said that Premier Guiseppe Pella was "at the crossroads;" that Pella should "choose, and choose quickly" because "Italian blood gushes with every instant lost."

The MSI newspaper, Il Secolo, said the hour had arrived when the appeal should be "to courage, rather than to calm." The time had arrived for calling enemies enemies and for having a reckoning with what Il Secolo called, "those who have proclaimed themselves our saviors -- internally and externally." And Il Secolo added:

"Trieste has celebrated her vespers of rebellion and of revenge. Trieste has given the initiative to the chasing out of the foreigner. The foreigner must go; the enemy (meaning, the British and Americans, as well as the Yugoslavs) must go!"

The newspaper Meridiano d'Italia went further. It said: "We should move the Bersaglieri toward San Giusto and free the Triestines. Blood calls for blood. Viva Trieste! Blood wants justice. . ."

The newspaper Roma, the organ of the leader of the Italian Monarchist party, Achille Lauro, had an interesting complaint to make. Roma blasted the London correspondent of Radio Italiana because he handled the news of Foreign Secretary Eden's speech to the House of Commons in a calm, objective manner.

Roma said this London correspondent's voice was "cold and glacial" as he gave his account of Eden's defense of General Winterton's handling of the Trieste riots. The Radio Italiana man had sent on the news "without one word of comment or blame." Roma added:

"Not even the inflection of his voice betrayed a sense of revulsion, of disdain toward those phrases that were as iron, poisoned on the palpitating wounds of the Fatherland."

I thought you might be interested in these excerpts from recent statements of representatives of the neo-Fascist MSI and the Monarchist parties. I believe they are significant statements. I have a hunch that their strident tones; their demands for military action in a country that was battered into defeat and ruin by war only ten years ago; will shock and dismay many Americans.

They certainly have shocked and dismayed many Italians.

One should be careful not to give too much weight to the strident voices of the neo-Fascist press or the spectacle of a student demonstration.

Il Mondo may have right, recently, when it called these things simply "the hysterical exasperations of a minority." But Il Mondo, too, is worried. It is worried about the manifestations themselves and the excesses that characterized them; worried about what it calls "the docility with which the press and the political parties have followed them, or have nourished the frenzy and hysteria." This reminds Il Mondo of what it calls "a past too soon forgotten."

I think that what concerns Il Mondo and many Italians with whom I have discussed this matter is the knowledge that fascism is a state of mind, as well as a system of government. I think they are saying that it would be wrong to judge the strength of the Fascist state of mind in Italy today by the fact that a neo-Fascist party won 29 seats in the

Chamber of Deputies last June -- although that showing was not unimpressive.

I thought some of the words coming from these strident voices of Italy's neo-Fascist press were worth reporting. I believe they help explain why the Italian students conducted their demonstrations reminiscent of the Fascist era on the 6th and 7th of November. I believe they are worth reporting because of the deep concern they are giving to responsible and intelligent Italians these days.

This is Graham Hovey, signing another Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radio Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Tape Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 4
Recorded in Rome November 21, 1953
Tape runs 14:10 with NAEB signoff

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This is Graham Hovey, sending along another ~~xx~~ radio Letter from Italy under a Rome dateline. These programs are produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana.

Before I came to Italy a couple of months ago friends told me that this time I might find a strong anti-American feeling, particularly in Rome. They said I should be prepared for this: that Italy, and especially Rome, might not be as friendly and accommodating as I had found them on previous visits.

That anti-Americanism may exist. It probably does exist in some circles and in some measure. After all, the Italians have experienced what one might call two American invasions in the last ten years. The first one was military and the second one was everything else: a tourist invasion; an invasion of American economic experts in the Marshall Plan days; invasions of Congressional investigating teams; and what some would call a kind of cultural invasion that includes everything from movies and Coca Cola and Singer sewing machines to artists and writers and visiting professors.

So, I say, that anti-Americanism may exist. But I haven't found it. The only major evidence of anti-American feeling I have seen was that displayed in the student demonstrations and riots over the Trieste violence, which I talked about in a previous Letter from Italy. And the British caught that attack worse than we did. In any event, it soon died down and the anti-American part of it was quickly forgotten.

What I have found in Italy that directly concerns Americans is something that I believe is more important; has more longrange signifi~~cc~~ance than these surface evidences of anti-Americanism that I was supposed to find.

There is in Italy today a genuine and growing fear about the direction of the United States foreign policy.

How widespread it is in the country I would not attempt to say on the basis of a residence of only two months to date.

But what makes it worth reporting, it seems to me, is that an American finds this fear in Italian circles where he least expects it. He finds gnawing doubts about American objectives and even American motives. In many cases, distrust would not be too strong a word.

For this particular American, this phenomenon is one of the most striking and impressive aspects of the Italian political landscape.

Never mind, for the moment, what the Communists and their Left Socialist allies say about us; theirs is the same old warmed-over Moscow-Cominform hash, with, to be sure, a few peculiarly Italian journalistic and rhetorical touches here and there.

And never mind what Italy's new and ever-bolder Fascists are saying about America, though, as I tried to indicate in a previous Letter, what they say is not unimportant in the present Italian political situation.

What ought to concern us is what our friends are saying; the people on whom rest the hopes for the survival and strengthening of Italy's democracy; the people who have supported our policies in the past and wish to support us in the future.

These are the Italians who find their political outlets in the parties of the Center and moderate Left; the parties that made up the old coalition of former Premier Alcide de Gasperi for most of these postwar years: the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Republicans and Liberals.

These are Italians who have no use for communism and who make no apologies for the behavior of the Soviet Union -- though some of them might argue that Italian Communists are not necessarily the same breed as Russian Communists.

Well, what are these Italian friends of ours thinking and saying about the United States and about American foreign policy these days?

One highly-educated Italian professional man, about whose friendship for America and Americans there can be no doubt, gave it to me bluntly. He said:

"Look here, we fear that America is leading all of us toward a third World war which could be avoided."

Let me repeat that: We fear that America is leading all of us toward a third World war which could be avoided. A serious thing to say about the United States; the country that these Italians would agree has kept western Europe afloat economically since World War II; a country that carries the greatest share of the financial burden for the North Atlantic treaty organization, which Italy joined four years ago; a country that suffered well over a hundred thousand casualties in far-off Korea in defense of the United Nations.

But my Italian friend was completely sincere. He didn't enjoy telling me that he feared America was leading everyone down the road to a war which could be avoided. But he was willing to argue the point -- and did, as a matter of fact, for several hours.

And the fears he expressed and the criticisms he made about American objectives and motives and tactics -- these things I have subsequently heard from a good many other sources; in every case, sources friendly to America, sources who wanted to believe in America.

There was the young doctor from Umbria; the young engineering student from the University of Bologna; the official of a United Nations agency with whom I talked in Palermo; and various representatives of middle-road parties and middle-road viewpoints here in Rome.

Perhaps I should say at the outset that I do not agree with most of these criticisms of America and of our foreign policy. I think many -- perhaps most -- of them are based on misunderstanding which might be cleared up with greater effort on both sides.

Nor do I believe that this misunderstanding is due to any failure of American information agencies to carry out their difficult jobs in this country, though we have few reliable methods of measuring the effectiveness of such efforts.

But I do think that what these Italians are thinking and saying about us is important. Whether their beliefs are right or wrong, they are sincerely held; they constitute a current political fact of life in Italy, and perhaps in western Europe. We must take these beliefs into account; to ignore them would be foolhardy indeed.

What are the things about America that bother these Italian friends?

First of all they generally cite what they regard as our intransigeance; our unwillingness to negotiate; the inflexibility of our foreign policies.

So, if you're like I am, and don't agree entirely with that criticism, you say: Look, didn't we show a substantial measure of flexibility and and almost infinite patience in the drawn-out negotiations that led to the Korean armistice?

And they generally will answer: Yes, you did, and we commend you for that. But you are not showing that kind of flexibility and patience elsewhere. You have become so obsessed with the idea that the Soviet

Union will never change its course, and that communism is exactly the same everywhere, that you seem incapable of adjusting to different conditions.

For example, say these Italian friends, Russia's situation has obviously changed somewhat since Stalin's death. How much it has changed we do not pretend to know. But what is wrong with trying to find that out by conferences at the highest level? And they add, a bit puckishly, Winston Churchill seems to think such conferences would be worthwhile and we take it you Americans would not consider him an appeaser?

Perhaps you answer by reminding your Italian friends that the United States did come around recently to a specific proposal for a meeting of Big Four foreign ministers in Switzerland to discuss the future of Germany. And that the Soviet Union rejected this bid. Also that Sir Winston Churchill has revised his earlier opinion about the desirability of a meeting with Mr. Malenkov.

But your Italian friends are hard to convince. They may admit what you say about the latest attempt on our side to get a Big Four meeting on Germany. But they retain the strong impression that the United States is invariably reluctant to go to the conference table. They don't contend that conferences with the Russians have generally been productive; they say, only, that so long as there is the slightest chance for even [redacted] minor agreements we should be willing to negotiate.

They believe -- these Italian friends -- that the United States places far too much faith on atomic and hydrogen bombs; on guns and rearmament and military bases as factors in the longrange job of building world peace.

That subject of military bases almost invariably gets into all discussions of the type I am describing. It is a timely subject in this Mediterranean part of the world because the United States has recently concluded agreements for air and naval bases in Greece and Spain.

It may be hard for Americans to understand how deeply some Italian democrats resent the deal made with Franco Spain. First of all, Spain is still on the conscience of western European democrats because Franco came to power with the help of Mussolini and Hitler in the days when the democracies were attempting to appease fascism. Secondly, the European, who knows modern war first-hand, is very sensitive indeed to the suggestion that bases in Spain are needed because it might be necessary to hold the Russians at the Pyrenees barrier in any future conflict. Europeans -- including Italians -- feel that if they had to be liberated after first being overrun by the Russian army there would not be much to liberate.

Let's take one example of Italian reaction to the Spanish bases transaction, from the Liberal weekly newspaper, Il Mondo, which many Italians will tell you is the best thing in Italian journalism. All we need for purposes of illustration is a sub-headline from Il Mondo's article after the American-Spanish agreement was concluded. This headline said: "The most ordinary strategic reasons and the most clever political calculations cannot conceal one simple and incontestable truth: that the Spain of Franco remains a totalitarian and fascist dictatorship."

The Italian friend I cited above said the same thing with broader application. He said:

"You Americans do a lot of talking about the defense of the free world, but we're beginning to think those are just nice words. We can't take you very seriously when you include as a part of that free world Franco Spain -- or, I might add, Tito's Yugoslavia."

It does little good to argue that we really had only the alternative of another Moscow-style dictatorship in Yugoslavia or that the air and naval bases in Spain would be used to defend Italy, too, in the event of war. The Italian democrat is apt to look only at the fact that our economic and military assistance is helping to bolster two dictatorships in his part of the world.

In fact, I find that military bases question one of the hardest things about American policy to explain convincingly. I've had Italian friends of America tell me seriously that, after all, it isn't the Soviet Union but the United States that is building air bases all over the landscape.

They argue that military installations invariably mean some measure of control over the people of the countries involved; and they say our policy of getting bases wherever we can diminishes or destroys the moral advantage we otherwise would enjoy over the Soviet Union in this struggle we call the Cold War.

In this connection, these Italians cite American opposition to the case brought by the Arab and Asian countries in the United Nations against continued French control of Morocco and Tunisia. And they say -- these Italians -- that the American position is dictated not by concern for freedom and justice but simply by expediency. We need the bases, so we support French colonialism, which can provide us with the bases. Or, we support French colonialism because we fear that otherwise we would lose France as a partner in western defense.

Incidentally, many Italians are convinced that the French would negotiate a settlement in Indo-China if it were not for American pressure to keep up that long and bitter struggle. And the Italians with whom I

have talked do not believe the French can win that war in any event; they say too many Indo-Chinese believe the Communist-led Viet-Minh is fighting a genuine war of independence -- from the French.

These Italian democrats believe we Americans are naive about both communism and fascism. They say, perhaps with some justification, that they know both better than we do. They say they know communism better because they MXX have had to live with the threat of it in these postwar years in which better than one out of every three Italians has voted for the Reds and their Left Socialist allies. Therefore, they do not appreciate advice from us on how to cope with this problem.

And they fear that the United States, in its anxiety over the communist problem, is headed down the road to some kind of totalitarianism, which they generally call Fascism. They cite what they regard as ultra-nationalism, exemplified by the restrictive provisions of the McCarran act; the congressional investigations; the attacks on educators and the public schools. And they say: We know these things well; they are like the things that came to Italy 30 years ago.

Another thing that bothers Italian democrats more than any other about American foreign policy is what they regard as our zeal to rearm Germany. The Italian government repeatedly has taken a strong stand for the European Defense Community treaty. That's the treaty that would rearm western Germans as part of an integrated supra-national, European army. But Italians know that the pressure for rearming the Germans in the first place came from the United States. And they fear the longrange effects of such a [redacted] policy.

They have no answer when you ask them how western Europe could possibly be defended without German participation. They concede that west Germans should have the right and the capacity to defend themselves against an attack from the east. But like the French, the Italians find it very hard to take that final step and agree to put guns once again in the hands of Germans.

They say: We know the Germans. We had them in our country fro a long time in World War II, first as allies of Fascist Italy and then as enemies of liberated Italy. There has been too little time for us to forget what they did and to get around to a readiness to trust them. And if you have ever visited the Ardeatine caves at the south edge of Rome, where the German SS slaughtered more than 300 Italian civilians in March of 1944, you can appreciate this feeling.

It has not been very pleasant to write this particular Letter from Italy. But, as I said earlier, this growing concern of Italian democrats about the course of American foreign policy is striking and impressive for a newly-arrived American reporter. And let me repeat: these people <u>are</u> Italian democrats, representing the middle road parties; the kind of people on whom the hopes for survival and strengthening of the Italian democracy must rest. They are our friends. They have supported American policies in the past and would like to do so in the future.

It would be altogether too simple an explanation to say that these Italians have been influenced by Communist propaganda. And I believe that their beliefs are held widely enough in this country so that they cannot be dismissed as unimportant. Hence, I thought I would make of this Letter from Italy a report on how at least a part of Italy -- an important part -- looks at America.

Graham Hovey reporting. Good by for now from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radio Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Tape Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 5
Recorded in Rome December 19, 1953
Tape runs 13:30

This is Graham Hovey, reporting from Rome with another radio Letter from Italy. These programs are produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana.

An American living abroad is apt to find his nationalism aroused in strange ways. A couple of days ago I could hardly wait to get to the neighborhood news stand and buy a copy of Italy's best-known newspaper, Il Corriere della Sera of Milan. I wanted to read the review of the previous night's performance of Giuseppe Verdi's "Rigoletto," at the famous La Scala opera house. An American baritone, Leonard Warren, had played the Rigoletto.

Now, I have never met Leonard Warren. But here I was, "sweating out" his performance at La Scala. And I'm sure I was not alone among the American colony in Italy in that respect. What was behind this concern for the singing and acting of a man I had never met?

The professional critics of America -- and Italy has some -- would say: American provincialism; a demonstration of the American cultural inferiority complex. But I don't think that's it. I think this hope that Leonard Warren would do well at Scala was related to something I mentioned briefly in a previous Letter: the thing I called the second American invasion of Italy.

The first invasion was our military invasion of ten years ago. By the second American invasion I meant such things as the flood of American tourists and economic experts and congressional committees -- and what I called a kind of cultural invasion that included everything from American movies and soft drinks and sewing machines to artists and writers and visiting professors.

Some aspects of that cultural invasion have done the United States harm with the Italians. Instead of helping to give Italians a full and fair picture of American life, they have given aid to those who deliberately distort that picture. Americans residing in Italy should be -- and, I believe, are -- more aware of the effects of such things than the folks back home.

Leonard Warren playing Rigoletto at La Scala represented an opportunity to chalk up a substantial figure on the credit side of the American cultural invasion ledger. In coming to Italy to play Rigoletto, Mr. Warren was bringing coals to Newcastle. Italians like their own fine baritone, Tito Gobbi, in that role. And the Scala audience is surely one of the most critical in the world.

For the record, I am glad to add that the critic of Corriere della Sera liked Mr. Warren, and so did the crowd at La Scala.

The critic praised Mr. Warren's "excellent Italian diction," and his "accentuation of profound intelligence." He said Mr. Warren's voice was "warm and moving" more than it was powerful and wrathful, as Italian stylistic tradition demands of Rigoletto. But he said the values of this voice permitted Mr. Warren to add depth to the character of Rigoletto "with an intelligence that did not escape the public."

And the critic concluded: "He was, among all, the interpreter that won the best acceptance and the most spontaneous applause."

It was definitely a big mark on the credit side of that American cultural invasion ledger, just as an all-Mozart concert at Rome's Argentina theater two weeks earlier had been. In that concert the young American, Leonard Bernstein, directed the Santa Cecilia symphony orchestra and was piano soloist for Mozart's Concerto in G.

The Italian critics prviously had blasted Bernstein for the way in which he conducted Beethoven's Ninth symphony with the same orchestra. But this time they came around. The critic for the Rome newspaper, Il Messaggero, called Bernstein a pianist "of poetic feeling and rich suggestions." He added: "Enthusiastic applause sanctioned a clear verdict." Another entry on the credit side of the American cultural invasion ledger.

Some would say there is nothing new in such an invasion. They would point out that American students and classicists and artists and writers have been coming here for a long time, just as Italians in these and other categories have come to America.

Well, perhaps the difference is simply one of considerable degree, rather than one of kind. At any rate, I am fascinated with this thing I call the second American invasion of Italy. And I honestly believe that few Americans realize how far it has gone and the impact it has had -- for better or worse -- on the way Italians think about America and Americans.

It has often been said that Rome and Italy have become for American writers what Paris was after the first World war. No one seems to know for sure why this is so, but certainly the writers have come. The names of John Horne Burns, Alfred Hayes, Paul Hyde Bonner and Eleanor Clark come to mind.

Some think John Hersey started it all during the war with his first novel, "A Bell for Adano." But not only young American writers have come to Italy. Ernest Hemingway has been here several times since the war and it was here that he wrote "Across the River and Into the Trees." There is a Hemingway prize for Italian novel writing, awarded by his Italian publisher, Mondadori of Milan. Robert Penn Warren has worked here. Sinclair Lewis wrote his last novel in Italy and died in Rome. In the postwar period, Italian publishers have poured out American books of all periods.

As I say, many Americans are aware of this influx of American writers and this rash of American books in translation. Many of us are aware, too, of the influx of both American motion pictures and the people who make them. No need to call the roll of American stars who have made pictures since the war at Rome's reconstructed Cinecitta. And sometimes Romans have a hard time finding an Italian picture at neighborhood theaters. Two of the three movie houses in the Rome neighborhood where I live are showing American films at this moment. And speaking of Leonard Warren carrying coals to Newcastle by playing Rigoletto at La Scala, one of these pictures is the Mario Lanza version of "The Great Caruso."

All this, of course, is part of that second American invasion, but not the part that fascinates me; not the part that prompts me to say that most Americans have no idea how far this cultural invasion has gone.

Let's look for a moment at one of the most primitive and remote parts of Italy: the island of Sardinia. Its capital, Cagliari, is only a

couple of hours from Rome by air, but you would be surprised how many mainland Italians have never been to Sardinia and have only the foggiest notion of what is going on there.

Well, here are just a couple of examples of things that have gone on in Sardinia since the war:

With the assistance of the Rockefeller foundation, malaria has been virtually wiped out in Sardinia. As a result of this three-year campaign against the malaria-bearing anopheles mosquito, nearly 9,000 acres of farm land have been reclaimed and more than 60,000 acres improved through swamp drainage. But that's part of the social and economic phase of this second American invasion and we're really concerned here with the cultural phase.

In Cagliari there is a very active cultural group called "The Friends of the Book." But it is concerned with more than books. Under the leadership of Professor Marcello Serra it has organized an experimental theater. And this little theater in remote Sardinia lists on its program for the current season the "Glass Menagerie" of Tennessee Williams; three one-act plays of the late Eugene O'Neill, and Thornton Wilder's "Queen of France."

Does this give you a better understanding of what I mean by the extent of this postwar American cultural invasion of Italy?

I spent an interesting autumn month in the mountain city of Perugia, capital of the Umbrian region. And one night I went to a city square to hear a concert by the police band, up from Rome.

One number was listed as "Un Americano in Parigi." If you need a translation, that's Geroge Gershwin's "An American in Paris." While the Rome cops were huffing and puffing out a respectable version of the Gershwin number I happened to turn and look across the square. A movie house over there was advertising Danny Kaye in the Hans Christian Andersen picture, billed over here as "Il Favoloso Andersen" -- the Fabulous Andersen. Perugia seemed to be getting this American cultural invasion from all sides that night.

A young Peruginian doctor came to visit our house one evening and brought along two volumes of phonograph records. Most of them turned out to be New Orleans jazz of the Louis Armstrong-Johnny Dodds-Kid Ory era. Somewhere this young doctor had acquired some old jazz classics that would increase the blood pressure of many a collector back home.

On a little street behind our house in Perugia one day I watched two little girls doing something that looked like the Charleston and singing all the while that moth-eaten, long-forgotten American tune, "Yes sir, she's my baby." I heard young boys on Perugia streets singing "La Donna e Mobile" from Rigoletto -- but I also heard them whistling "From the Halls of Montezuma," though I had not been aware that the United States marines ever scaled the Etruscan walls of Perugia.

A moment ago I spoke of the American jazz record collection of an Italian doctor. It might interest you to know that last Sunday, Radio Italiana carried a long program called, "La Citta del Jazz" -- the city of Jazz, the city being, of course, New Orleans. And please note that this was carried on Radio Italiana's Third program. That's the cultural program; the highbrow quality program that corresponds to the Third program of the

British Broadcasting corporation. Another recent Third program feature was a translation of James Thurber's "The Women."

And a regular feature of Radio Italiana's national program each Thursday afternoon is "Vita Musicale in America" -- musical life in America. The program this week included works of Virgil Thomson, Russell Bennett and Douglas Moore, played by the orchestra of the Eastman School of Music at Rochester, N. Y., under the direction of Howard Hanson.

It Italian listeners didn't feel in the mood for this music at this particular time they could turn their dials from the National program to Radio Italiana's lighter Second program. And there, this week, at the same time the American music was being transmitted on the National program, they would have heard, in translation, a three-act play of Maxwell Anderson: "Sotto i Ponti di New York" -- under the bridges of New York. In other words, at a particular moment on Thursday afternoon the choice for Italian radio listeners was that of American music or American drama. You can see what I mean when I refer to the American cultural invasion of Italy.

Radio Italiana carries no commercials on its third program and far fewer advertisements overall than an American commercial network. But it does have some sponsored programs. And here again that cultural invasion enters the picture in a way. The sponsor of the broadcasts of the excellent Radio Italiana symphony orchestra of Turin this season is the Italian branch of an American oil company. The sponsors of three programs on the Second program one night this week were, in order, an American toothpaste, an American chest rub and an American soap.

In addition to hearing American music and drama on their radios; in addition to seeing Hollywood's version of American life in their movie houses, the Italians are surely reading more in their newspapers and periodicals about America today than they ever did previously.

I'm not speaking here of the coverage of American government and politics and American foreign policy, but of other aspects of American life. I would guess that the major daily newspapers of Italy gave as much space to the wedding of Rita Hayworth and Dick Haymes as most American metropolitan papers did. And the Italian press covered thoroughly all the gory details of the Bobby Greenlease murder case, too.

Along different lines, Il Messaggero of Rome recently carried a long article by a journalist rather appropriately named Amerigo Ruggiero under the headline: "Washington, capital of a thousand aspects." And Amerigo was astonished and mostly pleased at what he saw in our capital city.

He told his Italian readers that the avenues of Washington were the "most spacious" in the world; that the Pentagon is the biggest building in the world devoted to offices; and that the Smithsonian Institute is called "Uncle Sam's Attic." And Amerigo warned his readers not to miss the National art gallery if they got the opportunity to visit Washington. For there, among other masterworks, he was delighted to find four paintings of Raphael which, he told his fellow countrymen, the late Andrew Mellon bought from Russia at the price of a million dollars.

I suppose you might say that these articles about various aspects of American life in Italian newspapers are a kind of reverse process of that American cultural invasion of Italy I have been talking about. But I believe one stems from the other. Undoubtedly both the first and second American invasions of Italy have had a part in prompting Italian newspapers to print more articles for Italians about America.

Now, what this all adds up to, in terms of American-Italian understanding I'm sure I don't know. As I suggested in a previous Letter, some aspects of this cultural invasion may help to explain evidences of anti-Americanism which some Americans say they find in Italy today. Other aspects have surely contributed to <u>better</u> understanding.

Writing several years ago about the influx of American students and artists and scholars into Italy, Professor Paolo Milano was confident about the results. He said:

"A direct dialogue between Italian and American intellectuals has begun, the comedy of errors is being slowly dispelled." Dr. Milano thought the time might be near when the Italian reader would be convinced that the general level of American culture was not so low as he believed the American "digest" magazines imply. And that, surely, would be a good thing.

You won't believe it, but while I was writing this broadcast on the American cultural invasion of Italy, a young Italian walked under the window of my apartment at the south edge of Rome, whistling the theme song from the American motion picture, "High Noon."

Graham Hovey, signing another radio Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radio Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 6
Recorded in Rome December 20, 1953
Tape runs 13:30

This is Graham Hovey, reporting from Rome with another radio Letter from Italy. These programs are produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana.

A big poster on a building near my apartment says that the Hon. Pietro Secchia will address a meeting of the Federation of Italian Communist Youth on Sunday at the Adriano theater.

The poster says that Signor Secchia, the vice secretary general of the Italian Communist party, will launch the Federation's drive for new members. And it says that the goal for 1954 is 40,000 young Communists in Rome and the region of Lazio.

This poster was pasted over another which you can still make out. This earlier poster says that two party leaders will speak at the Adriano theater on Sunday about plans for the future of Rome and the Lazio region. The speakers were the Hon. Edoardo D'Onofrio, vice president of the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and Aldo Natoli, regional secretary of the Communist party for Lazio.

This second poster had been pasted over a third one put up a week earlier. This third poster said that the Hon. Giuseppe di Vittorio would speak on Sunday at the Adriano theater about the demands for wage increases by workers in state-owned industries. Signor di Vittorio is secretary-general of the Communist-dominated Italian General Confederation of Labor.

If you could dig back beyond that third poster you would find that four weeks ago the Hon. Palmiro Togliatti, secretary general of the party, addressed a Sunday meeting at the Adriano theater, and that five weeks ago the speaker was Luigi Longo, the hardboiled party organizer.

An American in Rome sometimes gets the feeling that the Communists will win Italy in the end simply because they are willing to work harder at the job than all the democratic parties combined.

This impression might not be accurate. There is more to winning an election, more to taking over Italy, than just winning the battle of the posters or having Sunday morning meetings in the Adriano theater.

Still, I believe Americans should not dismiss this poster business lightly -- for two reasons: the posters themselves surely have some propaganda value for the Communists. And they do, in fact, signify serious party activity. Those meetings in the Adriano theater actually come off. And they are well attended.

One reason why they are well attended is that the Communist leaders speak only rarely about the Soviet Union and world communism. I noticed that even the poster announcing that Signor Togliatti would speak on the 36th anniversary of the October revolution did not say whose revolution or where it took place. There was no mention of the Soviet Union.

And note what the others were to talk about: Pietro Secchia, the strong man of the Italian Communist party; the real boss of the party's hard core, was to speak to the youth. He was to tell them about Communist plans for making their future brighter than it now is in Italy.

D'Onofrio and Natoli were to speak on the party's plans for the economic and social rejuvenation of the Rome and Lazio area -- a program the Communists since have illustrated with well-drawn charts; a program that promises more jobs, better pay, improved housing.

Giuseppe di Vittorio, possibly the most intelligent of the lot, was to talk about the pay of workers in industries operated by the government -- and there are many such workers in Rome. He was to explain the reasonable-sounding demands his big trade union was making; demands which were reinforced this last week by a 24-hour strike of such workers.

I would guess that if any of these speakers mentioned Karl Marx or Joe Stalin it was only in passing. I would wager that they stuck mostly to the subjects of jobs, wages, housing and security.

Now you and I know that these men are not sincere about these things. Di Vittorio's labor union could not really work for full employment and high wages under Italy's present democratic system. For if those things were achieved under a democratic system the extreme doctrine of communism could make little headway. Pietro Secchia and his chief lieutenant, Longo, really want only one thing: power. And they surely would know what to do with it if they got it -- and they would do it ruthlessly, with no concern for Italian workers or Italian institutions or anything else.

We know these things -- but the Italians who follow Togliatti and Secchia and Di Vittorio and Longo do not know them. And we had better realize once and for all that these Italian workers will never take our word for these things. They will have to find out for themselves. And there is a real longrange chance in Italy that by the time they do find out it will be too late.

The Italian working man is unquestionably much like his counterpart in any free country, including the United States. On a day-to-day basis he is mostly concerned about his job; how secure it is; how much it pays him and enables him to do for his family. So far as he knows, Di Vittorio's CGIL has worked harder to provide better and more secure jobs and higher pay than any other agency or group. If wages and salaries are considerably higher now than they were under fascism, the worker is apt to give credit to the CGIL.

One unpleasant incident on the Italian industrial scene this last autumn was the laying off of 2,000 steel workers in the city of Terni, north of Rome. The Terni plant was not competitive. It had to lay off surplus workers.

This Terni story was treated by the Communist press as one of the biggest news stories in Italy. When virtually all Italian dailies were devoting most of their front pages and their editorials to the subject of Trieste, the Communist newspapers were screaming just as hard about the Terni 2,000.

I should not want to suggest that the other newspapers ignored the Terni situation or that the Italian government was calloused about it. But the Communists made the loudest and most consistent noise. And I would guess that many embittered unemployed steel workers in Terni got exactly the idea the Communists intended them to get: that the Communists and the labor union they dominate were the only groups that really cared very much.

I think it is reasonable to assume that the workers feel that way in part because of the sheer energy and industry of the Communists. The Communist newspaper, L'Unita, does not write one editorial saying, "too bad what is happening in Terni." It literally shouts in black headlines for day after day that these workers and their families are suffering and that the government and the industry had better do something about it.

It is this energy that has allowed the Communists unblushingly to take credit for economic and social reforms actually carried out by the Italian government; reforms carried out in the face of relentless obstruction by the Communists.

Journalists who have visited the areas of the poverty-stricken south of Italy, where the government's land distribution and reform project is underway, report that some peasants benefitted actually give credit to the Communists. With a deep-seated distrust of the Rome government, dating all the way back to the time of the unification of Italy, some of these peasants say they got their land only because of Communist pressures on that government.

Now this is more than just a discouraging situation. It is an alarming and critical one. It is critical because the Communist vote seems to inch forward with each succeeding Italian election. It is critical for Italian democracy because, in the face of these Communist gains and the ever-louder thunder from the neo-Fascists at the other extreme, the Italian democratic parties seem more confused and divided than ever. This Communist strength is critical for Italian democracy in any case because it means that many industrial workers feel they are completely outside the political life of the nation; that they have no stake in the present government and no stake in the survival of the present democratic system.

Let's get down to some specifics with regard to these points:

In the crucial Italian postwar election of April 18, 1948, the Communists and their left Socialist allies polled eight million votes, or 31 per cent of the total, and won 183 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Last June 7, the Communists and their allies polled 9.5 million votes, or 35 per cent of the total, and won 218 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, for an overall gain of 35 seats.

It is always dangerous to read too much significance into local elections. But those held since last June indicate that the far left is continuing to gain. The one that had the most political impact was the comunal election in Vercelli, in the heart of the relatively prosperous Piedmont textile industry.

In the Vercelli comune, the Christian Democrats and their allies won office with a total of 13,911 votes over the Communists and left Socialists, who polled 13,315. In short, the winning margin was exactly 596 ballots. But it was the voting pattern that caused the concern.

The Communists and left Socialists had gained 294 votes in that comune since the national elections in June. These came mostly from the Social Democrats, who had lost 283 votes in the same period.

The governing Christian Democrats scored even a bigger gain than the Communists -- 656 votes. But these were scored at the expense of the far political right: the Monarchists, who lost 585 votes and the neo-Fascists, who lost 253. But these switches from the right did not represent conversion to the democratic faith. Instead, the rightists probably felt that the Christian Democrats since June had moved to the right. Or, perhaps they only reflected the post-election bickering within the ranks of both the Monarchists and the neo-Fascist MSI.

There was no attempt on the part of the Christian Democratic government to claim the Vercelli result as a victory. The Rome newspaper, Il Messaggero, which nearly always reflects the government's viewpoint, said just the opposite. Il Messaggero declared:

". . . the truth is that one element prevails over all the others, with a force of persuasion that denies all the objections. . . . It is the growth of the Communist power."

The newspaper used the Vercelli results as the point of departure for a scathing attack on "all those who, for months and years, have insisted on the disappearance of the Communist peril."

I referred a few minutes ago to the increased confusions and divisions among Italian democratic parties. And I cited the fact that the Communist gains in Vercelli came from one of these parties, the Social Democrats.

Il Messaggero had something to say about this with which even some of the leaders of these parties would privately agree. With regard to the so-called "lay" democratic parties -- the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans -- the newspaper asked:

"What have they done since the elections? What proof of good will, of firmness and of political vision have they offered?" and Il Messaggero added:

"The electorate -- the supreme judge -- does not seem to appreciate the clash of currents, the contrasts of ideas, that disturb the minor parties. They (meaning the voters) turn toward the clear-cut positions."

Now it is easy to point the finger of scorn at parties that have suffered defeat atthe polls. The fact is that these three parties -- Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans -- contain some of the most intelligent and most devoted men in Italian public life. The struggling Italian democracy needs these men and these parties; needs them today as it never has before in the eight years of its existence. And it should be said, too, that under the surface they are no more divided nor confused than the governing party, the Christian Democrats, for which Il Messaggero had only praise.

But the fact remains that all the Italian democratic parties -- the Christian Democracy along with the other three -- have provided little firmness and political vision since the shock of the elections last June.

The fact is that they have provided mostly the "clash of currents, the contrasts of ideas," that Il Messaggero rightly said do not seem to be appreciated by the electorate.

At the moment, the Republicans, Liberals and Social Democrats are engaged in long discussions on whether it is possible for them to agree on a common political program and thus form an influential coalition; a democratic alternative to the Christian Democratic government.

At the moment, the Christian Democracy -- a widely-based, heterogenous party, like our own, in many respects -- is showing new evidences of straining at its seams, with only the prestige and power of Alcide de Gasperi holding it together.

And while these things are going on, the Communists relentlessly stay on the job of building a party. They talk language ordinary Italians understand; they talk unceasingly about everyday problems and issues that concern ordinary Italians.

It is surely this energy, more even than the social and economic conditions of Italy, that has enabled the Italian Communist party to survive many major defeats in this postwar period but come back stronger than ever. It is this energy that has enabled a party of two million members and a hard core of perhaps 200,000 to poll -- with its Socialist allies -- a vote of 9.5 million.

And as Communism gains, Italian democracy loses, any way one looks at it. As Communism gains, its supporters among the Italian workers feel more isolated than ever from their government; and that government, in turn, feels more isolated from them. The results have been apparent in a rash of serious strikes in recent weeks and months. Some believe the results are apparent, too, in a turn to the right by the Pella government, which must depend increasingly on the support of the Monarchists to survive.

As I drove to the studios to record this program I passed a new series of Communist party posters. They say that the Hon. Di Vittorio will address a meeting of the activists of the CGIL -- the big labor union -- at the Manzoni theater on Sunday. Anyone interested is invited to attend.

One gets the feeling that only when the middle road parties are willing to work as hard as the Communists on all fronts -- including the battle of the posters -- will the future of Italian democracy be secure.

Graham Hovey, signing another Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radio Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this isthe NAEB network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 7
Recorded in Rome, December 22, 1953
Tape runs 14 minutes

This is Graham Hovey, reporting from Rome with another radio Letter from Italy, produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana.

Italian democrats know of only three methods by which to fight the spread of communism in Italy and cut down Communist strength at the polls.

The first is one that I suggested in a previous Letter from Italy: The democrats must be willing to work as hard as the Communists work at the tedious job of party building. The democratic parties do not appear to be working at anything like the Communist pace at the moment.

The second method is the longrange job of attacking and alleviating the social and economic conditions in which Communism can make its maximum appeal. This means, first of all, creating jobs for as many of those two million Italian unemployed as possible. It means, literally, bringing off a peaceful social and economic revolution in order to forestall a violent one. No one has yet suggested a better longrange method of fighting communism. But note the emphasis on the words, long-range. This method will work in Italy only if there is time -- perhaps 15 to 20 years. And it will work only if the democratic parties have determination enough to compose their differences on such complicated questions as land reform and courage enough to follow through on a common program in the face of bitter and determined opposition. I hope to review the Italian government's efforts on this front in later Letters from Italy.

The third method is closely related to the other two and probably will succeed only as the other two succeed:

It is the attempt, by persuasion and education and propaganda, to detach major groups -- important sectors -- from the great mass following the Communists now have; to do this by furnishing solid evidence (a) that the Communists really are serving the Soviet Union, rather than Italy; and (b) that genuine progress toward desirable economic and social goals can be made within the present democratic framework.

You can see how closely this third method is tied to, or overlaps, the others.

This third method would be aimed primarily at two major groups: On the political level, it would be aimed first at the three and a half million Italians who voted for the fellow-traveling left-wing Socialists in the national elections last June; it would be aimed at them and perhaps even at their leader, Pietro Nenni. And on the level of the industrial workers of Italy it would be aimed at groups within the CGIL -- the Communist-led Italian General Confederation of Labor, which has claimed as many as six million members.

Let's take a look at the current state of these detachment efforts in order:

In many respects, Pietro Nenni is one of the most interesting figures on the Italian political scene. He is also one of the most important. And since the elections of last June 7, he has been more important than ever, for his left-wing Socialists boosted their representation in the Chamber of Deputies from 50 to 75 seats.

Hope seems to be eternal in many Italian breasts that Nenni one day will break his tie with the Communists and join the left-of-center democratic forces.

It is hard for an American to understand why this hope should exist. Although Nenni is by all odds the most prominent member of his party, there is good reason to believe he does not control the party machinery. Most observers outside the Socialist party believe its apparatus is in the hands of three younger men -- Rodolfo Morandi, Oreste Lizzardi and Giusto Tolloy. And Italian democrats regard these three as Communist agents within the ranks of the Socialist party.

It would take tremendous courage and determination for Nenni to make the break when his party machinery is in the hands of such men. And if he were so inclined, he has before him the example of other prominent Italian politicians who have broken with his party in the last six years, but who have failed to lure more than a substantial minority of the party followers.

The most serious break of this kind occurred in 1947, when Giuseppe Saragat and his supporters cut their ties because they claimed Nenni was making the party simply an appendage of the Communists. But last June 7, the Saragat Socialists polled only a million, 200 thousand votes. They lost 600,000 from their 1948 total, and their representation in the Chamber of Deputies was cut from 33 to 19.

Some who know him say that Nenni lacks the courage to make the break and that he fears it would mean his political ruin if he did.

Others think Nenni sincerely believes that no genuine social and economic reforms can be carried out in Italy without Communist support and that a Communist-Socialist break would doom the hopes for such measures.

Some observers believe Nenni's determination to break with the Communists will increase in direct proportion to Communist chances of coming to power in Italy. These observers say Nenni above all is not stupid and that he knows well what has happened to Socialists of his kind after the Communists have taken over in other countries.

Whatever the truth about the innermost thoughts of Pietro Nenni there is a substantial group of Italian democratic Socialists that waits for him to break and believes that someday he will.

Nenni in the past showed himself capable of various kinds of political evolutions. He once was a Republican. And he was a Fascist and a co-worker of Benito Mussolini for a brief period.

Hopeful democratic Socialists also watch for Nenni bids to the democratic parties for a restoration of the old Popular Front, of pre-World War II vintage. There have been such tentative bids from Nenni since the June elections and one of them, issued during the long summer cabinet crisis, had a fairly reasonable sound. Nenni said that although his party had bitterly fought the Atlantic treaty, Italy had ratified that pact and, of course, could not go back on its solemn commitment. He said his party would feel justified only in demanding that Italy not join any European Defense community which would include as one objective the rearming of Germans.

That Nenni bid won support from many Italians who are not sympathetic to Communism and who are not even enrolled Socialists, but who fear the rearming of Germany under any conditions. These Italians resented what they regarded as the abrupt way in which Nenni's proposal was cast aside by Alcide de Gasperi, who then was seeking to form a new government.

These hopeful Italian Socialists point out that Nenni has concrete proof that detaching himself even a short distance from the Communists pays off at the polls. Immediately after World War II, the Socialists were the biggest party in Italy. But during the period of their alliance with the Communists, their strength diminished to the point where they were only a substantial tail to the Communist kite. In the Chamber of Deputies after the 1948 election, they held only 50 seats to 133 for the Reds.

For this year's election campaign, the Nenni Socialists decided to campaign with a separate list of candidates, rather than the common slate they drew with the Communists five years ago. Nenni's campaign slogan was "the Socialist alternative," the clear implication being that his party would steer a course midway between that of the Communists on the left and the Christian Democrats in the middle. Nenni said glibly that his party really sought only "neutrality" for Italy between the two great power blocs, headed by the United States and Russia.

The result of this appeal has already been noted: An increase of 50 per cent in the Nenni party's representation in the Chamber.

But the hard fact is that Nenni at no time hasoffered to break his so-called "unity of action" pact with the Communists. Another fact is that if Nenni has been hinting at a revival of the Popular Front kind of government, so have the Communists. Communist party leader Palmiro Togliatti is said to have told the British left-wing Laborite, R. H. S. Crossman, in effect: "If Nenni goes to the right, I'll go even further right than he does." Togliatti's meaning was clear. And the Communists have been trying to implement Popular Front strategy on the Italian laborfront already in a way I will examine in a few minutes.

And so, the effort to detach Nenni himself from the grasp of the Communists seems to be getting nowhere. Giuseppe Saragat of the Social Democrats, who made an effort to persuade De Gasperi to take Nenni into the post-election cabinet under certain conditions last summer, now has given up that angle. But Saragat still is trying, with his Social Democratic party, to maintain what he calls "Apertura a Sinistra" -- an opening to the left -- which is designed to capture many of Nenni's followers, if not the head man himself.

The Saragat effort will be examined in a later Letter. It will suffice for now to say that the available evidence indicates that the Social Democratic leader is having no major success. But the idea of detaching Nenni and his followers from Togliatti; the idea of bringing into the government a unified, powerful Socialist party whose leaders had broken decisively from the Communist embrace -- that idea will continue to fascinate Italian democrats of the political left.

But an outsider taking a look at recent election results and bits of additional evidence wonders if the reverse process isn't the more powerful one. I noted in a Rome newspaper yesterday that the directors of the Nenni party had voted unanimously to accept back into the fold the Hon. Umberto Calosso. The account said Signor Calosso had left the party in 1947, together with the Hon. Saragat.

If the Social democrats trying to win converts from the Communists and the Nenni Socialists think theirs is a formidable assignment they should stop to consider the job of Giulio Pastore. Signor Pastore is the head of the CISL, the trade union sponsored by the Christian Democratic party. His job is to build up his union by enticing workers away from the Communist-led CGIL, or Italian General Confederation of Labor.

Pastore was once a member of the executive committee of the CGIL, which was formed even before the end of World War II as an independent labor union. Christian Democrats, Socialists and Communists all participated in organizing the CGIL, but the internal politics of the union followed a pattern dismally familiar, even in the United States. The Communists gradually captured control of CGIL machinery and used the big union to call political strikes and otherwise advance their cause. Finally, in August, 1948, Christian Democratic members of the CGIL executive council resigned from the union and set up what has become the CISL under Pastore's leadership.

The CISL has claimed as many as a million and a half members at times. The CGIL, ably directed by Communist leader Giuseppe di Vittorio, has claimed as many as six million, though some Italian observers believe the number of dues-paying members may be two million less than that. In 1949, a third union, known as the UIL, was started by men who originally had been Left Socialist members of the CGIL. The UIL has the support of Social Democrats, Republicans and some Liberals, but its membership is thought to be only around half a million.

Consider, for a moment, the current plight of Signor Pastore, leader of the Christian Democratic CISL. Giuseppe di Vittorio of the CGIL has been calling a series of 24-hour strikes to enforce wage demands that many Italians think are perfectly reasonable. Signor Pastore has been trying to convince workers that the CISL is just as solicitous for their welfare as the CGIL is -- or even more so. Pastore has denounced Italian industrialists in stronger language than Di Vittorio. Both to demonstrate his militancy and because he thought CGIL demands were just, Signor Pastore has teamed his CISL with the Communist-led union several times in recent months on those 24-hour strikes.

This has brought him under fire from conservative elements in his own Christian Democratic party. That criticism hit a peak last week, when Pastore's union joined the CGIL in calling a 24-hour strike of the statali, the workers in industries operated by the state. For in effect, this was a strike against the government. And the government is run by Pastore's own Christian Democratic party. That government of Premier Giuseppe Pella made it very clear that it disapproved of the strike and questioned its legality. It also made motions in the direction of preparing a law to prevent it from happening again.

What would you have done in Giulio Pastore's position, given his mission of building a great labor union that will compete for members on something like even terms with the Communist-led CGIL?

Pastore was pilloried for his action by Giovanni Guareschi, author of the Don Camillo books and editor of the weekly magazine, Candido. Guareschi drew a huge cartoon, showing the Communist, Di Vittorio, about to post a Christmas greeting addressed to "Malenkov, Moscow, USSR." It is signed by Togliatti and Di Vittorio. But Pastore is rushing up, pen in hand, saying: "Wait before you post it. I wish to sign it, too."

The UIL decided not to join the other two unions in last week's strike. Di Vittorio and Company can be depended on to use this abstention effectively to point out to workers that the UIL puts its dislike of collaboration with the CGIL ahead of its devotion to their interests. At the moment, of course, Di Vittorio and the Communists are hailing the unity between themselves and the CISL. They are putting up posters, saying that this teamwork demonstrates what can be accomplished if the unions will only stick together. It's propaganda for what you might call a Popular Front on the labor union level to go along with the Communist-Left Socialist bids for a Popular Front on the strictly political level.

There is no sure way to measure this, but some observers are convinced that Pastore's CISL has lost ground in recent weeks and months. They cite as factors in such losses three things: the Christian Democratic party's losses in the national elections last June; the dilemma in which Pastore found himself in the recent strike of workers against the Christian Democratic government; and, finally, the attacks that have been made on him for teaming up with the Communists.

In summary, the effort by Italian democrats to bring about defections from Communist leadership on both the political and labor union level seem at the moment to be making little progress. There is some evidence that the defections, in fact, are going in the other direction.

Graham Hovey, signing another radio Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radio Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 8
Recorded in Rome, December 22, 1953
Tape runs 13 minutes

This is Graham Hovey, reporting from Rome with another radio Letter from Italy, produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana.

In previous Letters I have taken a look at the two extremes in Italian politics. I have examined the possibility that Italy might be drifting back to Fascism. And I have examined some factors in the growing strength of the Italian Communists.

Italy cannot go Fascist and Communist at the same time, of course. But the simultaneous drift toward the two extremes and away from the democratic middle is a familiar phenomenon in politics. The national elections of last June 7 demonstrated that his trend is continuing in Italy.

On the far right, the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement polled a million and a half votes and increased its representation in the Chamber of Deputies from six to 29 seats. The Monarchist party polled a million 800 thousand votes and boosted its Chamber delegation from 14 to 40.

On the far left, the Communists and left Socialists together gained a million and a half votes over their eight million figure of 1948 and increased their overall representation in the Chamber from 183 to 218.

The Fascists and Monarchists have gained by exploiting a variety of Italian frustrations and discontents. The Communists and left Socialists have done this too, but they also have worked unceasingly at the onerous job of party organization and the task of identifying themselves unmistakably with the interests of workers and peasants.

One can say all this without entirely explaining away that drift away from the democratic middle. What I am saying is that the parties belonging to that democratic middle road must shoulder some of the responsibility. It has been their weaknesses, as well as the other factors I have listed, that account for the growing strength of the far left and the louder noises emanating from the far right.

It follows that these democratic parties must correct their weaknesses; must do a more adequate job, if the delicate Italian democracy is to survive and grow stronger. Well, then, what are the prospects?

At the moment, the strongest of these parties; the strongest party in Italy, has the responsiblity of governing the country. I refer, of course, to the Christian Democratic party. Last June, the Christian Democrats polled nearly 11 million votes and won 262 Chamber seats. That represented a loss of two million votes and 43 seats over the party's 1948 showing.

Partly as the result of those losses, the Christian Democracy is obviously in a period of transition at the moment. Premier Giuseppe Pella must depend on Monarchist support for his parliamentary majority, but no one knows how long that will be forthcoming and at what price. The party has shown some signs of disintegration.

The other democratic parties -- the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans -- no longer share the responsibilities of governing, as all of them once did in the De Gasperi governments. And if the Christian Democrats are in a period of transition, these "lay" democratic parties, as the Italians call them, are in periods of genuine crisis. To be blunt about it, they arefacing the possibility of political extinction.

Their showings in the June elections were bad enough. The next election might wipe them out.

This would surely be an unfortunate development for the Italian democracy, as many Christian Democrats would agree. These three parties are needed. They contain some of the most intelligent and devoted men in Italian public life. Whether in or out of the government, these parties exert an influence on the Christian Democrats of a kind that neither the totalitarian left nor right is capable of exerting. They help the majority of Christian Democrats keep their sometimes unwieldly party in the middle of the road. And they provide a democratic alternative to the Christian Democracy for Italians unwilling to vote for a Catholic party.

And so more than just those who vote for the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans are watching with concern the efforts of these parties to clarify their positions and firm up their ranks. I think these efforts should be of interest to Americans, who, after all, have a rather large stake in what happens to the Italian democracy. And so I thought I would devote this Letter from Italy to a brief review of the current positions of these three democratic parties and their efforts to improve those positions.

First of all, here is what happened to these parties in the elections of last June:

The Social Democrats, largest of the three, dropped 600,000 votes from their 1948 total. They polled a million, 200 thousand, and their representation in the Chamber of Deputies went down from 33 to 19.

The Liberals, who had polled just over a million votes in 1948, dropped to 800,000, and won only 14 Chamber seats compared with 19 in the previous parliament.

The Republicans polled only 439,000 votes and dropped from nine Chamber seats to five.

One of two questions generally comes to the mind of a foreigner examining these unhappy election results. The first one is, why don't these parties combine forces for added strength? And the second question is: why don't these parties throw their combined support to Premier Pella and participate in his government, if they are eager to keep the Christian Democrats in the middle of the road?

The answer is that both of these courses have been considered, and, up to now, rejected, for reasons having to do with the election results and the differing characters and different problems of the parties involved.

Let's take up that second question first: why don't these three parties support Pella? Together they have 38 votes. If they withhold these 38 votes, Pella has no alternative to accepting the 40 Chamber votes of the Monarchists and paying a price for their support.

Well, as I have said, these parties did participate at various times in the governments headed by De Gasperi. But some of their members always thought such a course politically unwise. At best they were only tails to the Christian Democratic kite. Membership in a predominantly Christian Democratic government seemed to involve these minor parties in an obligation to defend that government. By belonging to such a government they risked being blamed for its shortcomings but found it difficult to claim credit for its achievements. They were risking loss of their political identities.

The Liberals finally dropped out in protest over the government's land reform program. The Social Democrats eventually dropped out because of their belief that such a course would best promote party unity and win defections from the left-wing Socialist party of Pietro Nenni. Only the Republicans stuck with De Gasperi to the end.

But all three parties did establish an alliance with the Christian Democrats for the June elections. And all three went along with the bigger party in passing an election law that aroused bitter opposition, not only from the Communists, who branded it "la legge truffa" -- the swindle law -- but also many Italian democrats. It was this law that would have given any party or group of parties getting one more than 50 per cent of the votes for the Chamber of Deputies 64 per cent of the seats -- or 380 seats out of the 590 total.

There is no doubt that this law was a big factor in the failure of the Christian Democrats and their three allied parties to get that 50 per cent.

Their poor showings as minor partners of the Christian Democrats caused the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans to have lengthy second thoughts, not only on the electoral law but on the whole question of the four-party coalition. And in any event, the election results were widely regarded as a repudiation of that De Gasperi coalition.

Giuseppe Saragat, leader of the Socail Democrats, looked at the 600,000 votes his party had lost and announced that he would come into the new government only if the Nenni Socialists were also included. When De Gasperi brushed this suggestion aside, for obvious reasons, Saragat launched his policy of "apertura a sinistra" -- opening to the left. This was designed either to effect reunion with Nenni's forces, on the condition they would break their alliance with the Communists, or to win recruits from Nenni if he refused to leave the Reds.

A split that had been brewing in Liberal ranks for a long time threatened disaster. Historically, the Liberals have been a conservative party, devoted to parliamentary democracy, but wary of government interference with the established economic and social order.

But the left wing of the Liberal party, composed mostly of younger men, now seems to be gaining the upper hand. Their economic and social views are closely akin to those of the Republicans and the Saragat Socialists.

The question now is whether this more progressive group can prevail without splitting the party. An indication of how nip and tuck the intra-party battle is came recently at a meeting of the national council. Bruno Villabruna, supported by the left and center, was re-elected party secretary, with 59 favorable votes. But 43 blank ballots were cast and 19 delegates abstained from voting.

So far as the dwindling Republican party was concerned, it could not participate in any government dependent on Monarchist support.

It is doubtful that any of three parties would serve in a government headed by Pella in any case. Most of their leaders seem to regard Pella as definitely a man of the political right. They feel he would have swung to the right even if he had not been dependent on those 40 Monarchist votes. And all three parties are severely critical of the manner in which Pella has handled the Trieste question.

So much, then, for the question of why the three parties are not supporting Pella and serving in his government.

As for the second question, my brief review of Social Democratic policy and Liberal internal troubles since the election have already indicated some difficulties in the path of union, or even alliance, of the three parties.

Nevertheless, alliance, or at least agreement on a common program of political action, has been seriously proposed recently by Ugo La Malfa, Republican deputy and former minister of foreign trade in the De Gasperi government. Significantly, La Malfa made his proposal for a get-together of the three party secretaries not in the Republican party newspaper, but in the weekly, Il Mondo, which is edited by the left-wing Liberals.

Although the proposal is not new it has aroused much interest and lively debate in Italian political and journalistic circles. All three party secretaries -- Saragat for the Social Democrats; Villabruna for the Liberals, and Oronzo Reale for La Malfa's own Republicans -- have now replied in the columns of Il Mondo.

You could summarize these three responses with the old American political expression, "yes, but." All three agree on desirability of common action, but they also see the obvious difficulties.

Saragat now is going all-out in his opposition to the Christian Democrats. He has discovered things about the Christian Democracy that apparently escaped him during the years in which he collaborated with it. He says that agreements among the three parties can be useful, but what is indispensable is that each, on its own ground, recover what Saragat calls "that democratic initiative that through an error of perspective was delegated to a coalition whose major exponent managed it for its own use and consumption. . . ."

Saragat insists that the Social Democratic program must be a genuine "opening to the left." He believes that such a policy, coupled with all-out assault on the Christian Democrats, will win recruits from the ranks of the Nenni Socialists.

Saragat fears too close a tie-up with the Liberals would hamper his efforts to win working-class support away from Nenni. It is also obvious that Villabruna cannot speak up decisively for the Liberals on the La Malfa proposal. He must keep ever in mind those 43 blank ballots and 19 abstentions at the time of his re-election as party secretary.

I have talked with Signor La Malfa about his proposal. It seems to me that his hopes for it are quite realistic. He believes that the two successful demonstrations of left-center democratic governments in our time have been the Roosevelt New Deal in America and the Labor government's

six-year tenure in Britain. He would like to see the three parties unite on a program that would be a cross between the New Deal and British Socialism. He speaks not of early victory at the polls, but only of the possibility of building a strength comparable to that of the Nenni Socialists in the next election. That would mean a combined gain for the three parties of half a million votes and doubling their present strength of 38 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

Such a strengthening of these three parties would surely be a healthy development for the Italian democracy. And the public debate on the La Malfa proposal has been interesting and stimulating. But it has gone on for a month now, without concrete result. One wonders if these parties have that much time. One wonders whether such a debate is not a luxury, given their present situation.

Signor La Malfa apparently believes so. His latest comment on the subject was an article in the Republican party newspaper under the headline: "Comedy of the Equivocals." In that article, La Malfa says: "The minor parties know that which they do not want, but they know little of what they do want." And he adds that by going their separate ways, the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans in the next elections will risk going "more or less rapidly to the bottom."

The discussion among the parties has been considerably livened recently by the proposal of a Christian Democratic leader for a resumption of the old four-party coalition. Former Interior Minister Mario Scelba called on the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans to come back into the fold in order to work for a program of social and economic reforms and thus beat off the challenge from both left and right.

I hope to examine the Scelba proposal in relation to the position of the Christian Democracy in a subsequent broadcast.

Graham Hovey, signing another Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radio Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 9
Recorded in Rome, January 6, 1954
Tape runs 13:55

This is Graham Hovey, reporting from Rome with a special Letter from Italy, produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana.

By the time you hear this broadcast Italy may have a new prime minister. These lines are necessarily being recorded less than 48 hours after the fall of the government of Giuseppe Pella.

At this moment, one can only speculate about the turn Italy's politics will take in the next few days and weeks. The only sure thing in the picture is that they will be difficult days and weeks for the eight-year-old Italian democracy and for the man who takes up the burden cast down by Pella on January 5.

But I believe it is possible at this point to answer some of the questions Americans may be asking about this new Italian political crisis. By taking a look at Pella's tactics in office and a closer look at Italy's biggest party -- the Christian Democrats -- it is possible to understand why this thing happened. And it is also possible to understand some of the difficulties that will confront Pella's successor.

Pella's dramatic resignation was as much of a shock in Rome as it must have been in Washington. No one had predicted his exit at this time. No one, with the exceptions of the Communists and Fascists, wanted to precipitate his exit at this time.

It had been apparent that Pella was heading into serious political storms, particularly with his own Christian Democratic party. But he had been in the process of reshuffling his cabinet, partly to meet party objections. And everyone seemed to think that with his revamped cabinet, Pella would go on doing business into the spring, and perhaps longer.

All evidence supported the idea that Pella was still in a strong position with the country-at-large.

The issue on which he fell was <u>not</u> Trieste, though his handling of that question may have been a long-range factor in the weakening of his political position. And I might interpolate that if the United States and Britain had been able to make good their October pledge to return Zone A of the Trieste Free Territory to Italy, Pella might have been strong enough to ride out this January crisis. Still it was <u>not</u> Trieste that caused Pella's fall.

Indeed, the immediate factor must have seemed a superficial one to many Italians: Pella fell because his own party -- the Christian Democrats -- would not accept the man he proposed to make his minister of agriculture. The party would not accept this man although he is a member of the party and a Christian Democratic member of the Chamber of Deputies.

Pella proposed to nominate Salvatore Aldisio as minister of agriculture. The party wanted Pella to retain Senator Rocco Salomone in that job. But finally the party told Pella to name anyone who would be clearly recognized as a supporter of the agricultural policy which the government has been carrying out and which the party charted.

Instead, Pella said the party's stand was an "inadmissable" interference with the freedom of the premier to choose his own cabinet. And on that issue, Pella quit.

Those are the bare bones of the story. You can understand why I say that to many Italians this issue must have seemed superficial, brought on by petty behavior on the part of both premier and party.

The explanation is that there was much more to this situation than met the eye; much more than simply the fate of one cabinet portfolio or the political fortunes of Signor Aldisio. A crisis between Pella and his party probably was inevitable and the Aldisio affair was just one symptom. And the fall of Pella, in turn, was just a symptom of a deeper and broader political crisis which today grips all Italian democratic parties, but especially the Christian Democrats.

Having said that, I should add that the Aldisio case by itself was not unimportant, and deserves examination. To understand why the party found Signor Aldisio completely unacceptable as minister of agriculture it is necessary to recall how forcefully the issue of agricultural reform and land tenure has been projected into Italian politics since World War II.

Under prodding from the political Left, the Christian Democratic party pledged itself to a drastic agricultural reform program, including the breaking up of big estates and the distributing of land to the peasants. Partly on the basis of this pledge, the party won its sweeping victory over the Communists and Left Socialists in the crucial election of April 18, 1948.

The government of former Premier Alcide De Gasperi was slow in getting started on this complicated reform, but work is now well underway and it is literally changing the face of the Italian landscape in the areas involved. By the end of 1952 decrees for transfer of more than 290,000 acres had been issued. By about a year ago more than 160,000 acres had actually been parceled out to more than 70,000 peasant families, and distribution has been accelerated since then.

But the whole long-range land reform program will continue for years. It involves home-building, road building, reclamation, irrigation, flood control and modernization of agricultural methods, in addition to land distribution. Many Italians believe land reform is the most important issue challenging the country. Many believe that if carried to a reasonably successfull conclusion it will deal a major blow against communism, particularly in the poverty-stricken south of the country, which may be decisive political battleground.

Well, what has all this to do with Signor Aldisio, whom Premier Pella proposed to make minister of agriculture? Signor Aldisio is a member of the ultra-conservative Right wing of the Christian Democratic party. And as a member of the De Gasperi cabinet, he bitterly opposed the land reform law. The Rome daily, Il Messaggero, recalls that Aldisio protested vigorously when the cabinet approved the law at a meeting from which he was absent.

You can understand, then, why supporters of the land reform were so aroused at the prospect of Signor Aldisio becoming minister of agriculture. They were unwilling to permit a man who had opposed the land reform from assuming a position where he could influence government agricultural policy. They knew such an appointment would be exploited by the Communists as proof that the Christian Democratic land reform was dead. They feared Pella was appointing Aldisio to appease the Monarchists, who are strongly opposed to land reform and whose support Pella has needed to insure a parliamentary majority.

It is interesting to note that the man who carried the veto of Christian Democratic party directors on the Aldisio appointment to Premier Pella was Amintore Fanfani. And it was Fanfani who went back a second time to plead with Pella not to make the appointment.

That was interesting for these reasons: first, Fanfani vigorously administered the beginnings of the land reform as minister of agriculture in De Gasperi's cabinet; second, Fanfani is leader of the so-called "Democratic Initiative" faction that has fought to keep the Christian Democrats on the road to social and economic reforms; a left-center faction that provides a counterforce within the party to the conservative wing which Aldisio represents; and, finally, Fanfani had served Pella loyally as minister of the interior and was slated for reappointment to that important job in the revamped cabinet.

But two points need emphasis here:

The first is that the Aldisio affair does not mean that the left-of-center faction is in firm control of the Christian Democratic party.

And the second is that Pella's troubles with his party were deeper and broader than simply a quarrel with the party's left wing over the agriculture ministry.

Fanfani was spokesman for the party directors on the veto of Aldisio, but this does not mean that Fanfani's "Democratic Initiative" faction can run the party or chart overall party policy. As a matter of fact, "Democratic Initiative" is only one of three fairly well defined left-of-center groups within the sprawling, heterogenous Christian Democratic party. All the Aldisio affair means so far as the party is concerned is that on this issue the Fanfani group, with the support of De Gasperi, was able to make its policy the party policy. Only in that context was the veto of Aldisio, achieved at the cost of a cabinet crisis, a victory for the Left wing of the Christian Democracy.

In that connection, it should be noted that Pella's intention of appointing a right-wing Christian Democrat -- Attilio Piccioni -- as vice premier and foreign minister in the revamped cabinet -- was quite acceptable to the party. In fact, the party may have suggested Piccioni for the job. It is interesting, then, to add the additional fact that Piccioni was the sponsor of Aldisio for the agriculture ministry.

But the fact that Piccioni was acceptable to the party as number two man in the cabinet illustrates the point that the left wing is not in firm control of the Christian Democracy. You might say that the left wing had to accept right-winger Piccioni as vice premier and foreign minister in order to put over its party veto of Aldisio as agriculture minister. But the Piccioni matter gets me back to my second point: that Pella's troubles with his party were broader than just the Aldisio affair.

The fact is that Pella has never been a "party man," in the sense in which politicians use that term. He was elected to parliament as a Christian Democrat and he served with distinction as budget minister in the De Gasperi cabinet. But one writer has said of him that although he lived for eight years in the midst of politics, he had as little to do with it as possible.

As I reported previously on this program, Pella was not the choice of the party to head the government after the summer cabinet crisis. He was selected in fact as well as constitutionally by President Luigi Einaudi, after De Gasperi had been defeated in parliament and Piccioni had failed even to get

to the point of asking the Chamber and Senate for a vote of confidence. The Christian Democratic leaders in parliament tactlessly made it clear that Pella was not their man; that they would have preferred someone else.

It was only the strenuous intervention of De Gasperi that got the party fairly well in line for Pella last autumn. But the political honeymoon between Pella and the country lasted much longer than that between the premier and his party.

De Gasperi and other Christian Democratic leaders were deeply disturbed by Pella's handling of the explosive Trieste question. Some thought he was trying to use that emotional issue to turn his supposedly stopgap government into a durable one and establish himself firmly in the premiership. It was said that Pella was spending too much time on foreign affairs and neglecting pressing domestic questions. Some Christian Democrats thought Pella should turn over the foreign ministry to someone else, for he was serving simultaneously as premier, foreign minister and budget minister.

Christian Democratic trade unionists, led by Giulio Pastore, criticized Pella for the firm stand taken by the government in the wave of industrial strikes that struck Italy in December. Their union, the CISL, had gone along with the Communist-dominated CGIL in backing those strikes.

And it riled many Christian Democrats that Pella had to depend on Monarchist support for a sure parliamentary majority and they were constantly asking what price the premier was paying for that support.

So much, then, for the party's side of the case. There is also Pella's side, and it too, deserves serious consideration. First of all, even some Christian Democrats vigorously opposed to Aldisio believed Pella had a valid point when he defended the freedom of the premier to choose his own cabinet ministers. It's the same argument often advanced in America that a President should have a cabinet of his own choosing -- forgetting for a moment the very basic difference between the American system of checks and balances and the European parliamentary system.

Secondly, Pella took up the burden of forming a government when that job was truly a thankless task. He took on that job at a critical time for the Italian democracy. And the fact that he succeeded where De Gasperi and Piccioni had failed brought an end to the long summer crisis.

Pella did that job well enough to restore the faith of Italians in their eight-year-old democratic system and to win genuine widespread support for himself in the country.

Pella can make out a case for the argument that his own party has never appreciated the job he did and that it never gave him the support he deserved during his four and a half months as premier. "Party man" or not, he was doing a job for the party as well as for the country. And he had served both party and country faithfully and well as budget and treasury minister for many years.

So far as the Trieste issue is concerned, Pella can argue with some evidence that it was forced on him and that De Gasperi himself had started the ball rolling by a much tougher stand on that issue after the elections last June.

So far as his dependence on the Monarchists was concerned, Pella can ask a very difficult question, namely, what was the alternative? What was the alternative to depending on the 40 Monarchist votes in the Chamber of Deputies

once the biggest of De Gasperi's former coalition partners -- the Social Democrats -- had decided to withhold their 19 votes from Pella? Together, the three former cabinet partners of the Christian Democrats -- that is, the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans -- now have only 38 Chamber votes.

Three developments in December brought the Pella-party relationship close to the showdown stage:

First, the Christian Democrats issued a statement that seemed to be neutral on the strike of workers in government-operated industries -- after Pella had taken a strong stand against the strike.

Second, former Interior Minister Mario Scelba publicly advocated a reconstruction of the old De Gasperi coalition government of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans. Scelba emphasized that he was speaking personally, but he is a director of the party. His speech was interpreted as criticism of Pella for accepting Monarchist support.

And finally, De Gasperi wrote a stirring call to action for the first issue of a new Christian Democratic weekly. In the article, he referred to the Pella cabinet as "a friendly government." To Pella, this implied that the party as such felt no responsibility for the government and did not regard it in any sense as a party government.

Pella then threatened to resign unless he got full party support. The party countered by demanding a reshuffle of the cabinet to make it more of a Christian Democratic political government. And it was inability to reach final agreement on the makeup of that government that brought on Pella's resignation.

As I say, these things help explain why the crisis between premier and party probably was inevitable and would have come later if not now. But these things only begin to explain the much deeper and broader Italian political crisis of which the fall of Pella is only a symptom. I hope to examine this more important question -- for Italy and for America -- in another special delivery radio Letter from Italy.

Graham Hovey reporting from Rome for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 10
Recorded in Rome, January 6, 1954
Tape runs 14:30

This is Graham Hovey, sending from Rome a second Letter from Italy concerning the political crisis that came with the fall of the government of Premier Giuseppe Pella. These programs are produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radio Italiana.

In the first of these two radio Letters on the Italian political crisis I tried to indicate why a showdown between Premier Pella and his own Christian Democratic party probably would have come eventually even if it had been averted for the present.

Pella has never been what politicians call "a party man;" he had never been the party's choice for prime minister; and he was unwilling to accept the party's veto of his choice for agriculture minister of a man who had opposed the party's land reform program.

But I added, in that first Letter devoted to the subject, that the fall of Pella was just a symptom of a deeper and broader political crisis which today grips all Italian democratic parties, but especially the Christian Democrats. And today I should like to examine that deeper and broader crisis as it affects Italy's biggest party; the party that has had the primary responsibility for governing the country for more than eight critical postwar years.

I should emphasize again that these lines are being recorded in advance of the designation of a new premier by Italy's president, Luigi Einaudi. But the analysis of the crisis in the Christian Democratic party may help explain what happened to Pella and some of the difficulties that probably will confront his successor.

I said that this deeper and broader crisis affects all Italian democratic parties.

I might add that I had prepared part of a series of Letters from Italy, examining the current situations of these parties, before the present crisis broke. And I was waiting only for the Pella cabinet to be reorganized before examining the position of the Christian Democrats. I believe that in spite of the changed situation caused by the fall of Pella, those previously-prepared analyses will stand up. But if you hear them you should keep in mind that I had no crystal ball and that they were prepared in advance of Pella's resignation on January 5.

To Europeans accustomed to party unity and responsibility, Italy's Christian Democrats make little sense. And even to Americans, accustomed to a Democratic party broad enough to cover Harry S. Truman and Harry F. Byrd, or a Republican party heterogeneous enough to embrace Senator George Aiken of Vermont on one hand and Senator John Bricker of Ohio on the other -- even to us, the Christian Democracy is an astonishing coalition.

A couple of years ago an American journalist, Leo J. Wollemborg, described the Christian Democratic party as "a rainbow with a spectrum ranging all the way from a faint pink to a Fascist black, or at least gray." And an Italian writer has referred to the party as "a very peculiar and treacherous organism." It is, said this writer, "an amalgam of a mass party, a political machine, and a medley of conflicting economic interests, each component depending on a different center of force." This Italian writer thought the mass party was provided by the tie with the Catholic church. The political

machine, he said, was "based on the huge network of key positions the party has been able to build up throughout the country" during its years in power. And the economic interests were simply the "big vested interests of Italy, plus Catholic labor."

Both this Italian writer and Leo J. Wollemborg wrote their descriptions of the Christian Democracy more than two years ago. But each had one additional thing to say which I think helps to explain the present crisis within the party, of which the fall of Premier Pella was a symptom.

The Italian writer said that the ingredients of the Christian Democracy were held together by "only one agent: the fact that the party is in power." He said that "any shift in the political situation within the country at large will threaten the whole structure."

And Leo Wollemborg said that it was due only to former Premier Alcide de Gasperi's "singular personality, his unusual mixture of deep piety and political skill, that the party has held together at all."

I say that these two assessments -- which actually contradict one another in a sense -- help explain what is happening to the Christian Democratic party today. The "shift in the political situation" which the Italian writer said would "threaten the whole structure" of the Christian Democracy actually occurred in the national elections last June 7. And if the party still is holding together, rather than breaking up into its many ingredients, it still is due to the prestige and power and political skill of Alcide de Gasperi.

Political scientists and political journalists have long sought to isolate the ingredients that go into the cement that keeps a great political party intact, but all would agree, I think, that victory at the polls ranks high on the list. And the Christian Democrats, founded on the remnants of Don Sturzo's old Italian Popular party during World War II, have been a remarkably successful party, whether they made any sense in their composition or not.

In the first national postwar election in Italy -- held June 2, 1946, to elect a Constituent Assembly and render a verdict on the monarchy -- the Christian Democrats became the strongest party in the country. They got 35.2 per cent of all votes cast.

And in the crucial national election of April 18, 1948 -- while the free world held its collective breath -- the Christian Democrats won nearly 49 per cent of the votes; captured an absolute majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and a comfortable plurality in the Senate. It had only about a million party members, but got more than 12.7 million votes.

In the national election of last June 7, the Christian Democrats polled 10.8 million votes to remain the largest single party by a wide margin. But they had dropped nearly two million from their 1948 high mark and their representation in the Chamber dropped from 305 seats to 262.

Mathematically speaking, the overall election result was not a defeat. But the result certainly was a serious political setback and it started the various factions of the party snarling at each other again. For the Christian Democrats had expected to do better. They had made an electoral alliance with the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans and they believed this four-party bloc would get more than 50 per cent of the votes. They had been able to pass an electoral law under which any group of parties getting more than 50 per cent of the votes would get nearly 65 per cent of the seats in the Chamber, or 380 out of 590. But the bloc failed by 57,000 votes to get its 50 per cent and wound up with a total of only 300 Chamber seats -- not a workable majority.

De Gasperi was struck down in the Chamber of Deputies when he presented a new and wholly Christian Democratic cabinet for approval the month after the elections. Another Christian Democratic leader, Attilio Piccioni, tried to form a government but failed even to reach the point of asking the approval of parliament.

Finally, as a stopgap measure, the parliament accepted a cabinet headed by Giuseppe Pella, made up of Christian Democrats and two independents. But, as I have indicated, the party was never very happy with Pella. It was Christian Democratic dissatisfaction with Pella and party prodding of the premier to make his cabinet more of a party government that brought on the showdown and led to his resignation.

It is no exaggeration to say that at some periods since that election of last June the various factions of the Christian Democracy have seemed more interested in fighting one another than in fighting their enemies of the far political left and right.

One of the Italians most alarmed at this deteriorating situation was Alcide de Gasperi. He had not taken his parliamentary defeat in July in what many Italians regarded as a gracious manner and after that all the grievances that inevitably pile up against a political leader long in office were heaped on him. Many of his friends urged De Gasperi to remain on the political sidelines, aside from serving quietly in the Chamber of Deputies. They pointed out that the Italian parliament must choose a successor to President Einaudi in 1955 and that he would be in an excellent position for serious consideration if he behaved in the interim in as non-political a manner as possible.

Instead, De Gasperi, at 72 years of age and after eight years of back-breaking work as head of the Italian government, undertook the onerous, rarely-rewarding job of party secretary. When he announced his candidacy for that job, he told friends privately: "I may be the only one who can keep the party together." Many Italian politicians outside the Christian Democracy agree with De Gasperi's assessment.

It may not be generally known outside Italy that De Gasperi had to sustain one more humiliation before taking up this thankless job: Although there was no other candidate, 25 members of the national council of the Christian Democracy cast blank ballots on the issue of electing De Gasperi party secretary, as aginst the 40-odd who voted for him.

It is generally agreed among Christian Democratic politicians that those 25 blank votes were not cast by one faction, but by representatives of several different party groupings. The incident may be important as a revelation of how serious the party split is.

This job of trying to hold the Christian Democracy together and to drive it down the middle of the road, where he believes its only hope of survival and success lie, may be the toughest job De Gasperi has ever undertaken.

One thing is certain: He will be blamed if things go wrong; he will get little credit if they go right. It is significant that all through the Pella tenure the Communists and Left Socialists concentrated their fire not on Pella but on De Gasperi. It is significant that the Monarchists, who gave their support to Pella, have no use for De Gasperi, nor he for them. Both extremes in the Italian political spectrum seem to know very well which political man is their real enemy and the effective foe of the doctrines and dogmas they represent.

It seems likely that because of these attacks on him from left and right and because of certain aspects of Pella's behavior, De Gasperi has been blamed by many Italians for Pella's fall. In the previous Letter on the fall of Pella, I mentioned De Gasperi's stirring call to action in a Christian Democratic weekly as one factor in Pella's determination to force a showdown with the party.

But the evidence available seems to indicate that all through the cabinet crisis De Gasperi's role was two-fold: that of trying to prod Pella to take certain actions that might placate the party and that of trying to persuade the party to keep its demands on Pella within reason so as not to upset the government. Indeed, at one point, De Gasperi, fearing that Pella might take extreme action, offered to make another personal call on the premier to try to get agreement. But Pella sent word that he did not believe such a meeting "opportune."

Anyhow, if I am correct in believing that the fall of Pella is but a symptom of a deeper and broader crisis within the Christian Democratic party, perhaps it is time to take another and closer look at the composition of the party.

As I reported previously, the party veto of Pella's plan to nominate the ultra-conservative Salvatore Aldisio asminister of agriculture was engineered by a left-of-center Christian Democratic faction known as the "Democratic Initiative." But "Democratic Initiative" is only one of three fairly well-defined left-lf-center groups within the Christian Democratic fold. That fact gives you a rough idea of how heterogeneous the Christian Democracy is. "Democratic Initiative" was formed originally to combat what its members regarded as a swing to the political right by the party directorate. As I say, it was instrumental in bring about the party veto of Signor Aldisio.

Yet, two of the most prominent leaders of "Democratic Initiative" held major positons in the Pella cabinet and would have been retained if Pella had revamped his government instead of resigning. They are Amintore Fanfani, minister of the interior, and Paolo Emilio Taviani, minister of defense.

But back to the party: The other major group on the Christian Democratic left is the trade unionists, the men who run the Catholic labor union known as the CISL. Their leader is Giulio Pastore, head of the CISL. The union itself claims more than a million and a half members and has a sizeable bloc of Christian Democratic deputies in parliament. Pastore is working hard to build a great union and to win workers away from the bigger Communist-dominated CGIL. But to do that he must fight some industrialists as hard as he fights the Communists. And that means, specifically, that Pastore is engaged in frequent bitter battles with the industrialists and big land-owners who make up the Christian Democratic right wing. This right wing is known as the Vespisti because it held its first caucus in a showroom for the Vespa motor scooter, and its leader is a big landowner, Carmine de Martino. When de Martino tried to address the Christian Democratic party congress a year ago, the left wing howled him down and told him to "go join the Fascists, where you belong."

But to get back to Pastore, his latest fight was actually against the government run by his own party. Pastore's CISL joined the Communist-led CGIL in calling a strike of workers in government industries in December over the strong protests of the Pella government.

The third left-of-center group in the Christian Democracy is led by Giovanni Gronchi, president of the Chamber of Deputies. It is not a large group, but some Christian Democrats regard it as dangerous. In economic and

social policy, the Gronchi group is reformist and often supports the Democratic Initiative and the trade unionists. But in foreign policy its line is closer to that of both the Communists and Fascists, strange as that may sound. It is nationalistic, like the Fascists, but it is also neutralistic. That means that it opposes the Atlantic alliance and European unification policies of De Gasperi.

It means that the Gronchi group might be capable of a deal with either the far left or the far right if the present political crisis should be prolonged and no other solution should appear feasible.

In addition to these factions there are, of course, a great many Christian Democrats who generally stick to the middle of the road and follow the party policy. And no look at the composition of the Christian Democracy would be complete without a reference to Catholic Action. This organization, which claims three million members, is not a part of the Christian Democracy. But its so-called Civic Committees, organized by Professor Luigi Gedda, a Piedmontese physician, did a tremendous job in rolling up votes for the Christian Democrats both in 1948 and again in 1953. His enemies say that Gedda would like to create a single Catholic, anti-Communist party which would embrace both the neo-Fascists and the so-called Christian Socialists. However that may be, Gedda's considerable influence is exerted in such a way as to push the party toward the political right.

Such is the party that Alcide de Gasperi, at 72, has undertaken to hold together and to re-forge as an effective political instrument, capable of following a middle-road, democratic course and enacting needed social and economic reforms.

At the moment, as you well know, the outlook is not very encouraging. But De Gasperi will surely persist, because he knows that the falling apart of the Christian Democracy at the present time would surely imperil the whole Italian democratic system.

This is Graham Hovey, signing the second in a series of two Letters from Italy dealing with the present Italian political crisis. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radio Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 11
Recorded in Rome January 15, 1954
Tape runs: 13:45

This is Graham Hovey, sending along another radio Letter from Italy under the dateline: Rome. These programs are produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

Here is the way a cabinet crisis can begin in Italy: The voice is that of the Hon. Giuseppe Pella. He is speaking to a crowd of journalists and radio and television reporters in a large hall of the Palazzo Quirinale in Rome. The date is January 5 and the hour is eight in the evening. Pella has just come out of the office of Italy's president, Luigi Einaudi:

PELLA (first tape): "Come sapete, era mio intendimento dare una maggiore efficienza tecnica e politica al Governo, che ho constituito nel mese di agosto sotto i segni della transitorieta."

HOVEY (interrupting to translate): "As you know, it was my intention to give a greater technical and political efficiency to the Government that I formed in the month of August on a transitory basis."

PELLA (first tape continues): "Questa maggiore efficienza mi sembrava, e ritengo ancora oggi, indispensabile per poter affrontare quei concreti programmi di lavoro e di realizzazioni che il Paese attende."

HOVEY (interrupting to translate): "It seemed to me -- and I still think so today -- that this greater efficiency was indispensable for meeting those concrete programs of work and realizations that the country expects."

PELLA (first tape continues): "Ho cercato, attraverso la formula del rimaneggiamento, di raggiungere questo risultato, ma, purtroppo, ho incontrato fatti e difficoltà che mi portano a concludere che il raggiungimento del risultato cui accennavo, cioè un governo politicamente e tecnicamente efficiente, può essere meglio raggiunto soltanto attraverso la formula della crisi."

HOVEY (interrupting to translate): "I have sought, under the formula of a remodelling or reshuffling of the cabinet to achieve this result, but unfortunately I have met with facts and difficulties that made me conclude that the attainment of the result which I pointed out, that is, a government politically and technically efficient, could be better achieved only under the formula of a crisis."

PELLA (first tape continues): "Per questo ho avuto l'onore di presentare al signor Presidente della Repubblica le dimissioni del Governo."

HOVEY (translating): "For this, I have had the honor of presenting to the President of the Republic the resignation of the government."

HOVEY (continuing commentary): Well, there it is; that's exactly the way Italy's latest cabinet crisis started at eight o'clock on the evening of January 5 at the Quirinal palace in Rome. I thought you might like to hear some of the developments of this crisis from the lips of the men who figured in it, as their remarks were recorded and broadcast by the news staff of Radio Italiana. And I thought this might be a good time to review the way such a crisis develops in Italy's parliamentary system, which is so vastly different from our own system of coordinate branches of government and checks and balances between them.

We could start, I think, right back there at the Quirinal Palace with President Luigi Einaudi. If you have visited Rome you almost certainly have seen the Palazzo Quirinale. It's on high ground not far from the center of downtown Rome and it stretches for a good many city blocks along Rome's Via Venti Settembre. The palace is a massive structure that was begun about 1574 by Pope Gregory XIII, on the ruins of the Baths of Constantine. It served for many years as the summer residence of the Popes.

After the unification of Italy late in the 19th century, however, the Palazzo Quirinale became the residence of Italy's kings. Its last royal occupant was King Umberto II, who held the throne for relatively few months after World War II. And when Italy voted out the monarchy in 1946 and became a republic, it seemed logical that the Palazzo Quirinale should become the residence of the President of the Republic. That seemed logical because the president was taking over some of the ministerial functions formerly exercised by the king.

Luigi Einaudi is actually the first president of the Italian republic. But he was not elected until 1948, some two years after the republic had been established. In that interim, Senator Enrico de Nicola served as acting president.

As one historical fact of some importance, we might remind ourselves that the nation of Italy -- the unified nation -- is only a very few years older than President Einaudi, who is 78. It's always well to keep that fact of a very late unification in mind when assessing Italy's history and its present democratic system.

I would venture a guess that President Einaudi is the most respected man in Italy. That's as it should be, for the president of the Republic is supposed to be above the political battle. He is the symbol of the unity of the whole nation; the man whose job it is to hold the country together. Talk to an Italian politician of whatever color -- from a Communist on the far Left to a neo-Fascist on the far Right -- and chances are he will voice respect for President Einaudi.

During the four and a half-month tenure of Giuseppe Pella as premier I found it interesting that Pella's supporters always liked to link his name with that of President Einaudi -- and that Pella's critics like to cite what they believed were the basic differences between the two men from Piedmont.

I suppose the word "integrity" explains the respect Italians have for their President. Luigi Einaudi, the university economics professor and Liberal party politician, never compromised with Fascism and he was important enough and respected enough so the Fascists let him alone.

The Italians are apt to have about as difficult a time electing a successor to Einaudi, when his term expires in 1955, as the French did in choosing a successor to President Auriol last year.

It's the common thing for an American to take a quick look at the Italian parliamentary system and say that the president of the Republic has no power. That is not quite accurate. It is true that the President cannot interfere very much with the executive work of the premier and his cabinet or the law-making powers of the parliament. But under certain circumstances, the president can dissolve either or both houses of parliament, and call new elections.

And, as a matter of fact, President Einaudi did dissolve the Italian senate last spring after a series of brawls during the debate over the law under which the June elections were to be held. That meant Italy also elected a new senate, instead of merely a new Chamber of Deputies, as had been sche-

But foreigners hear most about Italy's president, of course, when a cabinet crisis occurs. It is to the president of the republic, as you have heard, that the premier resigns his cabinet. And it is the president of the republic who charges someone with the job of forming a new government.

A few minutes ago you heard a tape recording of Premier Pella announcing his resignation to a crowd of reporters waiting in one of the halls of the Palazzo Quirinale outside President Einaudi's office.

That Pella resignation started a rather extensive series of conferences by President Einaudi. Some of these conferences represent protocol and even tradition -- if a republic not yet eight years old can have tradition. But most of them are very important. The President must sound out all shades of Italian political opinion in order to figure out what new combination of ministers under what prime minister will be able to get a vote of confidence from parliament and get on with the job of governing the nation.

President Einaudi started his series of conferences by calling in his predecessor -- former acting President Enrico de Nicola. Next to come was the only former premier still in parliament -- Alcide de Gasperi. Then came Senator Cesare Merzagora, a political independent who presides over the Senate, and the Hon. Giovanni Gronchi, a Christian Democrat who is president of the Chamber of Deputies. After them came all the leaders of the parties, from the Communists on the Left to the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement on the Right.

Four days after the crisis had begun with Pella's resignation, President Einaudi concluded his consultations. This ended the second phase of the crisis. Reporters were invited into the President's office and one of them, of course, was a Radio Italiana newsman with microphone. Here is the voice of President Luigi Einaudi as he spoke to newsmen and concluded this phase of the crisis:

EINAUDI (second tape begins): "Vi ringrazio della vostra assistenza attraverso la quale l'opinione pubblica e esattamente edotta del regolare svolgimento delle consultazioni tuttavia circondate dal doveroso riserbo."

HOVEY (translating): "I thank you for your assistance, through which public opinion is accurately (or exactly) informed of the regular development of the consultations, still necessarily surrounded by secrecy or reserve."

The journalists, as always, were trying to get more than President Einaudi was willing to give them at that time.

But on Tuesday, January 12, the President was ready for the next step. Signor Pella was summoned back to the Quirinale at 10:30 in the morning and a few minutes later the secretary general of the Presidency, Ferdinando Carbone, emerged from Einaudi's office andhere is what he told the waiting newsmen:

CARBONE (third tape begins): "Il Presidente della Repubblica ha conferito l'incarico all'on Pella di formare il nuovo Governo. L'on. Pella nel rendere grazie per la rinnovata prova di fiducia, ha espresso il proprio convincimento che i superiori interessi del Paese e la connessa esigenza di assicurare e rafforzare l'unita del suo partito rendono preferibile l'affidamento dell'incarico ad altra persona. Il Presidente della Repubblica nell' apprezzarne i motivi, ha preso atto della rinuncia ed ha ringraziato l'on. Pella per l'opera da lui svolta al servizio del Paese."

HOVEY (translating): Signor Carbone said: "The president of the Republic has conferred on the Hon. Pella the burden of forming a new government. The Hon. Pella, in rendering thanks for the renewed evidence of trust, has

expressed his conviction that the higher interests of the country and the related exigency of insuring and strengthening the unity of his party make preferable the commission of the task to another person. The President of the Republic in appreciation of these motives, has accepted the refusal and has thanked the Hon. Pella for his work in the service of the country."

Pella himself repeated much of what Carbone had already told the journalists when he left Einaudi's office a few minutes later.

Most observers felt that Einaudi's offer to Pella was in the nature of a courtesy. During cabinet crises when Alcide de Gasperi was premier, Einaudi followed the procedure of always asking the resigned prime minister to make the first new attempt at forming a government. It was obvious that Pella did not have the support of his own party -- the Christian Democrats -- and therefore could not form a new government at that time.

But with the courtesy to Pella out of the way, Einaudi could get on with his job.

Amintore Fanfani, minister of the interior in Pella's cabinet and a man instrumental in bringing aoubt Pella's resignation, was summoned to the Quirinal palace.

Shortly before noon, Secretary General Carbone came out to meet the newsmen once again and here is what he said:

CARBONE (fourth tape begins): "Il Presidente della Repubblica ha affidato all'on. Amintore Fanfani l'incarico di formare il nuovo Governo. L'Onorevole Fanfani si e riservato di accettare."

HOVEY (translating): "The President of the Republic has entrusted to the Hon. Amintore Fanfani the task of forming a new government. The Hon. Fanfani has accepted with reserve."

And a few minutes later Amintore Fanfani himself came out of the President's study to say the same thing at somewhat greater length. Here, then, is the premier-designate of Italy, as recorded at that historic moment in his career by Radio Italiana:

FANFANI (fifth tape begins): "Vi e già stato dato il comunicato relativo al colloquio che il signor Presidente della Repubblic si e degnato di accordarmi. Il signor Presidente mi ha invitato ad assumere l'incarico della formazione del nuovo Governo. Secondo la formula tradizionale ho accettato con reserva."

HOVEY (interrupting to translate): "You have already been given the communication relative to the conversation that the President of the Republic has accorded me. Mr. President has invited me to assume the task of the formation of a new Government. According to the traditional formula, I have accepted with reserve."

By accepting "with reserve," Fanfani meant that he would undertake a series of conferences with political leaders not unlike that completed by President Einaudi, but with the purpose of finding out if he could command enough support to form a government. To form a government, that is, that could command a majority in both houses of parliament.

Thus, with Fanfani's announcement, the ball passed to him from President Einaudi and another phase of the crisis had ended.

By the time you hear this broadcast you may know how Fanfani's efforts have come out. If he should get sufficient assurances of support from his own Christian Democratic party and other parties of the democratic middle the next step then would be to form a slate of ministers -- a cabinet.

He then would take this list of ministers to the Quirinale for President Einaudi's approval. Then would come the big test: the presenting of his cabinet and his projected program to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Only when that action has resulted in a vote of confidence will Italy's cabinet crisis be officially ended and a new government launched.

This is Graham Hovey, signing another Letter from Italy produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters. On this program you heard the actual voices of President Luigi Einaudi, retiring Premier Giuseppe Pella, Premier-designate Amintore Fanfani, and Ferdinando Carbone, secretary-general of the Presidency of the Republic, as they were recorded by newsmen of Radiotelevisione Italiana during the January cabinet crisis. This program was recorded in the studios of Radio Rome with the assistance of Dott. Antonello Marescalchi of the special events department of Radiotelevisione Italiana. This is the NAEB network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 12
Recorded in Rome January 18, 1954
Tape runs: 12:55

This is Graham Hovey with another radio Letter from Italy and the dateline: Rome. These programs are produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

In my previous Letter from Italy I tried to demonstrate how a cabinet crisis begins in Italy and how the President of the Republic takes the first steps necessary to resolve such a crisis. If you heard that Letter you heard the voice of Giuseppe Pella, as he announced his resignation as prime minister. You heard President Luigi Einaudi, thanking Italian newsmen for keeping the public informed about the development of the crisis. And, finally, you heard Amintore Fanfani tell the nation -- through a Radio Italiana microphone -- that President Einaudi had asked him to form a new government and that he had accepted "with reserve."

That's about where we left Italy's January political crisis in that previous Letter. The ball had passed from President Einaudi to Signor Fanfani. And Fanfani was about to begin the exhausting series of conferences with the country's political leaders to discover whether he could command enough support to form a government and end the crisis.

Let's pick up the Fanfani story at that point. You'll recall that Fanfani had accepted President Einaudi's assignment with the traditional "reserve" at about 12 noon on Tuesday, January 12. Almost everyone expected that Fanfani would go back to Einaudi's study at the Quirinal palace in three days, four at the latest.

Italian politicians have a theory that a premier-designate should not wait much longer than that before doing one of two things: either deciding to go ahead with the attempt to form a government or informing the president that the situation does not look promising and that he must be relieved of the commission.

They say that pressures on a man in that position invariably mount as time passes; that the prices exacted by individual politicians and political parties for participation in the new government or support of it inevitably go up if the premier-designate seems uncertain.

And the politicians and editorial writers also say that it's just bad business to keep the country on the hook beyond that first 72 or 96 hours. They say the people are apt to lose faith in their governmental system, particularly in a nation such as Italy, where the present democratic system is only eight years old.

Well, Fanfani didn't go back to the Quirinale on Friday -- and he didn't go back on Saturday, either. The fact is that he was having his troubles. At one point during those days, according to a report circulating in Rome, Fanfani was almost at the point of giving up his attempt.

I won't go into detail at the moment on the reasons for those Fanfani troubles. They had something to do with that heterogenous character of Fanfani's Christian Democratic party that was the subject of a previous Letter. They had something to do with the fact that Signor Fanfani is a highly controversial figure on the Italian political scene; one who has been in the thick of bitter political fights involving such questions as land distribution; labor legislation; public housing. And his difficulties stemmed also from the

fact that the Social Democratic party of Giuseppe Saragat laid down four major points as the bases for its support of a new government and that Fanfani could not unconditionally accept all four. If he could not get the support of the Social Democrats, with their 19 votes in the Chamber of Deputies, he could not be assured of a vote of confidence when he presented his cabinet to the parliament. That is, he could not be assured of such a majority unless he were willing to bid for the 40 votes of the Monarchists and that was one of the major criticisms levelled against his predecessor, Giuseppe Pella. In fact, it had been one of the criticisms levelled, among others, by Signor Fanfani.

At this writing it still is not clear how Fanfani will make out before the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. By the time you hear these lines you may know whether he got his majority or not, and, therefore, whether Italy's cabinet crisis is resolved or not.

At any rate, the strenuous efforts of the directors of the Christian Democratic party -- including the efforts of former Premier Alcide de Gasperi -- kept Fanfani at the job. And early Sunday evening January 17, he was ready to take the next step. About seven o'clock, his ministerial automobile pulled into the courtyard of the Palazzo Quirinale. The short, baldish, intense premier-designate was ushered into the studio of President Einaudi.

And about an hour later Ferdinando Carbone, secretary general of the office of the Presidency of the Republic, had an announcement for the waiting newsmen and the Radio Italiana microphone. Here is Secretary-General Carbone:

CARBONE (first tape begins): "Il Presidente della Repubblica ha questa sera alle ore 19 ricevuto a palazzo Quirinale l'onorevole Amintore Fanfani, il quale, dopo averlo messo al corrente della situazione politica in relazione all'incarico di formare il Ministero, si e dichiarato fiducioso di poter entro domani, sciogliendo la formulata riserva, presentare la lista del componenti del nuovo Governo."

HOVEY (interrupting to translate): "The President of the Republic has this evening at the hour of seven received at the Quirinal palace the Hon. Amintore Fanfani, who, after bringing him up to date on the political situation in relation to the task of forming a ministry, has declared himself confident of being able by tomorrow -- removing the formula of reserve -- to present the list of the components of the new government."

CARBONE (first tape continues): "L'on. Fanfani tornerà ad essere ricevuto dal Capo dello Stato domani 18 corr. alle ore 11,30."

HOVEY (translating): "The Hon. Fanfani will return to be received by the Head of the State tomorrow, the 19th, at the hour of 11:30."

A few minutes later -- at 8:25 p. m., to be exact -- Fanfani emerged from President Einaudi's studio to confirm what Carbone had said. Here is Signor Fanfani, telling the country that he is going ahead with the job of forming a new government and expects to have his slate of ministers ready the following day:

FANFANI (second tape begins): "Ho riferito al signor Presidente della Repubblica sulle indagni e colloqui che mi ero riservato di fare in questi cinque giorni. Credo di essere ormai in prossimita del porto, e di poter tornare domattina a sottoporre al signor Presidente della Repubblica la lista dei componenti il nuovo Governo."

HOVEY (translating): "I have reported to the President of the Republic

on the investigations and conversations that I have carried out in these last five days. I now believe that I am nearing the harbor (destination) and will be able to return tomorrow morning to submit to Mr. President of the Republic the list of the components of the new Government."

As I have said, this trip to the Quirinale meant Fanfani had really taken on the job. He was ready to remove the "reserve" label with which he had originally accepted the commission from President Einaudi on January 12. He now would go ahead to form a government and prepare to present both his program and his ministers to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate.

Up to this point in the crisis you could list six specific steps. First was the resignation of Signor Pella and his cabinet to President Einaudi on January 5. Second was the launching of an extensive series of conversations by Einaudi with political leaders of all parties and factions to examine possible ways out of the crisis. Third was the President's courtesy summons to Pella and his formal request that Pella undertake the formation of a new government -- a request that Pella, of course, declined. Fourth was President Einaudi's charge to Fanfani to form a new Government and Fanfani's conditional acceptance. Fifth was the lengthy series of conferences by Fanfani with roughly the same political leaders consulted by Einaudi. And sixth was Fanfani's Sunday evening trip to the Quirinal palace on January 17 to tell the President he was ready to get on with the job.

The seventh step came on schedule the next morning, January 18. Signor Fanfani arrived at the Presidential palace at 11:35 and confirmed officially to Einaudi that he had accepted the commission and was ready to present his list of ministers for the necessary formality of presidential approval.

Here again is the voice of presidential secretary-general Carbone as he made the official announcement to newsmen:

CARBONE (third tape begins): "L'on. Amintore Fanfani, ecc., ecc."

(NOTE TO ENGINEER: AFTER CARBONE BEGINS TO READ THE LIST OF MINISTERS PLEASE FADE HIM OUT, GRADUALLY, WHILE I TRANSLATE)

HOVEY (translating): "The Hon. Amintore Fanfani, [illegible] removing the reserve, has accepted the commission of forming the new government and has presented to the head ofthe state, who has signed it, the decree of nominations of the new ministers."

Soon Fanfani himself was again out of Einaudi's study, facing newsmen, newsreel cameramen, and, of course, Radio Italiana's microphone. Here he is at another important stage of his job as premier-designate:

FANFANI (fourth tape begins): "L'esame della situazione mi ha consigliato di sciogliere la riserva tradizionale e di accettare l'incarico conferitomi dal signor Presidente della Repubblica. La situazione ha imposto a me questo dovere verso la Nazione italiana."

HOVEY (translating): The examination of the situation has persuaded me to remove the traditional reserve and to accept the commission conferred on me by Mr. President of the Republic. The situation has imposed on me this duty toward the Italian nation.

Well, I have not intended to turn Letter from Italy either into an elementary political science lesson on the Italian parliamentary system or a radio lesson in the Italian language.

But it has long been my belief that most Americans -- myself included -- need to know more about the parliamentary system by which our allies and partners in western Europe govern themselves. We need to know more about this system and how it differs from ours if we are to understand western European political problems and something as complicated as this January cabinet crisis in Italy.

Finally, it seems to me, we ought to know as much as possible about the reasons for a particular cabinet crisis in Italy, one of the countries in which we have a substantial stake.

You will probably know the fate of Signor Fanfani's effort by the time you hear this Letter from Italy. But the political situation that brought on the crisis which led to the resignation of Signor Pella on January 5 is basically unchanged by the shift of ministerial portfolios.

If Signor Fanfani wins his vote of confidence in parliament, that situation will continue to hinder him as he tries to develop his governmental program. If he should be struck down by the parliament, that situation would confront the next man who makes the attempt to form a government and would make that man's job even more difficult than Fanfani's has been.

For basically, this is a crisis of the Italian democracy. Its most immediate and aggravating fact isthat the Italian democratic parties -- Fanfani's Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans -- did not get enough votes and did not elect enough men in the national election of last June 7. They did not elect enough members in the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate so that a democratic government could govern effectively.

Since then, each of these parties has been afflicted with its own internal crisis. This fact has made the job of the government even more difficult than the unfavorable mathematical lineup in the parliament dictated.

At this moment, Fanfani is not out of the woods. But the very fact that he finally decided to go ahead and form a government caused many Italians to heave a sigh of relief. As the Rome newspaper, Il Messaggero, said, editorially, the prolonged crisis had wearied and aggravated the uneasiness and bewilderment of public opinion.

Messaggero did not add the fact that public weariness over prolonged parliamentary squabbles and crises helped bring the Fascist march on Rome 30 years ago.

So, there is much sympathy in Italy tonight for the little man who stood before the Radio Italiana microphone in the Quirinal palace this morning and said:

FANFANI (repeating): "La situazione ha imposto a me questo dovere verso la Nazione italiana."

HOVEY (translating): "The situation has imposed on me this duty toward the Italian nation."

Graham Hovey, signing another radio Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios ofRadiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this isthe NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 14
Recorded in Rome, February 5, 1954
Tape runs: 13:35

(First in a series of four broadcasts on the Italian parliament in relation to the January political crisis)

This is Graham Hovey, sending along another radio Letter from Italy under the dateline: Rome. These programs are produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

The guide books say that the Palace of Montecitorio was begun in the year 1650 by the great Roman architect and sculptor, Giovanni Lorenzo Bernini.

If you have visited Rome you probably will recall Montecitorio. Its original front is located almost in the heart of downtown Rome, just off the Piazza Colonna. It is next door to the Chigi palace, which houses the Italian foreign ministry. Its most imposing exterior landmarks on this original front are a familiar but always beautiful type of bell tower and a huge clock that face the square which is named for the palace; a square that has at its center one of Rome's many obelisks.

At its other end, Montecitorio has another imposing front -- you'd have to call it another "front," even if the term seems contradictory. And this second "front" is dominated by a long and broad flight of steps that ends in the Piazza del Parlamento -- Parliament square.

This square gets its name because the Palace of Montecitorio houses the Italian Chamber of Deputies -- the more important house of the Italian parliament. Italians use the word "Montecitorio" in political conversation in the way we Americans use the expression "Capitol Hill," or the way in which the British use the word, "Westminster."

You would know immediately what an American meant if he told you to expect plenty of fireworks on Capitol Hill over the Bricker amendment. In the same way, if an Italian says it will be a week "molto movimentata" at Montecitorio, he means that the debate in the Chamber of Deputies will be fiery and agitated.

Well, the last week in January certainly was "molto movimentata" at the Palace of Montecitorio. It was the week in which the Chamber decided the fate of the government constituted on January 18 by Amintore Fanfani. It was the week in which the Chamber, by striking down Fanfani, left Italy without a government for the second time in a month, and thus reopened the political crisis which started with the resignation of Premier Giuseppe Pella on January 5.

Article 94 of the Italian constitution requires a new government to present itself to the Chamber and the Senate for a vote of confidence within 10 days after its formation. So, on Tuesday, January 26, Signor Fanfani formally presented his cabinet and his program, first to the Chamber and then to the Senate, which meets about half a mile southwest of Montecitorio in the Madama palace.

Then the Senate adjourned to permit the Chamber to act first. And for four long parliamentary sessions on consecutive days, Fanfani and his cabinet sat at the ministerial bench in the well of the Chamber and heard themselves worked over by political orators ranging from far Left to far Right. The vote of rejection for the Fanfani government came in mid-afternoon of Saturday, January 30.

Not for a long time have ordinary Italian citizens been so interested in a debate at Montecitorio.

Day after day, long lines of them formed in front of the entrances to Montecitorio in spite of almost constant rain and winter temperatures said to be the lowest in 70 years in Rome. They were hoping -- most of them vainly -- to get one of the relatively few gallery seats in the Chamber available to the general public.

If you left rainswept Parliament square and crossed the Corso to get under the protection of the arcades around the Largo Chigi, you could hear snatches of political conversation on all sides as small bunches of people waited for the latest editions of afternoon newspapers.

You might overhear a discussion on Fanfani's chances in a bus or streetcar or a Roman restaurant.

For the fact was that the Pella resignation came as a shock to a country which had settled down again after the unexpected fall of Premier Alcide de Gasperi last July. There is no doubt that Pella's popularity with the country-at-large remained high at the moment when difficulties with his own Christian Democratic party prompted him to quit the job he had taken on last August. There is no doubt that many ordinary Italians unable to follow the subtle twists and turns of intra-party politics felt that they had been left completely in the dark as to the real reasons for the new crisis.

So, these ordinary Italians felt some compulsion once again to interest themselves in their country's politics. They suddenly developed the feeling that they had a stake in the political drama being enacted within the walls of Montecitorio.

At least, that is the way it seemed to this foreign observer. On that dismal Tuesday when Fanfani presented his cabinet and program, my press credentials were in order for the Senate but not for the Chamber. So I joined a big crowd that gathered in the downpour at a west entrance to Montecitorio fully an hour before Fanfani was scheduled to arrive.

Most of us had series L tickets, which were lowest on the priority list. So, when the carabinieri finally opened the doors, practically no one in our crowd was permitted to enter, after that long wait in the rain.

Still, the crowd remained good-natured for the most part. And, more significant, perhaps, most of it remained right there at the entrance even after Fanfani had begun to speak. They were interested enough in what was going on to cling to the thin hope that sooner or later they would be admitted to the Chamber.

Plenty of spirited speeches were delivered by members of the crowd and most of them got respectful attention. Their common theme was the "disgrazia" -- this disgraceful situation in which citizens of the Republic could not get into Montecitorio to see the government of the Republic in action, even after a long wait in the rain and cold.

Now and then someone would rail at the cheerful and patient carabinieri who had the unhappy job of guarding the door. But mostly the crowd lashed the "bureaucracy" or some nebulous group called the "authorities" responsible for this "disgrazia."

It was impossible to note any common political denominator and chances are the crowd ranged the full length of the Italian political spectrum.

There was the sterotype of the Neapolitan. He had inched his way to the head of the line, where he gave brief lectures -- replete with Neapolitan gestures -- to the carabinieri and other listeners.

I couldn't get close enough to hear what he said, but I was sure I knew: for him this "disgrazia" was only the latest in a long series of insults suffered by the "real Italians" -- those from Naples south -- at the hands of the north ever since the unification of Italy under the aegis of Piedmont 80-odd years ago. After all, Amintore Fanfani was a native Tuscan, wasn't he? And he had been a university professor in Milan and Venice? Ecco, Signor lieutenant of the Carabinieri, it is all very clear and it is certainly a "disgrazia," and how long do they think the Neapolitans will tolerate this state of affairs?

Then there was the pleasant, well-informed, well-dressed elderly lady who stood on my right in the line and conversed with the men around her about the party lineup and the mathematical breakdown of the Chamber. If she had gotten into the gallery she was one spectator who obviously could have told the players without a scorecard and could have given thumbnail biographies of many of them.

She didn't think Signor Fanfani's chances were very good, and she was speculating on whom President Einaudi might summon to make the next try at forming a government if Fanfani should fail. Someone thought it might be De Gasperi, and the lady said si, but it should not be forgotten that De Gasperi now has 72 years.

There was the latecomer who insisted that his ticket had come right from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in the Palazzo Viminale and therefore must be honored.

But when he passed it up for inspection it turned out to be series L, like all the rest, and the patient carabiniere explained the situation once more. Then, as the ticket was passed back through the crowd, the last man on the chain got a big laugh when he turned it over to its embarrassed owner with a flourish and shouted: "Arrivederci, Signore!" Arrivederci generally translates as goodby for now, or perhaps, "solong," but in this instance it really meant, "better luck next time."

The crowd gradually thinned as it became apparent that the situation was truly hopeless, but I would guess that some of those good folk, drenched and cold, were still waiting at that west entrance when Fanfani left Montecitorio for the Senate.

And when I sloshed through the rain to the Madama palace, I found clustered at one of the entrances to the Senate the same kind of crowd I had just left at Montecitorio, huddled under umbrellas and newspapers and coats. If I had stopped for a moment, I'm sure I could have picked out the same types and heard some of the same conversations I had heard outside the Chamber.

This reporter will not soon forget those crowds of cheerful Italians, huddled in the rain outside Montecitorio and the Madama palace that last week in January, hoping for the chance to watch their parliamentary system function in time of political crisis. And despite the considerable discomfort involved, I found that I was glad I had waited for an hour and a half with that friendly crowd outside the Chamber of Deputies that January 26. When you are living among them, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Italians somehow deserve better than they have received from history.

As the result of my contact with those crowds, I know that I felt a bit better about the staying power of the Italian democracy as I entered Madama palace to hear Signor Fanfani present his program to the Senate of the Republic.

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The Italian parliamentary chambers are considerably larger than their American congressional counterparts. That's not surprising when you recall that the Italian Senate has 243 members, compared with our 96, and the Chamber of Deputies has 590, compared with 435 in our House of Representatives.

The Italian chambers are also much more ornate -- more elaborately put together -- than ours. To me they seem much brighter and more attractive than our Senate and House chambers, but some would say they are too lavish; overdone for the chambers of an elected parliament in a democratic country.

Let's concentrate on Montecitorio and the Chamber of Deputies, generally regarded as the more important of the two houses. The chamber is a huge hall with woodwork and leather mostly of a rich brown color. It has an intricate, expansive and attractive skylight, much like that in a great church, and it also has stained glass windows.

There are 11 different sections of seats for the deputies, banked toward the rear of the chamber at a 30-degree angle. Each deputy has an individual, red-leather seat and a small, individual desk. Microphones are posted at intervals throughout the bank of seats.

On a rostrum considerably higher than the one from which Speaker Martin holds forth in Washington sits the President of the Chamber, Giovanni Gronchi. He's a handsome man of 66, with strong, bronzed face and a full head of graying hair combed straight back. He wears thick, black-rimmed glasses.

Gronchi heads his own small left-wing faction of the Christian Democratic party. Off the rostrum and outside the Chamber, he often speaks out sharply against party policy. His name invariably figures in speculation about a new premier in time of cabinet crisis. During the early January crisis that followed the resignation of Premier Pella, Gronchi was the choice of Social Democratic leader Giuseppe Saragat to head a left-center coalition government. Many observers believe that if the time comes when the Christian Democrats are forced to try a coalition with the left-wing Socialists and perhaps the Communists, Gronchi will become premier.

However that may be, Gronchi is an effective presiding officer, as he sits on his throne, flanked by a battery of vice presidents and secretaries, working at desks on progressively lower levels. Gronchi is definitely in charge andhe never allows the deputies to forget it.

He does not rap for order with a gavel. He shakes a small but loud handbell vigorously. His voice is not mellow, but it carries stern, schoolmasterish authority.

When someone heckles a deputy who is addressing the Chamber, Gronchi quickly and sharply calls the offender by name, and that generally is all it takes. When Communist labor leader Giuseppe di Vittorio started to heckle Monarchist Deputy Alfredo Covelli during the Fanfani government debate in late January, Gronchi pointed at him and called: "L'onorevole Di Vittorio, si prega" -- Hon. Di Vittorio, please. Di Vittorio promptly shut up.

If the Chamber has conducted its business with greater decorum and less violence than the Senate in these eventful postwar years, it must be in great part because of the presiding ability of Giovanni Gronchi. He seems far more effective than his counterpart, Sen. Cesare Merzagora, who presides at Madama palace.

I saw Communist senators come up roaring and disrupt the proceedings for 10 minutes, shouting "duce,duce" at Premier Fanfani when he blasted the Communist ideology in presenting his program January 26. Nothing like that happened in the Chamber under Gronchi's rule.

The most spacious and attractive galleries are those at the front of the chamber, behind and above Gronchi's rostrum. They are reserved for families of ministers and deputies and for the diplomatic corps. The other chamber galleries are much like those in our House of Representatives, with the press section in the rear.

This, then, is the chamber of the Palace of Montecitorio where the Fanfani government met its fate after four long days of tumultuous and interesting debate the last week in January. It is the chamber where the fate of Fanfani's successor will undoubtedly have been determined by the time you hear this broadcast.

There was much an American observer could learn from that January debate. I hope to examine it in a subsequent radio Letter from Italy. Graham Hovey reporting. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 15
Recorded in Rome, February 5, 1954
Tape runs: 13:25

(Second in a series of four broadcasts on the Italian parliament in relation to the January political crisis)

This is Graham Hovey, sending from Rome another Letter from Italy, produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

A parliamentary debate in Italy is both similar and strikingly different from a debate in our own Senate or House of Representatives -- and I suppose there is nothing very surprising in that.

In Rome, as in Washington, there is the same bustle as a session gets underway. Pages dart up the aisles with messages for the legislators; a clerk at a microphone drones on with the reading of the minutes or some other document and no one in the house seems to be paying the slightest attention; members climb the rostrum to confer with the presiding officer, just as congressmen go up to confer with Speaker Joe Martin.

A member of the Chamber of Deputies invariably refers to another member as "the honorable" so-and-so, whether he really feels that way about him or not. Thus, Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti calls former Premier Alcide de Gasperi "l'onorevole De Gasperi." It reminds an American of the way two bitter enemies such as Congressman Emanuel Celler and ex-Congressman John Rankin would refer to each other as "the gentleman from New York," and "the gentleman from Mississippi," respectively.

These are some of the similarities. Then there are the differences -- and some of these strike an American visitor immediately.

One of these differences is obvious, but I think you must visit the Italian Senate or Chamber to get its full impact. In Washington senators and congressmen debate the Communist menace. Here in Rome that meance is always present in strength, ready to take part in the debate. The Communists and their fellow travelers occupy more than a third of the seats in both houses.

There they are, duly elected by qualified voters, holding a great bloc of seats on the left side of each chamber, if you are looking down from the rostrum.

There, two thirds of the way up the bank of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, on the inside of the first section, sits Palmiro Togliatti, number one man in Italy's Communist hierarchy.

Togliatti is a short man with broad shoulders, but he is hunched slightly, as though he had suffered from arthritis. His black hair, still thick in most places, is now thinning just a bit on top, but he hardly looks 61, which he will be on March 26. He dresses conservatively in dark blue suits and wears rimless glasses.

He hardly looks like the stereotype of the Communist revolutionary and many observers believe Togliatti is quite content for the present to play his role as parliamentary leader of a powerful minority party, scoring debating points against the government.

If there is impatience among the Communist deputies to get on with the revolution it probably originates with the hardboiled party organizer and

guerrilla warfare expert, Luigi Longo. He sits down a couple of rows and a bit to the right of Togliatti.

Longo was trained in revolutionary techniques and tactics in Moscow. He is a veteran of fighting with the international brigades in the Spanish civil war and the northern Italian underground in World War II. If the Communists ever should take over Italy, many observers believe the combination of strong man Longo and Senator Pietro Secchia of the Cominform might reduce Togliatti to figurehead status or shove him out of the picture altogether.

But even the humor-less, gray-haired, 54-year-old Longo does not fit the Communist revolutionary stereotype in appearance, andhe usually remains silent in the Chamber, apparently preferring to do his rabble-rousing at party rallies.

The man who does look like American newspaper cartoonists think a Communist revolutionary should look is Giuseppe di Vittorio, the secretary general of Italy's biggest labor union, the Communist-dominated CGIL. Di Vittorio has a broad, powerful torso fitted onto short legs; a large, squarish head, with a heavily-lined, dark-complexioned face and a thick shook of black hair. He generally sits in the second row from the well of the Chamber.

My characterization of him as the stereotype of the Communist revolutionary in appearance may be unfair. Italian friends of mine who are strongly anti-Communist say Di Vittorio is, by all odds, the most typically Italian of any of the Communist leaders. They think he might be the one most apt to balk at following the undiluted Moscow line if the Communists actually gained power in Italy.

One more Communist deputy certain to be pointed out to you at Montecitorio is far less important, but far more attractive than Togliatti, Longo or Di Vittorio. She is Laura Diaz, who got into politics after serving in the anti-fascist underground during World War II in the port city that we call Leghorn and the Italians call Livorno.

Signorina Diaz was the real glamor girl of Italian Communist ranks when she first came to Montecitorio. At 34 she is still a slim, attractive brunet, who generally sits near Di Vittorio in the second row of the first section.

Incidentally, Signorina Diaz is one of 33 women deputies in a Chamber of 590 members. Of those 33, the Communists have 16; the governing Christian Democratic party has 11; the left-wing Socialists four and the Monarchists two.

Well, I have gone into such detail about the Communist deputies <u>not</u> to glamorize them in any way nor to make them seem more formidable than they actually are.

But Americans impatient with the Italian government for not taking strong enough measures against communism need to be reminded that the problem looks different at this end. It is one thing to cope with the Communists in a country such as our own, where they have never been able to poll 100,000 votes, and where the problem is one of espionage and sabotage. It is quite a different thing to cope with the Communists in a country where they and their allies command the allegiance of better than one out of three voters.

Those 143 Communist deputies and 75 fellow-traveling Socialists can't simply be wished out of existence. Neither can they be legally thrown out of the Chamber, so long as they play the parliamentary game according to the rules, which they generally do.

Speaking of the Socialists allies of the Communists, their leader,

Pietro Nenni, is one of the most colorful and interesting figures in the Chamber. If you come clockwise around the bank from the Communist benches the next group is occupied by deputies of Nenni's Partito Socialista Italiano. Nenni himself sits about halfway up the bank in one of the last seats of the Socialist section -- just across the aisle from his bitter political enemies, the Social Democrats.

Nenni is a broad, stocky man of 63, with a fringe of sandy hair and thick-rimmed glasses. He has the reputation of being one of the most effective orators in the Chamber. He has a friendly appearance and, in fact, is liked personally by men who differ with him sharply in politics.

When you watch Nenni in operation in the Chamber it is difficult to imagine him as the stooge of Togliatti or anyone else. But it should not be forgotten that never once has Nenni really wavered from the Communist line since he struck his so-called "unity of action" pact with Togliatti.

Neither should it be forgotten that sitting not far from Nenni in the Chamber are Oreste Lizzadri and Giusto Tolloy, two men regarded by Italian democrats as virtual Communist agents operating within the Socialist party to keep it on the Kremlin track.

Continuing to move clockwise in the Chamber, you find in the next section Giuseppe Saragat and his Social Democrats, now reduced to 19 seats, and the Republican party, which now has only five.

Saragat is a tall, handsome man who looks like our former secretary of state, Dean Acheson, without the mustache. Saragat is restless during debate and seldom occupies one seat for very long. He has not yet recovered from the shock of the 1953 elections, when his party not only failed to gain at Nenni's expense, but lost 600,000 votes and 14 Chamber seats from its 1948 showing.

Best known of the five Republican deputies is Randolfo Pacciardi, minister of defense in De Gasperi cabinets and highly regarded by both President Eisenhower and the present supreme allied commander in Europe, Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther.

Pacciardi was a militant anti-fascist in the Mussolini era who spent years of exile in America. As commander of the Italian anti-fascist Garibaldi brigade in the Spanish civil war, he learned -- and has never forgotten -- the agonizing difficulties of trying to cooperate with the Communists in any common effort.

Because of his vigorous anti-fascism and anti-communism, Pacciardi has been bitterly and constantly attacked by the two extremes. But you get the impression that this husky, blunt-talking veteran of both shooting and political wars would follow wherever principal led him, regardless of the cost to himself or his dwindling party. His friends would say that is why Pacciardi swung his five Republican votes behind the Fanfani government in January while Saragat persuaded his party to vote no.

The most successful Italian party by far in this post-World War II period has been, of course, the Christian Democrats. They still hold 262 seats in the center and right-center of the Chamber -- 44 more than the Communists and Nenni Socialists combined.

Sitting high up on the bank in the exact center of the chamber is the man who, more than any other, fashioned this success. He is the man who for eight postwar years headed the government and virtually became "Mr. Italy," so far as Americans were concerned.

I refer, of course, to Alcide de Gasperi. No need to describe him -- you've seen his picture countless times. The cartoonists who caricature his hawk-like face with the long beak don't exaggerate very much at that. But somehow they have never captured the twinkle in his eye that is always there, behind the strong lenses of his glasses.

There is something symbolic about De Gasperi sitting in the center of the chamber. His philosophy and his program have been of the democratic middle-of-the-road. He has been by far the most effective enemy of the two extremes -- Togliatti and his Communists over on the left, and the frustrated political heirs of Benito Mussolini on the far right.

Sometimes you can tell much about a political man by the source and violence of the attacks against him. De Gasperi took on the Communists at the height of their postwar power -- and licked them when few thought he could. They have never forgiven him. When the neo-Fascists began to come out of the political woods, De Gasperi flayed them, too, and laid down the law to his party: no deal of any kind with the MSI. So the neo-Fascists, too, can hardly find words strong enough to use against him.

There he sits in the center of the Chamber with prestige and stature matched by none of the other 589. In recent months he has taken on one of his toughest jobs: that of holding together and reforging into an effective political instrument the sharply-divided, bickering forces of the Christian Democratic party. The fate of the Italian democracy may hinge on how well De Gasperi succeeds. One gets the feeling that Italy sooner or later will turn again to this remarkable man for leadership of the government.

Resuming the clockwise tour of the Chamber you come next to the benches occupied by the Liberals and the Monarchists and, finally -- at the far right end -- the benches of the neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano, of which I was speaking a moment ago.

The Liberal party, which traces its origin to the great Cavour, is now reduced to 14 Chamber seats. Like the other democratic parties it is divided between a left and right wing. Its deputies generally support the so-called "sound money" fiscal policies and measures for European unification. The Monarchists scored substantial gains in the 1953 elections and now have 40 deputies, a bloc big enough for serious political trading

The Monarchists once struck an electoral alliance with the neo-Fascists, but have found that they do better by themselves. They gained some stature with the country when they supported the recent government of Premier Pella, ostensibly without asking any price. Many Italians doubt that the Monarchists really are serious about wishing to bring back King Umberto II and scrap the republic.

The MSI, on the far right of the Chamber bank, has 29 seats as the result of its improved showing last year. Perhaps it is not too surprising that this noisy crowd often finds itself voting with the Communists at the other end of the spectrum, particularly on problems of Italian foreign policy.

One ofthe MSI's principal spokesmen is 40-year-old Giorgio Almirante, a baldish little man with black hair and mustache. The neo-Fascist students carried Almirante through Roman streets in triumph on their shoulders during the Trieste demonstrations of November.

But the patriarch of the neo-Fascist party is Augusto de Marsanich, white-haired, 63-year-old veteran of Mussolini's March on Rome. During the Fanfani government debate, De Marsanich shouted: "When we are accused of

totalitarianism I must protest!" But he likes to go down to the Piazza Venezia, put one hand on his hip as Mussolini used to do on the balcony, and harangue a rally of the political heirs of Il Duce.

Well, that is the way the bank of the Italian Chamber of Deputies looked to this reporter during the late January debate on the Fanfani government. It is pretty much the way the Chamber will look until it is reconstituted after new elections.

I'd like to describe highlights of that significant January debate for you in a subsequent Letter from Italy. This is Graham Hovey, signing another radio Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 16
Recorded in Rome, February 6, 1954
Tape runs: 13:20

(Third in a series of four broadcasts on the Italian parliament in relation to the January political crisis)

This is Graham Hovey, sending from Rome another Letter from Italy, produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana and the United States Information Service.

In my previous Letter I examined some similarities and some differences between congressional debate in Washington and parliamentary debate in Italy. But I didn't get around to saying much about the most striking difference of all.

It is the surface manifestation of that very basic structural difference between a government of coordinate branches, with checks and balances between them, and a government that is formed from the parliament and can be put out of existence by vote of the parliament.

Perhaps I can illustrate the visible difference in this way:

We all know that a few weeks ago President Eisenhower went up to Capitol Hill to deliver his annual message to Congress on the state of the union. And then the President went back down the hill to his executive offices in the White House.

He subsequently has sent up to the Hill various messages, asking the Congress to enact specific administration programs into law and to appropriate the necessary money to finance those programs. From time to time he may use the power and prestige of his great office to attempt to persuade the lawmakers to enact a particular measure -- or perhaps to block one which his administration opposes.

But it's entirely possible that the President will not return to Capitol Hill in person for the rest of this legislative session. He would resent senators and congressmen coming to the White House and trying to run the executive branch for him, and he knows that they are jealous of the powers of their coordinate branch and resent too much interference from the executive.

But let's suppose for a moment that the President was an elected member of the House of Representatives from his native state of Kansas.

And let's suppose that every member of the President's cabinet was either a congressman or senator.

And now let's suppose that after delivering that message on the State of the Union in January, the President had to sit there in the well of the House of Representatives while the House debated his program.

Suppose he had to sit there at a bench located just under Speaker Martin's rostrum, flanked by the members of his Cabinet, andhear himself andhis program raked over and over by vigorous and sarcastic and sometimes vitriolic critics. And let's carry it one step further:

Suppose that after sitting through all this debate, the President and his cabinet had to remain on that bench during a rollcall vote of the House which would determine not only the fate of the program, but actually whether the Eisenhower administration would stay in office or be thrown out.

If you had all that, you still wouldn't have the Italina parliamentary system, but you would have a reasonable facsimile.

This business of having the prime minister and his cabinet sit there on the ministerial bench, facing the legislators, for day after day of weary and often acrimonious debate is apt to strike an American as unnecessarily cruel.

But in Italy it's protocol; all a part of the parliamentary system, and no one thinks very much about it. I have heard of no proposals that the premier and cabinet be spared this ordeal.

After serving as Italy's premier for eight eventful years, Alcide de Gasperi had to sit at that bench in the Chamber of Deputies for several days last July to hear himself lashed and denounced -- and finally voted out of office. And actually, he had known almost from the start of the debate what the dismal result would be.

During the last week in January, Premier Amintore Fanfani and his ministers had to sit through four straight days of bitter debate although they knew after the first session that they had no chance to survive the onslaught.

Apparently the Italians just believe that this is a necessary part of the high price one must expect to pay for holding high office. They are amused that anyone should think it unnecessarily cruel.

If Amintore Fanfani objected to the ordeal he did a very successful job of concealing it. He is a short, slight man, almost entirely bald at 46, with only a fringe of sandy hair and brief mustache.

His appearance is pleasant, if not distinguished, for he smiles often and well. He kept smiling most of the time as he sat at the ministerial bench in the Chamber of Deputies and heard himself denounced as a corporativist, ex-fascist, integralist, pateranlist, transformist, and the would-be Italian counterpart of Salazar, Dollfuss and Gil Robles.

He kept smiling, but don't get the idea that Fanfani took these attacks lying down, or that he failed to give as good as he received.

As a matter of fact, he deliberately provoked the vigorous attacks from the far political left in his program speech of January 26. He referred sarcastically to "the Bolshevik serenade." And he blasted Communism as "an exasperated ideology," foreign to Italian traditions, guided by the example of a foreign power.

So Fanfani undoubtedly expected the assaults from the Communists and their left Socialist allies. What was harder to take was the vigorous opposition of the Social Democrats and the milder objections of the Monarchists and Liberals. For, once the Social Democrats and Monarchists had decided to vote against him and the Liberals had decided to abstain, his chance of obtaining the necessary vote of confidence was gone.

With the issue no longer in doubt, Fanfani paid his bitter respects to these groups, too -- and especially to the Social Democrats -- when he made the formal reply to criticisms for his government just before the fatal vote on January 30.

Now all of this is relatively ancient history and you may wonder why I am giving it such detailed attention. My reasons are both general and specific.

I started this series of Letters from Italy on the Italian parliamentary situation because I believe Americans always need to know more about the institutions and problems of a friendly country and an ally -- just as the Italians need to know more about how our government functions.

But there have been other provocations:

There have been a number of recent articles in American newspapers and magazines suggesting that Italy was about to go Communist.

There have been other recent articles in America suggesting that our government, including the Congress, was impatient with the Italian government for not cracking down on the Communists.

It is one purpose of this series to present -- without necessarily endorsing -- the Italian side of the story. To do that, one needs to know at least a few basic facts about the present Italian parliament. And the story of the downfall of the Fanfani government in late January provides a convenient way to illustrate those basic facts. I think it is important to know where Fanfani failed and why he failed.

The biggest single bloc of seats in the Chamber of Deputies is that of Fanfani's own Christian Democratic party. The Christian Democrats have 262 out of the 590. That's 34 seats short of an absolute majority but it provides a good start toward the goal.

Fanfani's first job in trying to constitute a government, then, was to insure united support from his own party. But to do that he had to compromise right from the start, for the Christian Democracy is a party of many factions and much internal bickering.

One example will demonstrate the extent to which Fanfani had to compromise at this point:

Giuseppe Pella resigned as premier on January 5 because the party vetoed his plan to appoint an ultra-conservative Christian Democrat, Salvatore Aldisio, as minister of agriculture. Fanfani himself pressed home the party's case because he felt Aldisio's appointment to that job might jeopardize the government's land-reform program.

But when Fanfani announced his own cabinet January 18, it included Salvatore Aldisio as minister of industry and commerce. Fanfani had been willing to accept Aldisio in a less sensitive ministry to win the support of the party's right wing.

As I say, Fanfani made this appointment at the outset to gain the unified backing of his own party. But they weakened his position with some of the other parties. And he needed a minimum of 34 more votes than the Christian Democrats could give him to get his majority.

There were really only two ways for Fanfani to get those votes. Pella had done it be bidding for the 40 votes of the Monarchist party.

But Fanfani and his left-wing Christian Democratic faction had been critical of Pella for depending on the Monarchists.

The only other practical way was to make a bid for support of the Social Democrats, with 19 votes; the Liberals, with 14, andthe Republicans, with 5. These were the moderate center and left parties that generally had supported De Gasperi and, at times, had served in his cabinet.

The 262 Christian Democratic votes plus the 38 of these three parties could put Fanfani over. Obviously, this is what he hoped would happen. So, if you examine his program speech, you find the biggest proposed budget in Italy's history and heavy emphasis on social and economic programs designed to attract the Social Democrats and Republicans. But you also find a pledge to continue the so-called "defense of the lira," hard-money policy and promises to work for European unification, designed to win the Liberals.

But Fanfani knew in advance that the Social Democrats, for reasons of their own, might find it difficult at this time to support any government headed by a Christian Democrat. So, he felt it necessary to keep the door slightly open for the Monarchists in the event the Social Democrats would not go along.

This possibility of having to depend on Monarchist support may have helped to account for the vigor and extent of Fanfani's assault on the Communists in his program speech. He may have wanted to assure conservatives in his own party as well as the Monarchists that his left-wing views have nothing in common with those of the Communists or the fellow-traveling Socialists.

There was one more subtlety in the situation that may have figured in Fanfani's attack on the Communists. It involved Pietro Nenni and his Socialists. At one point there were reports that because of Fanfani's left-wing reputation, the 75 Nenni Socialists might abstain from the vote of confidence altogether. This, of course, would have reduced Fanfani's mathematical problem.

But for obvious political reasons, the Christian Democrats felt they could not afford a government that would depend for its support on the tacit consent, if not active support, of Nenni. It was reported, therefore, that if Fanfani survived in the Chamber only because the Socialists abstained, his own Christian Democratic party would engineer his downfall in the Senate.

By sailing into the Communists in his program speech, Fanfani made it impossible for the Nenni Socialists to do anything but oppose him vigorously. And thus, in his final speech before the vote, Fanfani cited this Socialist opposition as one more proof that Nenni is, in fact, the captive of the Communists.

Well, as everyone now knows, all of Fanfani's juggling and compromising was in vain. He started out with a total of 247 sure votes against him -- 143 Communists, 75 Nenni Socialists and 29 neo-Fascists.

Of the votes from the other parties that he tried for, Fanfani got only the five of the Republicans.

By leaving the door only slightly ajar instead of inviting them cordially into the house, he lost the 40 Monarchists.

That left it up to the Social Democrats, who might have been expected to back him as a social reformer. But the Social Democrats have not recovered from the shock of the 1953 elections, when they lost heavily to the Nenni Socialists. They are convinced that one reason for those losses was their previous collaboration with -- and perhaps subservience to -- the Christian Democrats.

They demanded that Fanfani come out for a new electoral law, based on strict proportional representation, which they believe would help them. This Fanfani was unable to do because of opposition in his own party.

They accused him of "trasformismo," meaning the act oftrying to piece together a parliamentary majority with anyone willing to come in, at whatever cost of policy and principle. This was because Fanfani had not closed the door definitely to the Monarchists.

Once the Social Democrats had gone over into opposition, the Liberals decided to abstain from the vote. They said Fanfani had not given sufficient guarantees about reforms in public administration. And in the end there were even a few defections in Christian Democratic ranks, despite De Gasperi's strong plea for Fanfani.

In mid-afternoon of January 30 came the rollcall vote. Present, 575 deputies; voting, 563, meaning that a majority would be 282; voting to sustain Fanfani, 260; opposed 303.

Standing up at the ministerial bench, Fanfani asked recognition from Chamber President Giovanni Gronchi. He was no longer smiling, but his voice was firm:

"I have the honor," he said, "to ask suspension of the work of the Chamber in order to carry to the President of the Republic the resignation of the Government."

The Fanfani chapter was over. But the formidable mathematical party lineup in the Chamber of Deputies remained. And the tough problems that tripped up Fanfani would be waiting there in the Palace of Montecitorio to greet his successor.

Graham Hovey, signing another Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of the United States Information Service for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 17
Recorded in Rome, February 6, 1954
Tape runs: 13:30

Holt

(Last in a series of four broadcasts on the Italian parliament in relation to the January political crisis)

This is Graham Hovey, sending from Rome another Letter from Italy, produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana and the United States Information Service.

There were historic overtones -- perhaps I should say overtones of a fairly recent past -- in the debate of the Italian Chamber of Deputies on the fate of the Fanfani government during the January political crisis.

And those overtones heightened the interest and significance of the debate for an American interested both in Italy's past and in prospects for the survival and strengthening of Italy's young democratic system.

It seemed to me that these overtones should have added much of what journalists call "human interest material" to the running news story itself during those exciting January days in the Palace of Montecitorio.

Some of these overtones were sounded by the use of individual Italian political words that have no counterparts in American politics -- words such as "trasformismo," "massimalismo," "corporatism," "integralism," "clericalism," and "Catholic imperialism." All of these and more like them were hurled back and forth across the Chamber during the four days in which a majority of the 590 deputies decided to vote out of office the government headed by Amintore Fanfani.

But there were other historic overtones that could not be invoked by a single word; historic parallels that were not even drawn in detail, but only hinted at by the orators.

Thus, the Italian politician best known to Americans -- Alcide de Gasperi -- referred to "the spectacle of this parliamentary misery that follows at a distance of only a few years the shining hopes born in the first assembly of the Republic." By "parliamentary misery," De Gasperi was referring to the apparent inability at that moment of the Italian democratic parties to join legislative forces in order to give to the country a broadbased and stable government. He said the country was perplexed and troubled by this incapacity of the Chamber of Deputies.

De Gasperi said it was the functionality; the vitality of the Parliament that was at stake and not merely the fortune of one party or the other. He appealed to the deputies of the democratic parties to recognize what he called the necessity for a common, serious and continued effort in order that the decline of Italian democratic institutions should not become "inevitable and fatal."

De Gasperi drew no historic parallel. He didn't need to. It would be a safe bet that his words set every deputy present -- including those of the totalitarian left and those of the totalitarina right -- to thinking of the early 1920s. For it was the discrediting of Italy's democratic, parliamentary institutions in the face of crisis after World War I that paved the way for the triumph of fascism. De Gasperi was actually saying:

Don't let it happen again.

One of Italy's outstanding young historians, Vittorio Gabrielli, has said: "It is a sad fact that the Italian people finally accepted fascism out of sheer weariness, waiting for leadership from among the legally chosen -- a leadership that never came."

De Gasperi was actually saying:

The Italian people are again getting weary of parliamentary bickering and stalemate; they are again getting tired of waiting for effective democratic leadership. Let's not procrastinate until they again accept totalitarianism -- whether communism or a new brand of fascism -- out of sheer weariness.

De Gasperi's words were addressed to all the democratic parties and, as he made clear, even to the Monarchists, who claim to be democratic but are generally not considered a part of the democratic bloc in parliament.

But De Gasperi obviously was speaking especially to his onetime cabinet colleague, Giuseppe Saragat, leader of the right-wing Socialists, the party we generally call the Social Democrats. And the reason for this concentration on Saragat was immediate, not primarily historical. For as the parliamentary fight over the Fanfani government was evolving it was clear that the verdict would hinge on the decision of the Social Democrats, with their 19 votes. But even here De Gasperi could have drawn a somewhat questionable parallel with 1920. He could have said to Saragat:

Look, the failure of the Socialist party and the Catholic party to join forces in a common effort permitted Italy to fall into fascism. Let's not repeat that failure in the face of the threat of communism.

I said that parallel is questionable because Saragat's party today only remotely resembles the Italian Socialist party of the pre-fascist era. The Saragat party is distinctly a minor party facing the possibility of extinction; the Socialists of 1920 were the biggest single party in Italy, with 157 seats in the Chamber.

Today's counterpart for the 1920 Socialist party would be Pietro Nenni's Partito Socialista Italiano, which has 75 Chamber seats. And here the parallel is somewhat clearer. For Nenni today follows the Moscow line almost as faithfully as Italian Communist party chieftain, Palmiro Togliatti.

In other words, Nenni is following the policy that in 1920 was known as "Maximalism," a policy of adhering to the Communist international line and working for the destruction of bourgeois democracy and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat.

I say the parallel is clearer because the Italian Socialists of the pre-fascist period gradually adopted "Maximalism," after the Soviet revolution. This kept them from cooperating with the Catholic party in the face of the rising threat of fascism.

Thus, the word "massimalismo," with its historic overtones, was hurled across the Chamber floor at Nenni during the January debate. It was what Premier Fanfani meant when he answered his critics just before the Chamber voted and said:

"The Christian Democratic party would be willing to make a political marriage with Nenni, but it suspects that on the night of the wedding it would find in the bridal chamber Nenni replaced by Togliatti." And amid the general laughter, Fanfani added:

"The Christian Democratic party is still Christian enough to reject, now and forever, such bigamy."

But let's get back for a moment to Signor Saragat and his Social Democratic party. It was obvious that Saragat felt keenly the charge made by the Christian Democrats and pro-government newspapers that by casting his party's 19 votes against Fanfani he was playing into the hands of the Communists. I might inerpolate that this charge was not made alone by Italians. The New York Times said editorially that Saragat, as usual, was "putting narrow, personal, party considerations above his patriotism."

Obviously that was not the way Signor Saragat sized up the situation. He charged that it was really the Christian Democrats who were frittering away the Italian democracy by trying to please both the political right and left with fine words but no concrete program for solving Italy's pressing problems. He was especially bitter at what he regarded as Premier Fanfani's simultaneous bid for support from the Monarchists on the right and his own Social Democrats on the left.

And Saragat had a word with historic overtones to throw at Fanfani and the Christian Democrats to describe such a maneuver: Trasformismo. Professor Gabrielli, whom I cited a few minutes ago, says trasformismo means, in practice, the virtual obliteration of political distinctions among parties. A man forms a government as best he can; he constructs his parliamentary majority by personal deals with individual politicians across party lines, but has no fixed principles or policies.

Trasformismo came into Italian politics when Agostino Depretis and the historic Italian left came to power in 1876.

In his excellent book, The United States and Italy, Professor H. Stuart Hughes describes the Depretis technique for staying in power at any cost. He says: "Casting aside any unnecessary scruples about political principles, Depretis simply picked up his majority where he could find it. He made bargains with one and all, whether from the left or from the right. Any deputy willing to support the government could thereby acquire a claim to a suitable share of official patronage. . . . The result was trasformismo -- the 'transformation' of deputies from supposedly reliable members of the opposition to stalwarts of the government majority."

The real master of trasformismo was Giovanni Giolitti, who held the premiership most of the time from 1901 to about 1915. As Professor Hughes points out, historians are now having second thoughts about Giolitti and concluding that he made some major contributions to Italy's political development. But he stayed in office by manipulating majorities through agreements wherever he could find them. When the Socialists first began to rise in Italy, Giolitti cooperated with them, too, and helped them launch their program by organizing 4,000 cooperatives.

At times during his eight years as premier, Alcide de Gasperi was compared to Giolitti because of his ability at maneuvering and compromising within his own faction-ridden Christian Democratic party and his coalition government. But many political observers believe the Italian politician most capable of practicing trasformismo in the present situation is Giuseppe Pella. Pella is a believer in the adage about the soft answer that turneth away wrath.

Just before his resignation as premier on January 5, Pella told newsmen it was important for a politician to enter the premiership on tiptoe and exit the same way -- and that he would know how to do both.

He quietly swung the Christian Democrats into a temporary alliance with the Monarchists, but there were indications that he would as willingly have reconstructed the old De Gasperi four-party coalition if prospects had been more promising.

But it must have surprised the controversial Amintore Fanfani to hear himself charged with attempting a policy of trasformismo. Saragat, however, was in dead earnest. He called the Christian Democratic efforts to gain a majority for Fanfani "a play in which true policy gives way to trasformismo and to the maneuver."

In such a way did the term which Hughes calls "an Italianism rich in innuendo:" a term with rich historic overtones enter the January debate in the Chamber of Deputies.

As a footnote, I might add that about three months ago -- long before Giuseppe Saragat used the historic term at Montecitorio, and at a time when it seemed that Pella would remain in power for a considerable period -- Professor Gabrielli said, in a lecture:

"Trasformismo has been a constant threat to the Italian democracy; it remains a threat today."

Saragat's Social Democratic colleague, Giuseppe Romita, added another expressive term to the January debate which seems to fit in well with trasformismo. He said that the Christian Democrats actually had followed, in the government, a policy of "l'immobilismodinamico" -- dynamic immobilism.

Romita also charged the Christian Democrats with attempting a "Catholic imperialism," a charge to which De Gasperi replied:

"No, Hon. Romita, our imperialism is the mandate of 11 million voters." It was a pointed reference to the size of the Christian Democratic vote in the 1953 elections contrasted with the 1,200,000 votes polled by the Social Democratic forces of Romita and Saragat.

Romita's appeal in this instance had been to the historic and still deeply-felt Italian anti-clericalism; the feeling against church involvement in politics. It is a feeling that has to do with the way in which Italy was unified in the 1860s. The Vatican, with the support of Napoleon III, was able to hold Rome until 1870, nearly 10 years after the unification of most of the rest of the Italian peninsula under the rule of Piedmont.

It is a feeling that some observers believe had much to do with the relative setback of the Christian Democrats in the 1953 elections, where they polled 11 million votes, as De Gasperi reminded Romita, but failed, in coalition with their allies, to get an absolute majority of all votes cast.

It's argued that an electoral law passed by the Christian Democrats, which would have given them and their allies 64 per cent of the seats in the Chamber if they had gotten more than 50 per cent of the total vote, aroused the old anti-clericalism. It was felt that if the Christian Democrats got that kind of majority they would try to impose what their enemies call "a confessional state or regime.

But Romita's anti-clerical thrusts in the January debate were mild compared with those of Pietro Nenni, often called the most anti-clerical of Italian politicians.

It was Nenni who thundered against "Catholic integralism," which he said

was fundamentally illiberal and anti-democratic. It was Nenni who accused Fanfani of what he called "Catholic tendencies" from which had come Salazar and Dollfuss and Gil Robles.

And always Nenni and his Communist allies brought against Fanfani the charge that he was a corporativist. By that they meant, of course, that Fanfani had favored the kind of economic structure imposed by Mussolini and the fascists. This charge against Fanfani had been made also by strongly anti-Communist Italians. In support of it they could cite some books written by Fanfani as a young professor of economic history, in which he commented favorably on corporatism as an economic system.

And so the word "corporativista," another word with historic Italian overtones, was tossed into the January debate at Montecitorio.

As I said earlier, I found that these historic overtones heightened my interest in that debate and made it more significant. It was my thought that this somewhat sketchy review of those overtones would do the same for you.

Graham Hovey, signing another radio Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of the United States Information Service for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and thisis the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 18
Recorded in Rome, March 5, 1954
Tape runs: 13:30

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MAR 15 1954
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(First in a series of two broadcasts on Italian attitudes toward Americans and Russians, as reflected in public opinion polls).

This is Graham Hovey in Rome, sending along another Letter from Italy, produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

Every now andthen I like to give this program a kind of "Italy looks at America" aspect. I believe it is important for Americans to know how they and their country are regarded abroad. And I think most Americans are eager for such information.

Today's version of "Italy looks at America" should be more scientific than my previous efforts on this theme. It is not based on interviews with Italian politicians or so-called "opinion leaders." It consists of results of a public opinion poll, based on a scientific sample, of the whole Italian population.

For all its faults, and despite some conspicuous failures, the public opinion poll, based on a scientific sample, remains the most practical device we have for measuring national attitudes on public questions. I mean that the poll is the best means we have short of actual elections, held on specific issues.

In America, we know that despite their failures to predict accurately the result of our 1948 presidential election, the polls were back in the picture as strong as ever in 1952. Popular interest in them seemed as high as ever.

Well, popular interest in public opinion polling seems high in Italy, too. The popular illustrated weekly called Giorno widely advertises the fact that it carries results of scientific polls conducted by an agency known as DOXA.

DOXA recently conducted polls to determine attitudes of Italian citizens toward the United States and toward the Soviet Union. The articles and tables on the results were a big journalistic scoop for the magazine Giorno. I thought you might be interested in some of these results, compiled and adpated for this program by my wife and colleague, Mary Jean Hovey.

DOXA starts out by explaining a scientific polling sample. It says that a sample is "the part which gives us an approximate idea of the whole; it is the ladleful which says if the soup is salted or not. . . ." I was amused at the soup analogy. It is one used often by a colleague of mine who has contributed much to refining of polling technique: Dr. Ralph O. Nafziger, director of the School of Journalism at the University of Wisconsin.

But let's get on to the results of the first poll -- the one on Italian attitudes toward America and Americans.

As its first question, DOXA asked Italians: "Do you have greater sympathy for the British, the Americans, the Germans or the French? And in what order of preference would you put them?"

Fifty six per cent of the Italians polled said they were most sympathetic to Americans. Eighteen per cent listed us in second place; ten percent in third. Only six per cent listed the Americans last. Another ten per cent gave us no ranking.

As against the 56 per cent who liked Americans best, 22 per cent listed the Germans first; 12 per cent preferred the French; and three per cent preferred the British.

It seems possible that the events of last autumn in Trieste had something to do with the weak British showing.

As I have said, 56 per cent of all Italians polled said they liked Americans best. But when DOXA centered on those who said they were Communists or supporters of Pietro Nenni's fellow traveling Socialist party, the results were very different. Of this group, 40 per cent preferred the French; 36 per cent listed the Germans first, and only 21 per cent chose the Americans. As you can see, these results among the Communists and their allies would seem to fit in with official party attitudes to some extent.

DOXA next broke down the results for members of the Social Democratic party, the Republican party and other democratic left-of-center groups -- and the change of sentiment was pronounced. Seventy per cent of this group of Italians preferred Americans; 14 per cent liked the Germans best; 10 per cent preferred the French, and six per cent the British.

When DOXA got to the largest of the Italian parties -- the Christian Democrats -- 80 per cent preferred Americans to nine per cent each for Germans and French, and two per cent for the British. Next in line were the Liberals and Monarchists, whose preferences were listed together. Sixty six per cent of them preferred Americans; 22 per cent the Germans; 10 per cent the French, and two per cent the British.

When DOXA reached the far political right, where the heirs of Benito Mussolini hold forth, it found the most striking difference of all from the general trend:

Of the Italians who said they supported the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement, or MSI, 74 per cent preferred Germans. Only 24 per cent of the neo-Fascist sympathizers listed Americans first; two per cent favored the French; and the British had no supporters at all.

DOXA made one more division on this first question -- a division between Italian men and women. So far as Italian men were concerned, their collective preference was a tossup between Americans and French. Only ten per cent put us in fourth place and another ten per cent designated the French as least popular. But the women gave Americans a slight edge. Only five per cent of them put us in last place, while seven per cent designated the French.

Italian men and women also differed in their attitudes toward the Germans. Only 16 per cent of the men said they had the least sympathy for the Germans, while 33 per cent of the women liked the Germans least among the four nationalities.

But perhaps I have given too much attention to this matter of sympathy for different nationalities. It is hardly a constructive thing, even if interesting.

For its second major question, DOXA asked Italians to select three adjectives from a list of 24 that would best describe Americans. And the adjective chosen most often was the word, "generous." Thirty eight per cent of Italians polled used "generous" as one of their three adjectives by which to describe Americans. In second place, with 37 per cent, was the word, "practical."

Nineteen per cent of the Italians polled said Americans were "vain," but eight per cent said we were "modest." Another 19 per cent used the adjective,

"intelligent," to describe Americans, but nine per cent thought us "foolish." Eighteen per cent said we were "ingenuous" people.

Twelve per cent of the Italians said Americans were "calm," but another nine per cent called us "impulsive," and three per cent said we were "agitated."

As against nine per cent who thought we were "courageous," seven per cent said we were "timid." And as against nine per cent of the Italians who said Americans were "idealistic," six per cent said we were "without ideals."

There was more of the same, but perhaps this will give you a general idea: DOXA found that exactly two-thirds of all answers expressed "praise" for Americans, while one-third expressed "blame."

Moving along to matters more important in the world political picture, DOXA said this to Italians in its polling sample: "Some say that American aims to dominate the world. What do you think?"

Twenty nine per cent of Italians polled said the statement was true; that America does aim to dominate the world. And another 40 per cent said the statement was "partly true." Twenty three per cent said the statement was "false," and eight per cent made no response to the question. But let's remember that 69 per cent said the statement that America aims to dominate the world was either true or partly true.

DOXA's political party breakdown on this question was interesting -- and revealing. As for the Communists and left-wing Socialists, 74 per cent of them said it was true that America aims to dominate the world. And another 13 per cent said the statement was partly true. Only five per cent said it was false.

In the democratic left-of-center groups, including the Social Democrats and Republicans, only 16 per cent thought the statement true, but 55 per cent said it was true in part. Twenty six per cent called it false.

Among Christian Democrats, only eight per cent thought America wished to dominate the world, but an additional 46 per cent said the statement was partly true. Forty per cent called to false.

Fifteen per cent of the Liberals and Monarchists believed the statement that America wished to dominate the world was true; 45 per cent said it was partly true; and 37 per cent said it was false.

The neo-Fascists were more nearly in agreement with the Communists and left Socialists than any of the other Italian parties on this question. That, of course, is not an unusual thing in Italian politics, particularly on specific foreign policy questions not involving the Soviet Union. Forty eight per cent of the neo-Fascists said it was true that the United States wished to dominate the world and another 41 per cent thought the statement partly true.

But DOXA went further with this matter, partly because, as the polling agency itself said, its question on the United States made use of a "propagandistic cliche" that was "somewhat superficial." So, it asked the Italians polled this question:

"Some assert that America is not interested enough in Italy, others that she meddles too much in our affairs. According to you, who is right?"

Thirteen per cent said the United States was not interested enough in Italy; 33 per cent said our policy toward Italy was about the right one; 30 per cent said we meddled too much, and 24 per cent said they did not know or at least gave no answer.

Next, DOXA asked Italians why they thought the United States had given -- and continues to give -- financial aid to Italy. Fifteen per cent said America sincerely desires to help Italy get back on her feet so that she can maintain herself. Forty eight per cent said it was because America wants to stop Italy from going Communist. Thirty two per cent said America wants to have friends in Italy so as to have Italy for an ally in the event of war with Russia. And 19 per cent said the United States was giving aid in order to take possession of Italian markets. You will note that these percentages exceed one hundred, for some persons polled gave more than one answer.

At a time when ratification of the European army treaty is a lively issue in Italian politics, DOXA's next question was timely and interesting. It listed several possible ways to prevent the outbreak of a new war, and asked Italians to choose the one they thought best.

The biggest single group -- 37 per cent of those interviewed -- answered that they did not know. The second biggest group -- 34 per cent -- said the best way to prevent war was by stepping up the rearmament of western Europe.

Fourteen per cent said the best way to begin the disarmament of western Europe; three per cent said it was best to leave western European armament at its present level. Twelve per cent answered, with regard to this question about the best way to prevent a new war: "One can do nothing."

Finally, DOXA singled out the 34 per cent who said the best way to prevent war was by increasing the rearmament of western Europe and asked: "Is it desirable that America aid Italy to rearm?" Ninety two per cent said yes and four per cent said no.

As I'm sure the officials of the DOXA polling agency would concede, we should be careful not to read too much into these results of the poll about Italian attitudes toward America and Americans. But I think these two general conclusions might be justified:

First, there is no substantial anti-American feeling in Italy; on the contrary, a majority of Italians seems to have more sympathy and affection for Americans than for their neighbors of western Europe.

And second, Americans as individuals are more popular with Italians than American policies, as a general rule.

Both of these points confirm strong hunches that I reported in a previous Letter from Italy. Friends told me before I came last year that I might find a rising tide of anti-Americanism. But as I said previously, if such feeling exists I can't find it -- in Rome or anywhere else. And the DOXA poll, with its evidence that many Italians think of Americans as generous, practical and industrious, confirms my feeling that if anti-Americanism exists it is confined to a small minority. In fact, these DOXA reports tend to confirm something Italian friends have been telling me for a long time:

That the weakest and most ineffective part of the Communist propaganda effort in Italy is its anti-American aspect.

On the other hand, many Italians who like Americans are somewhat distrustful of some aspects of American foreign policy. Recall for a moment the 69 per cent in the DOXA poll who said the statement that America aims to dominate the world was either true or partly true.

And I would like to add one more observation only indirectly related to this particular DOXA poll:

The fact that most Italians are friendly and sympathetic to Americans does not mean -- emphatically does not mean -- that communism is no threat in Italy, or that the Communists and their allies could not be voted into power in democratic elections.

Don't forget that even 21 per cent of the Communists and left Socialists polled by DOXA said they had more sympathy for Americans than for Germans, British and French.

The fact that they like us does not mean that Italians will vote the way we should like to have them vote. It does not mean this any more than a contrary Italian feeling toward Russians would mean that Italians would not continue to vote Communist in great numbers.

And speaking of the Italian attitude toward Russia and Russians, I hope to examine the results of DOXA's poll on that subject for the magazine, Giorno, in a future Letter from Italy. Graham Hovey reporting. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. ~~26~~ 19
Recorded in Rome, March 5, 1954
Tape runs: 13:45

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(Second of two broadcasts on Italian attitudes toward Americans and Russians, as reflected in public opinion polls).

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This is Graham Hovey in Rome, sending another radio Letter from Italy, produced for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

In a previous Letter, I told you something about the Italian public opinion polling agency -- the organization called DOXA -- and how it discloses the results of its polling in a popular Italian illustrated weekly called Giorno, meaning the day.

Like the pollsters in America, DOXA explains to the readers of Giorno that a scientific polling sample is the spoonful of soup which tells the cook whether the whole bowl of soup has been salted sufficiently. Or, as DOXA put it recently, the sample is "the heap of coal which makes known the quality of the entire load."

And like Dr. George Gallup, the man who directs the Italian poll -- Dr. P. Luzzatto Fegiz, professor of statistics at the University of Trieste -- makes a considerable effort to explain to readers the margin of error in such polling. Professor Fegiz believes DOXA's margin of error is no greater than six per cent. He reports, for example that 41 per cent of Italian adults questioned by DOXA knew that Clare Boothe Luce is United States ambassador to Italy. And he says that means that the percentage of all Italian adults who know the name of the American ambassador is between 35 and 47 per cent.

Like the American polling agencies, DOXA encounters much ignorance and much indifference to many public questions on the part of ordinary Italian citizens.

One manifestation of this indifference uncovered by DOXA in a recent poll on the attitudes of Italians toward the United States and the Soviet Union surprised me very much. As a journalist, I have been interested in the great number of daily newspapers available on the newstands here in Rome. I have also been impressed with the fact that at certain times of the day it is difficult to get close enough to one of these stands to buy a paper because of the large crowds pushing up to the counters. I know of 16 different daily newspapers published right here in Rome. And all newstands also carry at least the two great non-Roman dailies -- Il Corriere della Sera, of Milan, and La Stampa, of Turin.

But judging by DOXA poll results, something must be wrong with this picture. Out of 100 Italians polled in these recent surveys, 25 said they did not read newspapers at all and another 20 said they read a daily paper only now and then.

But in any event, as I reported previously, the magazine Giorno seems convinced that the Italian public is much interested in the results of the DOXA polls and it advertises strenuously the fact that it carries these results. Giorno especially advertised its two recent articles, complete with charts, on the results of the DOXA samplings with regard to Italian attitudes toward America and Russia.

As I reported in that previous letter, the DOXA poll on America and Americans disclosed these two basic facts: First, Italians have much sympathy and affection for Americans; 56 per cent of those polled said they were more sympathetic to Americans than to Germans, French and British. And second, Americans as individuals are considerably more popular with Italians than are some aspects of American foreign policy; 29 per cent of the Italians polled said it was true that

America aims to dominate the world, and an additional 40 per cent said the statement was partly true.

When it got around to Russia and the Russians, the DOXA agency did not ask the same questions that perhaps you or I would have asked. In fact, there is no single result that provides a clear-cut test of Italian sentiment between Americans and Russians or between American and Soviet foreign policies. DOXA made what I would call -- without intending any criticism -- an oblique approach to these questions. Nevertheless, I thought the DOXA results were interesting, and worth passing along to you.

Here is DOXA's first question to its scientific sample of Italian citizens -- and remember that the wording is that of DOXA and not my own: DOXA said this: "As you know, some western scientists have delivered to Russia the relative secrets of the atomic bomb. According to you, have they worked for peace, or have they increased the peril of war?"

Of the men polled, 24 per cent said that scientists who had turned over relative atomic bomb secrets to Russia had worked for peace; an every 50 per cent said these scientists had increased the danger of war. Among the Italian women, only 14 per cent of those polled said the scientists who had passed over atomic secrets to Moscow had worked for world peace; 44 per cent said such scientists had increased the peril of war. Among the men, 13 per cent expressed the opinion that such action by the scientists had no effect, one way or another, on the chances for war or peace; among the women, 12 per cent gave this same answer.

Twenty seven per cent of the women polled said simply that they did not know how to answer the question; only 10 per cent of the men made that response.

DOXA and the magazine Giorno summed up this section of the question in this way: Among the men, those who thought scientists who passed atomic secrets to Russia were increasing the risk of war outnumbered by two to one those who thought such actions contributed to peace; among the women, those who thought such scientists had increased the chances for war outnumbered by three to one those who thought those actions contributed to peace.

The article in Giorno by the DOXA polling agency then broke down these results according to the educational background of the Italians polled. I don't wish to throw too many figures at you, so perhaps we'll confine our examination of this phase of the question to two groups. But first I should report that the more education a person had had, the stronger, generally, was his feeling that scientists who passed atomic secrets to the Soviet Union were increasing the peril of war, rather than contributing to peace.

Among Italians who had gone only to elementary school, or had not attended school at all, 21 per cent thought scientists delivering atomic secrets to Russia were working for peace, as aginst 41 per cent who said such scientists were increasing the risk of war. In this category, 13 per cent said such action by scientists would have no effect on the chances for peace or war, and 24 per cent said they did not know how to answer the question.

But when only university graduates were interviewed, the result was strikingly different:

In the university group, only nine per cent of the Italians polled regarded the passing of atomic secrets to Moscow by western scientists as a contribution to world peace. Sixty eight per cent of them said such action increased the peril of war. Only nine per cent said such passing of secrets would have no effect, one way or another, on the chances for peace, and only five per cent of these university graduates said they did not know how to answer the question.

With understatement, DOXA concluded: "In the more educated groups it is notable that there are more pessimists."

DOXA then moved on to break down the answers to this question according to the political affiliation or sympathy of the Italians polled -- and here the results are about what one might expect. You could say that the results are roughly in line with official Italian party policy and propaganda.

Thus, among the Communists and their left-wing Socialist allies, 54 per cent of the Italians polled said the action of western scientists in handing over atomic secrets to Russia helped the chances for world peace. Only 10 per cent in this group said such action increased the risk of a new war. Nineteen per cent of the Communists and fellow traveling Socialists said such a passing of secrets by the scientists would have no influence on the question of peace or war, and 17 per cent said they did not know.

Moving gradually from left to right across the political spectrum, DOXA found that Italian Social Democrats and Republicans felt almost exactly the reverse of the Communists and left Socialists. In this democratic, left-of-center group, only 17 per cent thought scientists passing atomic secrets to Russia were working for peace, against 52 per cent who thought such action increased the risk of war.

The contrast to the Communist viewpoint was even more striking among the members or supporters of Italy's biggest party, the Christian Democrats. Only eight per cent of these believed the turning over of atomic secrets to Russia by western scientists helped the cause of world peace. Sixty seven per cent said this action increased the peril of war.

Among Liberals and Monarchists, 10 per cent thought such a transfer of secrets a contribution to peace and 71 per cent thought it increased the risk of war. And, finally, among the supporters of the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement, eight per cent thought the handing over of atomic secrets to Russia helped the cause of peace and 65 per cent said it expanded the peril of war -- figures comparable to those for the Christian Democrats.

To summarize this section of DOXA's report to the magazine Giorno, in the camp of the Communists and their allies the idea that scientists who gave Russia atomic secrets ~~XXXX~~ contributed to peace carried by a margin of five to one. But in all other Italian parties taken together, the verdict was eight to one that such scientists had increased the danger of another war.

DOXA also asked Italians this question: "Taking account of all factors -- human and technical -- do you believe that from the military point of view, Russia or America is the stronger today?" In Italy, a country allied with the United States in the North Atlantic treaty organization, the overall results were these:

Fifteen per cent said they believed Russia was the stronger and 32 per cent said they thought the United States was the more powerful as of today. But 30 per cent said they thought the strength of the two powerful nations was about on par, and 22 per cent said they did not know.

The political party results were about as they had been on the previous question: 41 per cent of the Communists and their allies said Russia was stronger and only six per cent of this group picked the United States, with 33 per cent saying they thought the two powers were about equal. But among the Christian Democrats, to take one other example, only six per cent said they thought Russia was the stronger. An even 50 per cent said the United States was the more powerful and 21 per cent said they believed the two powers were about on par.

Now we come to a DOXA question that would have been more meaningful for Americans if it had included the United States in the list of countries involved. DOXA asked Italians: In your opinion, which of the following three countries showed the most hostility to Italy after the war -- France, England and Russia.

In the overall survey, only two per cent of the Italians polled siad France had been most hostile. Forty one per cent said Britain and 37 per cent said Russia. Eleven per cent of those responding said all three of these countries had been hostile to Italy and only two per cent said none of the three had shown hostility. Perhaps three historical reminders should be inserted at this point:

1. Many Italians have long nursed a deep resentment against Britain as the nation which consistently thwarted Italy's ambitions -- colonial and otherwise -- in the Mediterranean area.

2. The British army contributed to the World War II debacle of the Italians in Africa; then fought on Italian soil for nearly two years; and finally stayed on as an occupying power once the war was over. The Soviet army, on the other hand, has never been on Italian territory.

3. And finally, the British have been responsible for the administration of Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste and were blamed for the violence and deaths of last autumn.

These factors may help account for the overall result of the DOXA poll, in which 41 per cent of the Italians said England had shown the most hostility to Italy in this postwar period against 37 per cent who listed Russia. In DOXA's breakdown according to educational background, the result was somewhat different. Persons with the most formal education among those polled said that Russia had shown the most hostility to Italy, although the margin was not great between the Soviet Union and England.

DOXA also broke down answers to this question according to geographic location. The polling agency found that in the south of Italy and in the islands, including Sicily and Sardinia, the Italian people thought Russia had shown greater hostility than England in the postwar years. But in the northern and central parts of Italy, about 46 per cent said England had demonstrated the greatest hostility, compared with 37 per cent who named Russia as the major offender.

Once again, the political party breakdown was what one could anticipate. Among Communists and left Socialists, 70 per cent said England had shown the most hostility, against eight per cent who listed Russia. But among Christian Democrats, only 23 per cent called England the greatest offender, against 54 per cent who named the Soviet Union.

DOXA's last question was worded this way: "What acts of Russia, hostile to Italy, have hurt it the most?"

Thirty three per cent of Italians polled listed the Soviet Union's detention of Italian prisoners captured during World War II. It has been estimated that upwards of 60,000 Italians were so detained; only a relative handful have come back. And the Italians clearly resent this more than anything else the Soviet Union has done. In second place, cited by 19 per cent of those polled, is Russia's persistent veto of Italy's admission to the United Nations. Six per cent cited Moscow's hostility to the return of Trieste to Italy; nine per cent cited Russia's claim for war indemnities; and five per cent listed Communism's struggle against the church and persecution of priests.

Well, as I have said, and as the director of the DOXA agency -- Professor Fegiz of the University of Trieste would agree -- not too much should be read into these responses to the questions of the pollsters on Italian attitudes toward America and Russia. But they do provide us with the most scientific evidence we have on the attitudes of ordinary Italian citizens on these broad questions. I thought you might find these results as interesting as I did. Graham Hovey, reporting. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 20
Recorded in Rome, March 4, 1954
Tape runs: 14:08

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MAR 15 1954
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Tape begins: "This is Graham Hovey...."

(Note: Letter from Italy No. 20 was a discussion among Burton Paulu, manager of University of Minnesota Station KUOM, Minneapolis, Minn., Lawrence Creshkoff, assistant manager in charge of programs for Station WGBH, Boston, Mass., and Graham Hovey on the broadcasting systems of Britain, France and Italy.

Mr. Paulu, past vice president of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters, is the NAEB-Fulbright research scholar for the 1953-54 academic year in England, accredited to the British Broadcasting Corporation; Mr. Creshkoff is the NAEB-Fulbright research scholar in France, accredited to Radio-diffusion-Television Francaise. Mr. Hovey, associated professor of journalism at the University of Wisconsin and news analyst for Station WHA and the Wisconsin State Broadcasting Service, is the NAEB-Fulbright research scholar in Italy, accredited to Radiotelevisione Italiana.

The discussion was informal and no script was prepared.)

Tape ends: "...and this is the NAEB Network."

Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 21
Recorded in Rome, March 6, 1954
Tape runs: 14:06

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MAR 15 1954

AM 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 PM

This is Graham Hovey, recording in Rome another Letter from Italy for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- the NAEB Network.

Several bookstores in downtown Rome are currently displaying in their show windows a book in Italian by James Blaine Walker caller, "La Storia della Industria Americana (The history -- or the story -- of American industry)."

I haven't had the chance to read that book or even to get an indication of the scope of its contents or the point of view of the author. But the prominence of its display in the show windows of leading Roman bookstores is indicative of something that an American residing in Europe is apt to find interesting -- and perhaps significant.

I happen to know that in at least three of those bookstores currently displaying Walker's "Story of American Industry" you could find copies -- in translation -- of the book, "U.S.A., The Permanent Revolution." That's the book that grew out of a special issue of Fortune magazine; the special issue edited by Russell W. Davenport some two or three years ago. Italians can buy that book -- "U.S.A., The Permanent Revolution" -- translated into their own language, in at least three Roman bookstores and perhaps more.

Now, European fascination with certain aspects of the American economic and industrial system is not a new thing, any more than European interest in certain aspects of the American political system is new.

But it seems to this reporter that European interest in how our economic machine functions, and what the social and cultural ramifications are, has reached some kind of peak. I wouldn't know when this peak was reached; and perhaps it's a plateau, rather than a peak. Anyhow, the interest is certainly very high -- at least here in Italy. The prominent show window display displays of a book on the history of American industry is one indication. The presence on bookstore shelves of an Italian translation of "U.S.A., The Permanent Revolution," is another.

Still other indications are the frequent serious articles in Italian dailies and weeklies which attempt to dig beneath the surface and tell their readers how our system actually functions. I would like to examine a couple of these articles in a few moments.

This interest in the American economic and industrial system is not surprising, at a time when the prosperity -- or even the economic survival -- of western Europe depends to such a great extent on what happens in America. This interest is not surprising at a time when European newspapers, like their American counterparts, are carrying frequent articles from New York and Washington on the possibilities of an economic setback in the United States.

This interest is not surprising, but -- if I may be permitted an apparent redundancy -- it is interesting. And the printed results of this interest are particularly interesting to an American working abroad. Take those two newspaper articles to which I referred a moment ago, for example.

The headline over one of them says that we Americans have completed our social revolution -- and I quote: "Not with barricades, but with fiscal policy." The writer, Ermanno Contini, believes we have actually brought off a peaceful social revolution in America by use of the government taxing power -- and Signor Contini seems to be all for that kind of revolution.

The man who wrote the headline over the second newspaper article actually borrowed the title of Russell Davenport's book, with only the slightest change. He referred to "the permanent revolution in the U.S.A." But the writer of that article, Aldo Canonici, had a name for the system under which that permanent revolution was achieved that would startle most Americans. Signor Canonici called it, "white communism," and I'll tell you how he picked up that tile in a few moments.

Ermanno Contini wrote his long article on the American industrial and economic system in the Rome morning daily, Il Messagero, which is officially independent, but almost invariably supports the Italian government. Aldo Canonici wrote his article on "White Communism" for the stimulating Italian weekly, Il Mondo, which is edited by a group of Liberals. Both Il Messaggero and Il Mondo are strongly anti-Communist. In the Italian political spectrum, I would place Il Messaggero a little to the right of center and Il Mondo a little to the left of center. I cite these points only as background for judging the Contini and Canonici articles.

I might say that I did not decide to review these two articles on Letter from Italy because I agreed with the conclusions of the writers about America. But I believe the viewpoints are those of two intelligent Italian journalists, each of whom tried seriously and objectively to find out what makes the American system tick.

I almost always find the views of such foreign observers interesting. And I believe that some -- not all, but some -- of the viewpoints of Signori Contini and Canonici would coincide with those of Russell Davenport and his coworkers, who wrote, "U.S.A., The Permanent Revolution." Some are reminiscent of the conclusions of the late Frederick Lewis Allen in his book on the first 50 years of this century in America; the volume called "The Big Change."

Signor Contini wrote his article after a tour of the Chicago stockyards. He duly describes how, in the beef slaughter houses, a live animal can be transformed into pieces of meat, ready to be sold, in 39 minutes. He calls the conducted tour of the Chicago stockyards "a symptomatic manifestation of that national pride which replaces the monuments of history with the marvels of industry, of mechanics andof producation."

Signor Contini describes vividly the city of Chicago -- the unattractive, along with the beautiful. And he marvels at what he calls "the exciting sense of dynamic exuberance, of progressing alacrity, of prophetic anticipation." He wonders if the world has found, in this America, a new young generator. He says that in America "all is in transformation and progress, even the social structure."

Then comes the shocker. Signor Contini says that the Swift packing plant in Chicago is the symbol of what he calls "the discovery of the new order in which unconscious socialism is spreading through American society."

He hastens to tell his readers that one cannot speak of socialism in America without scandalising people, but he adds that there is no doubt that Americans have realized many of the "applications" of socialism with non-socialist methods.

And Signor Contini says that by this process Americans have made of their country "one of the most socially advanced that exists today." He uses the Swift plant as a symbol of this process. He says that as the Swift slaughter houses quickly break an animal into pieces for distribution to meat buyers, so are the riches which the company produces broken into pieces and distributed to employers and stockholders.

It is the progressive income tax to which Signor Contini gives much of the credit for this phenomenon; the income tax and the inheritance tax. He tells his Italian readers -- and I quote:

"Individual enrichment -- rapid and gigantic; industrial success due to a fortunate stroke on the stock market; the fabulous destiny of the Rockefellers, Carnegies, Fords, Morgans, Astors; all the legendary images of capitalistic America tyrannized by a few Wall Street magnates, now belongs to the past."

He says that of 150 million Americans today, only 72 have annual incomes exceeding a million dollars and only 12,000 own properties worth a million. And he adds that in 1929, these figures were 500 and 21,000, respectively. Obviously, Signor Contini believes today's situation is healthier than that which existed just prior to the Great Depression.

He cites the fact that an American earning $50,000 must pay half of it to the government in taxes, and says the levy on higher incomes is stepped up to the point where the government claims 93 per cent in the top bracket. And he says, of the America that this tax system has helped to create:

"It is still possible to create colossal business revolutions, but it is not possible to amass enormous fortunes except, I am told, in Texas, which finds itself in a full phase of development and constitutes the exception to the rule."

Signor Contini then tells his readers in Il Messaggero that the inheritance tax also has helped to discourage excessive accumulations of wealth and has encouraged fractionalizing and dispersing of shares of stock in the great American industries. Thus, he says, the real proprietors of Swift & Company are the 64,000 shareholders, and he adds that no one of these, "not even Swift," holds more than one per cent of the stock.

He tells his Italian readers that this kind of system was called "social capitalism" in a poll conducted by an American magazine. And Signor Contini believes this system is "the fruit of a slow revolution, made and won with a fiscal policy, rather than with barricades."

Signor Contini concludes that it is not only the economic, military and political power that has pushed America to assume, almost in spite of itself, the function of western world leadership. It is, he says, the American system's "democratic sincerity, its vitality, its modernity, its fascinating, constructive, solid cosmopolitanism" which, in Signor Contini's opinion, is "the sure sign of a higher destiny of a unified civilization."

Aldo Canonici's article in the weekly Il Mondo, the one called, "White Communism: the Permanent Revolution in the U.S.A.," is much broader in scope than that of Ermanno Contini in Il Messaggero. Signor Canonici believes that it has been vigorous intervention by the federal government on many different economic and social fronts which has given the United States its mixed economic system that he says has been well defined as "a permanent revolution."

And why does Signor Canonici call our system "White Communism?" Well, first of all because he says it is impossible, in good faith, to characterize the American system as "capitalism," though it is "capitalist." Second because Signor Canonici could not accept the names suggested for our system by readers responding to a poll conducted in 1951 by This Week magazine -- names such as "the new capitalism," "proletarian capitalism," "productivism," and "democratic economy." Nor did he believe that the abstraction, "The American way of life," hit the mark.

But one day Signor Canonici was having a chat in Naples with an old Italian railway employee who was ~~xxxxxxx~~ a convinced Communist. Signor Canonici says of the conversation: "I answered many questions which he (meaning the Communist railway worker) asked me with a lively curiosity on the conditions in the United States. He mentally compared what I told him about America with the conditions which he thought existed in Russia. At the end, after I had skimmed over the subjects of federal government benefits for veterans, progressive taxes, TVA and other things, he (the Communist worker) concluded: "Allora, in the United States there is also communism -- but white communism."

And Signor Canonici adds: "Arbitrarily, I adopted this term of 'white communism' in place of the many others suggested. 'White communism' because its ultimate and is that of equality, such as the ideal aim of communism was to have been. Equality . . . without the red color of a revolution, without the spilling of blood, only one party, and the suppression of the most elemental liberties of thought and speech."

Like Signor Contini, in Il Messaggero, Signor Canonici is impressed by the American graduated system of income taxes. He says that no country in the world, excluding perhaps Great Britain, has a tax system so well conceived from the standpoint of equalizing incomes, And it impresses this Italian that rich Americans who try to evade their income taxes go to jail along with the poor; the celebrities along with the unknowns.

But Signor Canonici is impressed by many other features of the American system: Social security, government responsibility for finding jobs for unemployed; old-age pensions; farm price support programs; the spectacular growth of free, independent labor unions; veterans' benefits; the Tennessee Valley authority.

This, he says, is "not capitalism." The classical school of capitalism that Adam Smith and the Manchester school described in their treatises "does not exist in the United States." Signor Canonici calls it "white communism," and he describes it in these words: ". . . a scheme without a scheme, a movement which has no rigid ideology; which can mold and modify according to momentary circumstances."

He says this system is characterized by "a continuous work of modernization, restoration and amendment to the old system." Private initiative, he says, "continues to be the fulcrum of the national life, but to it is added the work of the state to protect the interests of the people and to prevent excesses. . ."

Signor Canonici predicts that the march forward of the American system will be long. He says the "expectations for the success of this new experiment seem good."

One of the reasons why he believes the prospects are good is the behavior of the Eisenhower administration with respect to the economic and social program of the New Deal, launched by President Roosevelt more than 20 ~~xxxxxxxx~~ years ago.

Signor Canonici says that in many European circles the election of a Republican candidate was interpreted as "a repudiation of the work accomplished in 20 years of a Democratic majority; a backward step in respect to the social politics of the New Deal and the Fair Deal." But Signor Canonici believes that the victory of Eisenhower instead represented, in effect, a ratification of the preceding work. He says: "Eisenhower never thought of requesting in his campaign a reduction of progressive taxes or a halt to the legis-

lation for social security." And he concludes: "One sees, in other words, that what one day was established as a bold program by Roosevelt and the Democratic left is today turned into a program of both parties; that it will be subject to revision, but never stopped."

You may not agree with the conclusions of Signori Ermanno Contini and Aldo Canonici about the American economic system, but I think many of you will agree that they are stimulating viewpoints. And certainly they are intended to be very friendly and favorable viewpoints about our economic and social system. Signori Cantini and Canonici seem to be telling us, among other things, that, partly by design and perhaps partly by accident, we Americans have built better than we ourselves frequently realize.

And as I recall it, that was one of the conclusions of Russell Davenport and his colleagues in that book: "U.S.A., Permanent Revolution," which, as I said earlier, you can find on the shelves of at least three Roman bookstores in Italy these days.

Graham Hovey reporting. This program was recorded in the Rome studios of the United States Information Service for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 22
Recorded in Rome, March 28, 1954
Tape runs: 13:40

(First of three broadcasts on background and prospects of the Scelba government)

This is Graham Hovey, recording another Letter from Italy for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- the NAEB Network.

Now may be as good a time as any to catch up with the Italian political situation. After more than two months of drift and crisis, this country now has a fully-constituted government for the first time since Giuseppe Pella resigned as premier January 5. The dust has settled a bit on most of the major events of that two-month period and it should be possible to put them in perspective.

The new government, headed by Mario Scelba, was fully constituted on March 10 when it won a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies by a narrow, 13-vote margin. Three hundred deputies from the democratic parties of the center and moderate left voted in favor of the Scelba cabinet. Two hundred eighty-three deputies voted no. They were of the Communist and left-wing Socialist parties on the far left, and the Monarchists and neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement on the far right.

Scelba's margin of victory in the Chamber thus was exactly the same as it had been in the Senate, where he was confirmed by 123 votes to 110 on February 26.

What the Scelba government will be able to accomplish of its ambitious program with such a narrow parliamentary margin to work with is, of course, a matter of wide speculation here in Italy, even as it is in the United States. I hope to examine the prospects for the new government in subsequent Letters from Italy.

Perhaps the first things to be said about Scelba as premier are that he sincerely didn't want the job, and that the reasons why he got it were not ones that might seem obvious to foreign observers.

Signor Scelba was minister of the interior in the cabinets of former Premier Alcide de Gasperi for more than six years. In that job, he rebuilt the national police force, and re-established public order in a country where riots had been almost the order of the day in industrial centers after the war. His jeep-equipped flying squads cracked down hard on the Communists and Fascists when they went beyond the law in their political demonstrations, and he thereby incurred their bitter enmity. Scelba was the nominal author of the highly controversial 1953 electoral law enacted after violent debate in both houses of parliament. That law would have given 64 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies to any coalition of parties polling more than 50 per cent of the total vote.

It is generally conceded that this law was a major factor in the relative setback suffered by Scelba's Christian Democratic party in those elections of June, 1953. Because of ballots whose validity was challenged, the Christian Democrats and their allies -- the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans -- barely failed to get that 50 per cent plus of the total vote. Thus they do not have a comfortable working majority in parliament.

Six years of strenuous work as interior minister and the beating he took because of the electoral law that bore his name caused Scelba to conclude that he had had enough of cabinet service after the June election. He declined reappointment as interior minister, and during the eight months that followed he concentrated on his duties as a member of the Chamber from his native Sicily and a member of the directorate of the Christian Democratic party. And during that time he was often called on for speeches at regional party meetings and rallies.

Oddly enough, it was a speech he gave at one such function that led indirectly to his being summoned to the Quirinal palace on February 8 and charged by President Einaudi with the task of forming a government. Here is the way it happened:

Scelba was one of a good many leaders of the Christian Democratic party who were unhappy at Premier Pella's dependence on Monarchist support during his four and a half months in office. They felt that such support could be bought only with a policy of drift and inaction on the Italian domestic front, while big problems grew bigger. They feared that a tacit alliance with the Monarchists would react against the Christian Democrats and the other democratic parties in subsequent elections.

So, Scelba went up into Pella's own legislative constituency in mid-December and delivered a speech at a party rally in Novara. In that speech, he called in effect for a reconstruction of the old, four-party De Gasperi coalition, saying this was the best method of insuring social and economic progress and strengthening the bases of Italian democracy.

Pella bridled at the Scelba speech, particularly because it came at a time when other Christian Democrats were openly indicating their uneasiness at the course Pella was following.

So, when Pella on December 19 precipitated the crisis that was to result in the resignation of his government 17 days later, he mentioned the Scelba Novara speech as one factor.

He also mentioned an article written for a Christian Democratic weekly by Alcide de Gasperi in which the former premier referred to the Pella cabinet as "a friendly government," supposedly meaning that it was not a party government.

There seems to be a tradition in parliamentary governmental systems that the man primarily responsible for bringing down one government should be entrusted with the job of forming its successor. At least it happens that way in Italy.

The official reason why Pella resigned was the veto the Christian Democratic party leaders sought to impose on an ultra-conservative, Salvatore Aldisio, whom Pella wished to name as minister of agriculture. And the man who pressed home that party veto of Aldisio was Amintore Fanfani, leader of the so-called "Democratic Initiative" left-wing faction of the Christian Democracy.

It was logical under the unwritten rules, then, that President Einaudi should give Fanfani the first crack at forming a new government, after Pella had declined a formal courtesy offer to make a new try. Fanfani, in a manner of speaking, had brought down Pella, so give Fanfani the responsibility for forming a government to replace the Pella government.

Well, as everyone now knows, Fanfani tried and failed. He was struck down by 303 votes to 260, on January 30, when he asked the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence for a government composed entirely of Christian Democrats, except for a single independent.

On the surface, then, the two Christian Democrats aside from Fanfani, who had had most to do with Pella's fall were Alcide de Gasperi and Mario Scelba.

This interpretation was unfair to De Gasperi, who actually put forth a tremendous effort to close the breach between Pella and the party and keep Pella in office. But De Gasperi had written the editorial which described Pella's cabinet as "a friendly government." Furthermore, De Gasperi was far stronger with party and country than Scelba. And, if the Christian Democrats were to attempt to reconstruct the four-party democratic coalition, to eliminate the necessity for dependence on the Monarchists, the best man to do the job was obviously the man who had established that four-party coalition in the first place — De Gasperi.

But there were reasons which seemed compelling to De Gasperi why he should not return as head of the government at this time.

He had failed in his attempt to constitute a government following the 1953 elections. Some weeks afterward, De Gasperi had taken on the thankless job of secretary of his party. He had done so because he feared the great heterogeneous Christian Democracy was in real danger of splitting into half a dozen parties. He felt — and many party members agreed — that he was the man who would have the best chance to hold the party together and reforge it as an effective political instrument.

It's a safe guess that that job has been even harder than De Gasperi anticipated. And there are real doubts that any other Christian Democratic leader would have a chance of success.

I have repeatedly examined the heterogeneous character of the Christian Democracy on these programs. One fairly recent example will serve to illustrate the point. After Fanfani fell, the party directorate quarreled long and bitterly about which direction it should take. The decision to follow the recommendation of Scelba's Novara speech and attempt to re-form the old four-party democratic coalition was adopted February 3 by only a seven vote margin — 122 to 115. That will give you an idea of how touch-and-go the internal Christian Democratic party situation often is on very basic policy matters. It will give you a rough idea of how precarious Scelba's support within his own party actually is at the moment.

Anyhow, De Gasperi felt that it was his duty to stay on as party secretary and do his best to hold the party together in support of the new coalition government.

With De Gasperi eliminating himself, then, the choice of Scelba was virtually inevitable. It was Scelba who had started the agitation for a reconstruction of the four-party government: a proposition which his party directorate had accepted, even if by a narrow margin. There was no one else of comparable stature who had taken this line so decisively. And from the standpoint of parliamentary protocol, it had been Scelba's Novara speech that had helped precipitate the Pella crisis.

Those are the real reasons, then, why President Einaudi conferred the burden of forming a new government on Scelba on February 8.

It was not, as some observers have assumed, that Einaudi felt the Italian situation had become so shaky that the hardboiled Sicilian policeman had to be called in to push a tough policy toward the Communists.

In fact, those who know Scelba best will tell you that he is a devoted democrat. They defend his record as interior minister and claim that his flying squads never broke up a peaceful, law-abiding political rally — by the Communists or anyone else.

But in those critical postwar years when the Italian political situation was touch and go, Scelba did not hesitate to use the police power to the fullest to enforce the laws and recreate respect for the authority of the government. Probably not even Scelba himself would contend there were no police excesses in that period.

When he first took over as interior minister, Scelba asked for a report on the condition and morale of the national police. When he got that pessimistic report he is said to have remarked, grimly: "If I were a Communist I would start the revolution tomorrow."

The Communists made their most serious bid for power after the attempted assassination of their leader, Palmiro Togliatti, in the summer of 1948. Scelba had been interior minister for only a year and a half.

The Communists called a general strike to protest the attempt on Togliatti, and the response was impressive. Then it became apparent that they intended to prolong the strike and, if possible, to use it as a weapon with which to bring down the government. At this point, workers began to go back to their jobs. There were riots, but Scelba's flying squads and rejuvenated carabinieri were able to cope with them. More important, Scelba kept his head.

He did not permit himself to be provoked into hasty police action. That could have resulted in widespread bloodshed and backfired badly against the government.

Thus, Scelba and the government prevailed. And that incident probably marked the turning point of the struggle to restore respect for law and order to postwar Italy.

Policemen are rarely loved. Italians, who were subjected to a police state for 20 years, are apt to have an automatic dislike and distrust of the man in charge of the national police. It would not be accurate to say that Mario Scelba enjoys a wide, general popularity.

One often overhears remarks in derogation of this squat, bald, 52-year-old Sicilian lawyer. Some northern Italians simply resent having a premier from the south, especially from Sicily. They criticize Scelba's accent and his rather dull political speeches.

But as I say, those Italians who know Scelba best seem to think highly of him.

They say he was a consistent and sincere anti-fascist, who helped smuggle forbidden books into Fascist Italy and otherwise maintained contact with the anti-Fascist exiles.

They say he worked actively and courageously in the Rome underground before the liberation of the capital of June, 1944.

They say Scelba is one of the hardest workers in government; that he personally is scrupulously honest; and that he proved himself a good administrator in a difficult job.

They say, finally, that he is a shrewd politician in a system and country that requires political shrewdness.

He learned his early political lessons from the famous Sicilian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo, whom he served as private secretary while a young law student in Rome. It was Don Sturzo who founded the party that eventually became the Christian Democracy. And it was the 82-year-old Don Sturzo, now a senator for life, who came out of relative seclusion to deliver a rare speech for the Scelba government during senate debate in late February.

And when the Scelba government finally got its vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies there were celebrations in the streets of the Sicilian city of Caltagirone, birthplace of both Scelba and Don Sturzo.

But of course you can often tell as much about a political man by the behavior of his enemies as you can by the remarks of his friends.

The Communists and left Socialists on one extreme and the neo-Fascists on the other had little to say in criticism of Pella during his four and one-half months as premier. Obviously, they thought — rightly or wrongly — that they had little to fear from him.

But the extremes reacted vigorously against the left-wing Christian Democrat, Fanfani. And they have gone all out in their efforts to bring down or harass Scelba and his middle-road government, which is pledged to extensive social and economic reforms.

The Communists generally know well whom their real and effective opponents are. Obviously, they fear Mario Scelba. They fear him for reasons that have little to do with the effectiveness of his flying squads against their riots.

They fear him because he has been able to reconstitute the coalition of democratic parties, whereas their success depends on a shattering of Italian democratic unity.

They fear him because they know he is in earnest about his government's economic and social program, whereas their success depends on democratic drift, indecision and inaction, in a country where staggering economic and social problems cry for solution.

Graham Hovey signing another letter from Italy. This program, was recorded in the Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters -- and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey — Letter from Italy No. 19
NAEB Network
Recorded in Rome, March 2, 1955
Tape runs: 14:00

#60

(Interview with the young Italian painter, Francesco Del Drago; first of two on so-called "Third Force" painters in Italy).

This is Graham Hovey, recording a Letter from Italy for the network of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters. These programs are produced with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

I have never been a diligent student of art, and if you asked me to summarize recent developments in Italian painting I could not reply in detail. But in recent weeks, somewhat by accident, I have become interested in one artistic development in Italy that a Roman critic has called a "Third Force."

A friend enticed me into a Roman gallery exhibiting recent works of the young Italian painter, Francesco Del Drago. And I immediately got interested in both painter and paintings.

His subject matter alone would have attracted me. Like most Americans who have observed it, I am fascinated by Italian peasant life, with its sharply-drawn illustrations of the age-old basic relationship between man and nature.

As I stood before Del Drago's canvases and water colors, I couldn't have told you how much he had been influenced by the Abstractionists or what he owed to the Impressionists. All I knew was that Del Drago's peasants seemed as genuine as the ones I had seen in Abruzzo or Calabria or Sicily.

In these peasant faces I found the inevitable lines of labor and hardship and fatigue. But I found also the patience and dignity — that unbelievable dignity — which anyone who has observed peasants closely will know is there.

And their activities — the picking of the olives, the threshing of the grain, the lunching and resting under an oak tree during harvest — these activities painted by Del Drago had that character of rhythm and ageless ritual which sensitive observers have always noted. Del Drago's landscapes seemed natural and well-managed.

No grist here for the political propaganda mill. Nor anything that would please extremists of neo-realism or abstraction.

A critic once said that as a man, Francesco Del Drago is "as open as a large window." He is tall and rugged, with black hair that is combed back but rarely stays there. I found him at the gallery in a tweed jacket and slacks, with a Scotch plaid shirt open at the neck.

By the way, he is the Prince Del Drago, scion of a prominent Roman family, but this you might never find out from him. He prefers to be Francesco Del Drago, painter, and he looks like a man of the people who doesn't work ostentatiously at being one.

A man of great energies and enthusiasm, this Del Drago — a forceful, extrovert personality in a rugged physique; a man who can wear you down either talking about art or hiking the rough countryside around the village of Filacciano, where he lives and works. Wear you down but never bore you.

He was born on Washington's birthday, 1920, and painted from the time he was seven. He was an officer in the Italian army in World War II and invalided home. Then he took part in the anti-fascist underground and when Filacciano was free he was installed as mayor by the Committee of National Liberation.

But he quickly got back at his easel, and in 1950, he took his diploma from Rome's Academy of Fine Arts. He since has studied in France and Holland, but has always returned to Filacciano to work.

Filacciano is a tiny hill village overlooking the Tiber valley north of Rome, between Mount Soratte and the Sabine Hills — a country-side famous in antiquity. The Del Drago family castle is built into the wall from which the village was defended in former times.

Del Drago's modest studio probably is much like that of other painters — whitewashed walls, plenty of light, scores of jars with brushes, easels with finished and half-finished work, lots of books, one inscribed by Pablo Picasso.

In this setting, we talked painting and painters. I wanted you to get the impact of Del Drago's personality, so we recorded part of his answers to my questions. But his friend, the young American painter, David Chapin — who also might be classed in this so-called "Third Force" in painting — translated those answers for you.

Signor Del drago, in reviewing the recent exhibition of your painting in Rome, the Italian critic, Luciano Budigna, used an expression which I never had heard previously outside political discussions. He professed to see in the artistic world the development of a "Third Force." And he cited you as a gifted exponent of this "Third Force." In your judgment, what does Signor Budigna mean in using that expression?

DEL DRAGO: I think that when Luciano Budigna uses the political expression, a "Third Force," he means a position between abstraction and neo-realism. He does not mean a compromise, but a painting based upon nature and availing itself of the most recent conquests attained by others and by ourselves. That postion is not a new one. It is the only one that painting has ever had when it has been an art. From the Egyptians all the way down to Picasso and Matisse, this has always been true.

The esthetic of neo-realism is wrong, because it takes a stand in blind opposition to any kind of formalism or international abstraction. And thereby it reduces painting to a sort of provincial illustration. At the present moment, however, both in Italy and France, that neo-realist movement is undergoing a crisis.

On the other hand, pure abstraction in its most extreme form may be very interesting as an experiment in developing a new pictorial grammar. But a grammar is valid only if it serves to make a work of art, and that is, if it serves to express something. In the case of the painter, that means to express an internal or external world, as the case may be.

HOVEY: Signor Budigna, the critic, believes the band of artists that he would put in this category — this "Third Force" — artists between the extremes of realism and abstraction — that this band is steadily growing larger and more effective. I wonder if you would agree with that, and, if so, what factors you believe may be responsible for this development?

DEL DRAGO: As I believe I have indicated in my previous answer, I do not believe the "Third Force" exists, as a <u>movement</u>. I believe that when many persons think of a movement, they think of a fairly compact group of painters — perhaps a group that gathers at some cafe for long discussions of their work and ideals. The "Third Force," in the meaning I attach to that expression, is <u>not</u> a movement. The factors which lead a painter to travel this road between abstraction and neo-realism exist <u>inside</u> that painter. And the best painters of our time are <u>on</u> this road, either consciously or unconsciously.

Picasso, Matisse, Leger, and, among the younger, Pignon — all these are on this road consciously.

On the other hand we have the Italian painter, Guttuso. He is the most valid representative of neo-realism, perhaps because he is a self-made artist. But, when he paints a

good pciture, Guttuso does so using means that completely contradict his neo-realist theories. Therefore, one might say that Guttuso unconsciously follows the road of the "Third Force."

Likewise, the best of the more extreme abstract painters, such as Herbin, Menassier, Esteve and Hartung, though professing pure abstraction, show a clear world of images in their paintings.

Critical theories are useful basically only as helps in understanding works already created. Every artist who really works creates an esthetic of his own. It is only bad or mediocre painters who make use of theories for the actual construction of their works.

In the final analysis, every artist is alone, and has his own problems to solve. It is not the road that makes the artist, but the artist who makes the road.

HOVEY: Well, I would like to know, Signor Del Drago, how you would describe your own work. I note that you once referred to your American friend, David Chapin, as a painter of "realist" themes. But you emphasized that you meant "realist," and not "neo-realist." Would you place yourself in that same category?

DEL DRAGO: Yes, absolutely. I am a realist, not a neo-realist. I am a realist because I believe in the inspiration that comes from the world outside the artist — an actual, objective, human world. I believe in the images that I receive from nature, even if they must, of necessity, be modified by my spirit and by my feelings, and by the demands of pictorial composition at the moment of creation. My realism, therefore, is a lyrical realism. Thus, a girl dressed in violet may change to violet a whole landscape.

HOVEY: The critics said your first personal exhibition, back in 1950, was clearly "cubist." You, yourself, called your work of that period "neo-Cubist," I believe. But then you obviously made a rather sharp turn as a painter, and when you held your next personal exhibition in 1952, the critics noticed a great change. What was responsible for that change, and how would you describe it?

DEL DRAGO: When a young man seeks, he changes.

HOVEY: You said, on occasion of this 1952 exhibition at Rome, that you had no other desire than to present the life around your village of Filacciano — to represent, in your words, "this serene acceptance of grief and labor, enlightened at times by a song that knows nostalgia and hope." Then you added that this was a difficult position for a painter to take in these times. Why do you think it is a difficult position?

DEL DRAGO: A work may have a political-economic aspect, or a poetical-religious aspect. It is this second aspect that interests me. That is, the eternal character of work — of work as a myth. Here in this countryside, the gathering of the olives, the gathering of the grapes, the threshing of grain, assume the aspect of ritual. They are always repeated in the same, season rhythms that will change little in the centuries to come. Many people are interested in that which changes. I am interested in that which does not change. Certain places, certain colors, a certain relationship between an arm and the branches of a tree; a relationship of the hips of women to the great jugs they carry upon their heads; between the hair on their heads and the grass under their feet — all these things, these relationships, are eternal. They are eternal because for centuries they have formed the very poetry of life.

The difficulty is to discover these things anew. This is difficult precisely because these themes have been exploited so much in the past. It is also difficult to travel a road which the abstract painters find too naturalistic, and the neo-realists find too abstract. But this road is the true road — the true way of art. Certainly it would be easier for an artist simply to take a place in the ranks of one of these two official conformisms — abstraction or neo-realism.

HOVEY: Signor Del Drago, as you know, a great many Italian painters and many from other countries have come to Rome to do their work. One has only to recall the artist colony on Via Margutta in downtown Rome to realize what an attraction the city is for many painters. Yet you, who are Roman, have turned your back on Rome to work at Filacciano, which you have described as a "small and ancient agricultural village, [redacted] situated on top of a hill thick with bushes, vineyards and olive tree groves, with the Tiber flowing at its base." Why Filacciano?

DEL DRAGO: Filacciano is a little hamlet — the smallest that you could possibly imagine. It is like a big family. I love this mirror of humanity that is Filacciano.— and I love all the legendary world which surrounds it: the Sabine Hills, Mount Soratte, the Tiber. Here, still, man is in direct contact with nature; a contact which is good. The people like wholesome things. This simple humanity eliminates all that is not essential, but multiplies all that is important — just as one must do in painting a picture that is good.

HOVEY: "This mirror of humanity that is Filacciano . . ." Even with what his words lose in translation, I believe you can sense that Del Drago speaks as a poet. Critics say he also paints like a poet. One referred to the "fabricated poetry" of a Del Drago meadow painting. Another says the lyrical is the vein "most authentic" of Del Drago's creative temperament. You will recall his preference for what he calls the "poetical-religious" aspect of art rather than the "political-economic" aspect. And he once said that in his painting he had "sought always more of forgetting myself in order to achieve the same poetry of the creature or creatures that I had before me."

Obviously, this reporter can venture no qualified judgment about this so-called "Third Force" in art, with which Francesco Del Drago has been identified, but which he says is simply the road between abstraction and neo-realism which all good artists travel. But I do believe we may be hearing more about this 35-year-old Italian whom some critics say is already one of the best painters of his generation.

Graham Hovey reporting. This Letter from Italy was recorded in Filacciano and Rome for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters — and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey — Letter from Italy No. 20 #61
NAEB Network
Recorded in Rome, March 2, 1955
Tape runs: 14:00

(Interview with the young American painter, David Chapin; second of two on so-called "Third Force" painters in Italy).

This is Graham Hovey, recording a Letter from Italy for the network of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters. These programs are produced with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

One mild late-winter morning, I drove out of Rome on the Via Cassia, then cut straight north through rugged country to the village of Soriano nel Cimino. If you are a classicist or Roman historian you may have heard of the place. If not, you probably haven't. The town gets the latter part of its name from the fact that it rests on one of the series of mountain peaks known as the Cimini.

I was going to Soriano to chat with a young American painter, David Chapin, who has been working there in relative isolation for more than three years. I had met Chapin through his friend, the Italian painter, Francesco Del Drago — and those of you who heard the previous Letter from Italy will know that it was Chapin's voice that recorded Del Drago's answers to my questions about painters and painting on that program.

This serious, highly intelligent American would be interesting in any event. I was particularly eager to know him better because I was sure that he, like Del Drago, would fit into the category of young artists which the eminent Rome critic, Luciano Budigna, had called a "Third Force."

I should not give the impression that the paintings of David Chapin are similar to those of Francesco Del Drago — as paintings. Actually, their methods of work are very dissimilar. Yet, the two young painters have some things in common.

For one thing, each was attracted by abstract painting at one stage, but rebelled against it. Each considers himself a realist, but underscores that he is not a neo-realist. You can see how Budigna originated "Third Force" as a term for painters between the extremes of abstraction and neo-realism.

Both Chapin and Del Drago turned their backs on the salons and artist colonies of Rome to work in isolation in primitive country not far from one another. Both have concentrated on the country life that surrounds them, painting the peasants themselves; the harvests, the threshing, the gathering of olives and chestnuts; and the landscapes. When Chapin had an exhibition at Rome in 1953, Del Drago wrote on the program: "Your pictures from afar have the same tone as the song of the peasants; the same miraculous sincerity."

David Chapin was born at Springfield, Mass., December 13, 1919, about two months before Francesco Del Drago was born at Rome. Chapin studied architecture, then attended art school in New York. He taught art at Illinois Wesleyan university before coming to Italy.

I found him in a small house that is part of a villa, on a hill above the town of Soriano. We chatted in the living room that also serves as one of his two studios on occasion.

David, whenever I meet an American artist or writer or musician living and working in this country I always like to ask him: Why Italy? Perhaps I've just read too many articles saying that Rome has become for these Americans what Paris was between the two World wars. I'm not sure this is entirely true. But I would still like to ask why you — at this particular stage in your career as an artist — chose Italy as a place to live and work?

CHAPIN: The choice of Italy for me was personal — one of a personal artistic nature. After I got out of the navy in December, 1945, I studied art under Hans Hoffmann in New York City for two years. During that time, I took part in the most abstract artistic ideas then circulating.

But then something came along that had a great impact for me. It was a retrospective exhibition in New York of the work of the French painter, Pierre Bonnard. His work showed me how an artist could realistically depict the life that surrounded him, but at the same time, make full use of the most modern abstract principles. In short, Bonnard bridged the great gap that seems to separate realism from abstraction.

I went to Illinois Wesleyan university at Bloomington and taught art for three and a half years, using simple abstract terms to explain pictorial structure to my students. But in my own work I began to travel the road indicated for me by my discovery of Bonnard. I junked my abstract painting and tried to combine my abstract theories with direct observation of nature.

HOVEY (interrupting): Yes, I understand that some of your students at Illinois Wesleyan were a bit surprised when they saw your first exhibition, after two years in Bloomington. Evidently, they had expected a more blatant abstraction in your painting.

CHAPIN: Yes, they were — and some of them were rather relieved! But to get back to your question as to why I came to Italy: I think there was something instinctive about it. I had made the shift from abstraction to painting what you might call everyday subject matter. In New York I had seen the Italian realist film, "Open City," and later I saw "The Bicycle Thief." I was struck by their sincerity, and by the coherence of the picture of human life which they gave. I thought that somehow in Italy it might be easier for me to get close to the basic facts of human existence.

Beyond that, of course, Italy is in a sense the cradle of western culture. Here I could investigate at first hand the monuments of the classical, medieval and renaissance worlds. But I repeat: It was really an instinctive move. You might say I was flying by the seat of my pants when I came to Italy.

HOVEY: Well, I'd like to follow that flight a bit further, David, and specifically, I would like to follow it from Rome to Soriano nel Cimino. I think some people have the idea that all American artists who come to Italy settle down on Via Margutta, near the Spanish steps, in the heart of Rome. Yet, you came to Italy and straightaway settled in a hill town north of Rome that I would imagine few Americans have ever heard about. I know that this fact made a deep impression on your good friend, the Italian artist, Francesco Del Drago. He once wrote that the fact that you left America, after having successful personal exhibitions of your work there, and settled down in relative solitude at Soriano for several years was solid evidence of "a strong artistic conscience." You have told why you came to Italy. But why Soriano?

CHAPIN: Even before leaving America I had made up my mind that I did not wish to live in Rome . I wanted to live in a small community — one that might be called "typically Italian." Landscape has always figured prominently in my work, and I wished to find a place where people lived in direct contact with nature. Soriano is very definitely such a place.

HOVEY: Well, could you expand on that a bit, David. What, exactly did you find at Soriano?

CHAPIN: First of all, I found a rugged, volcanic landscape — a boulder-strewn mountain, covered with ancient chestnut trees, gnarled and twisted in every conceivable way. Because it is so thickly forested, this mountain is said to be unique in all Italy. Soriano itself is crowded on a cone-shaped spur near the base of Monte Cimino. From our house — across a ravine and slightly higher — the town looks like a gigantic ant heap of humanity. From our windows, we can see ancient and modern forms of traffic circulating through Soriano

streets — ox-carts, donkeys, automobiles, trucks, busses and motor scooters. At the top of the heap, dominating the town, is a 12th-century castle, which is now used as a prison. In the countryside that surrounds this mountain and this hill town, in every season, the peasants work virtually as they have always worked down through the centuries.

You can go out, day after day, with pencil and paper, and find the same actions repeated in the same way. When you have drawn them enough times they become part of your — and part of your work. In other words, I have found at Soriano a subject matter that is well defined and significant. By significant, I mean that it shows the relationship that man has always had with nature. But shows it in a very simple form.

HOVEY: I take it this is what you mean when you say you thought that in Italy it might be easier to get close to the basic facts of human existence.

CHAPIN: Yes, that's what I mean. American civilization is young. It is a civilization in transition. And therefore it is more difficult for an artist with my interests, and at my stage of development, to find in America a subject matter as well defined as that which I have found in Italy. You need something older — something simpler, something unchanging. I have found that something at Soriano.

But I have also found something else, and that is seclusion, and a relative degree of isolation from other artists.

HOVEY: That point about relative isolation surprises me a bit. I supposed that contact with other artists was necessary — was even essential — for artistic stimulation.

CHAPIN: Well, this may sound strange, but I think that today artists, as a group, are suffering from over-stimulation. First of all, they have their own discussions among themselves. Then there is the treatment of art by the newspapers, radio, television, public lectures and, especially, what we might call the art press, with its criticism and scholarly research. In the form of reproductions, we have at our finger tips the art of all ages.

I felt that I needed seclusion on order to do my own work — far more than I needed incessant contact with fellow artists. When you verbalize too much about art, it becomes a theory — and theories eventually prevent an artist from seeing. The artist's first job is to see. Then, afterward, comes the long, hard work which leads to the final realization of the artistic image. In order to realize this image in a forceful way, the artist must utilize the abstract language that has been developed by the best painters of his time.

The best way to learn this language is by visiting museums and looking at reproductions, and <u>not</u> in endless discussions with other painters. I am reminded that Pierre Bonnard once said that when an artist paints by a theory he winds up with only a caricature of what he set out to do. And it was said of Bonnard that when his friends discussed art, he remained silent — and observed.

HOVEY: I see. Well, David, earlier you were talking about a particular stage in your development as an artist. Is Soriano a part of that stage? And if so, what comes after Soriano?

CHAPIN: Soriano is <u>definitely</u> a stage in my development. And I want to make it clear that when I said I had found something in Italy that would be more difficult to find in American I was referring <u>only</u> to this particular stage. I do not wish to be an expatriate painter.

But Soriano — or something like Soriano — was essential to me at this point. I feel that the Soriano period — which has lasted about three and a half years — is now about over. In fact, I now have definite plans to move to England this summer — to begin the next stage. And specifically, I plan to move from this primitive Italian countryside right into the heart of London.

HOVEY: That should be quite a change of pace. Why the heart of London?

CHAPIN: Well, here at Soriano I have painted man close to nature. Now I want to do something vastly different. I want to paint man cut off from nature, living in the anti-naturalist surroundings of a modern, sprawling city. But I am not yet ready to go back to America. There is still too much left to see and learn in Europe. Hence, London. I hope to find and paint the poetry that must exist in a city of definite character, such as London.

HOVEY: Well, David, why London and not Paris? Paris surely is a modern, sprawling city with a character of its own. And Paris historically has had a tremendous attraction for painters — isn't that ture?

CHAPIN: Yes, that is true. But don't forget that the Impressionists began painting Paris a hundred years ago. It is very difficult to find new images in ground that has been so well worked over. The Paris vein, you might say, has been well worked over, if not actually exhausted.

HOVEY: Well, from what you have said, I gather that sometime after London — sometime in the future — you plan to come to a stop in America once again.

CHAPIN: Definitely. That's what I meant when I said I didn't want to become an expatriate painter. My objective is to go back to America andproduce works that will be recognized as American. But in these formative years, I feel a compulsion to suck up as much of the culture of Europe and the rest of the world as I can.

Today, western civilization is in the throes of developing an entirely new culture. It will be as different from what has gone before as the Renaissance was from medieval culture. And it is necessary to understand what has gone before in order to create something that is definitely new.

HOVEY: Those of you who heard Francesco Del Drago on the previous Letter from Italy will now understand better why I say that he and David Chapin have many things in common — and why these two young painters, one Italian, one American, only a few months apart in their ages, both belong to the band of artists that the Rome critic, Luciano Budigna, calls a "Third Force;" a group that Signor Budigna believes is becoming larger and more effective in the artistic world.

The paintings of Chapin and Del Drago are dissimilar. So are their actual methods of work at the easel. But both learned well the principles of abstraction while rejecting abstract painting. Both rejected neo-realism. Both sought places of work remote from the great cities; places where they could paint something very old, very simple, and largely unchanging.

Said Del Drago: "Many people are interested in that which changes. I am interested in that which does not change." And Chapin laughingly suggested that he might, as a painter, be classified as a kind of "neo-reactionary."

Both fear artistic theories as guides by which to paint.

Both talk of trying to paint the poetry that they see.

For more than three years their artistic lives have followed similar patterns. In a few months they will diverge. I would be much interested in following their progress.

Graham Hovey reporting. This Letter from Italy was recorded in Soriano and Rome for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters — and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey -- Letter from Italy No. 21
NAEB Network
Recorded in Rome, March 14, 1955
Tape runs: 14:00

#162

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MAR 31 1955

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(A look at Premier Scelba and Foreign Minister Martino on the occasion of their official visit to America).

This is Graham Hovey, recording in Rome a Letter from Italy for the network of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters. These programs are produced with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

This particular Letter from Italy is designed to coincide, as far as possible, with the official visit to the United States of the Italian prime minister and foreign minister. There will be plenty of information available -- in the press and on radio and television -- about the objectives of that visit and what develops from it. But I thought it might be a good idea to devote this program to a look at the men themselves, and the policies they have stood for in Italian government and politics.

Both Premier Mario Scelba and Foreign Minister Gaetano Martino are Sicilians, and they are approximately the same age. There is a temptation to say that any resemblance between the two men ends at that point. This would not be entirely accurate, as will be clear in a few minutes. But in appearance, personality, professional background and political party preference, it is true, the two men are quite dissimilar.

Many of you probably could identify Scelba's picture, if you saw it in your newspaper. He has been in the thick of public life almost constantly in post-World War II years, much of the time as minister of the interior in cabinets of the late Alcide De Gasperi. He is short, stocky and bald, with a broad, oval face, prominent nose, and sharp, widely-set eyes.

If Scelba looks the part of the politician -- and many believe he does -- Gaetano Martino seems perfectly cast as foreign minister, so far as appearance is concerned. He is a man of only medium height, but he carries himself in a manner that seems just a bit austere -- in the best tradition of the diplomat. He looks younger than his 54 years, but his grey hair adds just the right touch of maturity to his distinguished bearing.

Scelba's ingenuous smile is that of the public man. Martino smiles as often as Scelba, but it seems a bit forced; again, the word "austere" comes to mind.

If Scelba looks the part of the politician, it may be in part because he has always been a politician, from the time when, as a boy, he sat at the feet of the famous Sicilian priest, Don Luigi Sturzo, and got his first political schooling.

Martino's background was very different. He entered active politics only after World War II. Prior to that, he was a university professor and a scholar with more than a hundred published works.

Mario Scelba was born Sept. 5, 1901, at Caltagirone, in the interior of Sicily, just nine months after the birth of Gaetano Martino in Messina, not far away.

Caltagirone was also the birthplace of Don Sturzo, who, in fact, served as mayor of that city from 1905 to 1920. As a boy, Scelba studied classics with Don Sturzo in the classroom and politics outside. The priest-politician founded Italy's Popular party -- the forerunner of today's Christian Democratic party -- in 1919, which was about the time young Scelba came to Rome to study law.

Soon Scelba was serving as Sturzo's personal secretary in the Popular party. As fascism tightened its grip on Italy, Don Sturzo was obliged to go into exile, but Scelba continued his political activity as a journalist for Popular party newspapers until Mussolini suppressed the anti-fascist parties and press.

Scelba's record under fascism is clean-cut. He withdrew from public life altogether, went back to Caltagirone and quietly practiced law. But he maintained contacts with anti-fascists at home and in exile, and helped smuggle in books that were on Mussolini's black list.

The developments of World War II gave Scelba new opportunities for public service. Prior to the Allied liberation of Rome on June 4, 1944, Scelba had returned to the capital to work actively in the anti-fascist underground. And with Alcide De Gasperi and others, he founded the Christian Democratic party as the successor to the old Popular party.

As I say, this background is vastly different from that of Gaetano Martino. Yet Martino, strangely enough, grew up in a political atmosphere. His father was a staunch Republican and the mayor of Messina for more than 20 years. But Martino elected to study medicine, and he was graduated as a doctor from the University of Messina in 1923. He then studied abroad — in England, France and Germany — and somewhere along the line he decided to be a university professor.

Martino took the equivalent of our Ph.D. in 1928. Then came an unusual interlude. He went off to Paraguay to teach physiology at the University of Asuncion before coming back to Sicily to settle down as professor of bio-chemistry and general physiology at the University of Messina. Except for the war period, when he took time out to serve as a medical officer in the Italian navy, Martino advanced steadily in the academic world.

Eventually he was elected rector of the university by his faculty colleagues — a position corresponding roughly, but not exactly, to that of president of an American academy. His output of articles on the nervous system and nutrition for learned journals was impressive. On the social side, he became president of the Messina Rotary club.

With this kind of record, it was understandable that pressures would be put on Martino to enter politics after the fall of fascism and the end of the war. He says he was reluctant to say yes when the Liberals asked him to help reconstitute that party in Sicily in 1945. And he admits, candidly, that he had never been a militant anti-fascist.

But eventually, he joined the Liberal party and became a member of its national committee. He was elected to the assembly that wrote Italy's new republican constitution in 1947 and he since has been elected twice to the Chamber of Deputies from Messina. He had been vice president of the Chamber but had never held a cabinet portfolio until Mario Scelba named him education minister a year ago. He became foreign minister when Attilio Piccioni resigned last fall.

You can understand from all this why the temptation is to say that the only things Premier Scelba and Foreign Minister Martino have in common are their Sicilian origin and their ages.

Scelba has spent many of his adult years in rough and tumble politics; Martino has spent most of his adult life in the sophisticated atmosphere of a university. Scelba has traveled little — in fact his recent official visit to England was his first trip to that country — and he speaks only a little French, in addition to Italian. Martino is widely traveled; speaks fair English, very good French and fluent Spanish. Scelba was a constant foe of fascism; Martino, at least, accepted the regime of Mussolini. Scelba, a devout Catholic, has always been a member of a Roman Catholic party; Martino, an equally devout Catholic, is a member of the Liberal party which historically has opposed the church in politics.

Scelba is a much more cultured man than his critics would admit or than many of his political associates realize, but Martino has written more than a hundred articles for learned journals.

Still, the political fates brought these two Sicilians onto the same governmental team in 1954, and the intervening months have shown that actually they have many things in common.

Perhaps the most important thing they have in common is the belief that Italy's way out of her present crucial political situation is the way of the middle road, with a government made up of the old De Gasperi coalition of democratic parties of the center. Not all members of Scelba's Christian Democratic party share his faith in this democratic coalition. There is real doubt, at the moment, that the men directing Martino's Liberal party share his belief. But Scelba and Martino are deeply committed, and their political fortunes are apt to rise or fall with the success or failure of democratic coalition government.

In fact, I would guess that Mario Scelba will be remembered longest for the fact that he rebuilt the democratic coalition after it had fallen apart in the wake of the 1953 election. And I think this will be true whether democracy survives or fails in Italy.

This may surprise those of you who are familiar with Scelba's work as interior minister, when he rebuilt the national police and carabinieri and used them vigorously in crucial postwar years to put down Communist demonstrations that got out of hand. And certainly, Scelba today is best known both at home and abroad for that police job — the organizing of the famous "celere," or flying squads, to cope with Communist and Fascist violence in the squares of Italy.

But as a longrange proposition I will stick with my guess. I think that when the political historians tackle this particular period they will single out Mario Scelba for the fact that he rebuilt a democratic coalition when few believed it could be done. Perhaps just a bit of background will help to put that job in focus:

Italy's four democratic parties — the majority Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, Liberals and Republicans — had joined forces and drawn up a unified slate of candidates for the election of June, 1953. Together they had enacted an electoral law carrying Scelba's name that would have given them about 65 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies if they had polled more than 50 per cent of the total vote. Partly because of widespread resentment over that law, the democratic coalition fell just short of its 50 per cent. And this setback caused the coalition to break up in bitter recrimination after the election. De Gasperi, whose name had been synonomous with Italian political stability in the postwar period, tried to form a government composed only of Christian Democrats — and failed. So did another Christian Democrat, Attilio Piccioni.

Finally, a third Christian Democrat, Giuseppe Pella, managed in mid-August to form a government and resolve the long summer crisis. At first, Pella himself referred to his government as a kind of caretaker cabinet, to get the budget passed and allow the political dust to settle.

Then Pella began to depend on the right-wing Monarchist party, which had more votes in the Chamber than the three minor democratic parties together. Thus, the real significance of Pella's four-month government was that it marked a turn away from the democratic center and an uneasy and unofficial alliance between the Christian Democrats and the Monarchists.

One Christian Democrat who didn't like this situation at all was Mario Scelba. In December of 1953, he made a speech in which he advocated a return to the democratic coalition. He said this was the only effective way to bring needed social and economic reforms as well as to fight communism. This speech was one factor in Pella's downfall in January, 1954, and a factor that eventually led President Luigi Einaudi to give Scelba the job of doing what he had advocated: reconstructing the democratic coalition.

It was a difficult taks. Scelba had to pay — with key cabinet jobs — for the 38 votes which the three minor parties could give him in the Chamber of deputies. And even with these 38 he could count on a majority in the Chamber of only a few votes. And the higher price had paid for this support, the more dissatisfaction he created in his own Christian Democratic party.

Interestingly enough, one of the biggest fights with his own party came when Scelba named Martino minister of education. The Liberals demanded this position as part of their price for participating in the Scelba government. The Christian Democrats had maintained a tight grip on the education ministry during most of the postwar years, and many observers felt they would never give it up. And they were able to put one of their own in this job once again when Scelba moved Martino to the foreign office last fall.

Anyhow, Scelba eventually reconstituted the democratic coalition. His is a cabinet of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Liberals, with the Republicans supporting, but not actually participating. And this government now has lasted well over a year.

How much longer it will last is anybody's guess. Martino's Liberal party recently threatened a crisis over an issue of farm tenant contracts. The Republicans are becoming restless. In any event, the Scelba government is bound by constitutional provision to resign formally after the election of a new president of the republic next month.

How well Scelba has done in his year as premier is also a live debating topic. In terms of actual legislation to carry out his program, he has not compiled an impressive record. But he did bring off the return of Trieste to Italy. He and Martino will go to Washington with the ratification of the European Union treaty in their pockets. He has given stability to a country that seemed to be faltering and stumbling toward some kind of totalitarianism.

If democratic government survives and flourishes in Italy, Scelba will surely get considerable credit. He was the man who never at any time lost faith in it. He was the Christian Democratic leader who always vigorously opposed a turn to the right and a bid for support of the Monarchists. He has opposed with equal vigor any decisive turn to the left, and a bid for the support of Pietro Nenni's Socialist party, which nearly always follows the Communist line.

If democratic government eventually gives way in Italy, the crackup of the Christian Democrat-Social Democrat-Liberal-Republican coalition could be the first signal. And it could turn out that Scelba headed the last serious attempt to make such a democratic coalition government work.

As I said earlier, the political fortune of Gaetano Martino, too, would seem to be tied to success for this democratic coalition idea which he has strongly supported. But perhaps this is not quite so certain as it is in the case of Mario Scelba. For Martino has made enough of an impression on the country to figure prominently in speculation about the new president of the republic, to be elected very shortly.

At this moment, Martino's chances of succeeding President Einaudi in May would seem to be of the "darkhorse" variety. Some Italians feel that at 54 he is too young. Some feel he has advanced a little too rapidly. But given an early deadlock in the presidential assembly, Martino might make it. He then would have to place himself above the political battle.

These, then, are the two men from Sicily — Mario Scelba and Gaetano Martino — who will be visiting Washington about the time you hear this broadcast; two Italian statesmen different from one another in many respects but agreed in their stand for middle road democracy at home, and a pro-western, European unity policy abroad.

Graham Hovey reporting. This Letter from Italy was recorded in Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters — and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey — Letter from Italy No. 22 #63
NAEB Network
Recorded in Rome, March 14, 1955
Tape runs: 13:30

(Aria d'Italia — the Air of Italy)

This is Graham Hovey, recording in Rome a Letter from Italy for the network of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters. These programs are produced with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

A reporter trying to do a serious job of covering the Italian scene occasionally needs a change of pace. For some time now I have intended to do a program to be called, simply, "The Air of Italy." The weekly newspaper, Il Mondo, often carries columns in its last few pages under the headline, "Aria di Napoli," or "Aria di Rome," or perhaps "Aria di Washington." The objective of such columns is to try to report the atmosphere of Naples or Rome or Washington at that particular moment — something that individual news stories from those cities rarely do.

This is an ambitious undertaking, but it can be a lot of fun, so long as it is not taken too seriously. No one should take what follows on this Letter from Italy too seriously. It is the Hovey version of "Aria d'Italia," the air of Italy. It is an attempt to capture a part of the atmosphere — the mood — of this country at this particular moment.

Perhaps it is not news to report that the state-appointed and self-appointed guardians of the public morals are at least as busy here in Italy as they are in America.

The difference would seem to be that in America we really don't have state-appointed guardians of the public morals and, in any event, such matters rarely burden the President of the United States.

Here in Italy, the prime minister, Mr. Scelba, had to take time out from preparations for his state visit to America to ponder the merits or demerits of a motion picture called, "The Adventures of Jacques Casanova." Mr. Scelba seems destined to be bothered with such things.

Some years ago, while he was minister of the interior in the cabinet of Alcide De Gasperi, Scelba's national police started to enforce a ban on the two-piece bathing suit at Italy's beaches. The pandemonium was at least as great as that raised by the Communists against the European Union treaty in the recent parliamentary debate. One Rome newspaper suggested that these policemen might better be employed trying to track down Mr. Scelba's fellow Sicilian, the bandit Giuliano, who then was still at large and defying the authorities.

Giuliano was finally disposed of, and no doubt Casanova will be too, in time. At the moment, the situation regarding the film is this:

It was produced last year by a joint Italian-French company, and its original title was, "The Adventures and Loves of Jacques Casanova." The producers obtained the necessary advance approval of the responsible Italian government agency last June, after agreeing to eliminate certain scenes and dialogue and to strike the word "loves" from the title. Then they spent about $640,000 to make the film.

The government's censorship commission approved the Casanova picture last November, with the stipulation that theaters showing it refuse admission to minors of 16 or under. But Italy's film industry has its equivalent of our Johnston office — with a so-called Commission of Self-Censorship, composed of distinguished writers and critics. To be on the safe side, the producers also submitted the Casanova film to this commission and got its unanimous approval.

Subsequently, the picture was projected in first-run movie houses throughout Italy. By about March 1, it reportedly had shown in every large Italian city except Trieste and Cagliari.

Then, on March 2, the government censorship office ordered the film withdrawn from circulation on grounds that it was offensive to public decency, morals and good taste. The authority for such recall was contained in a law enacted in 1923 — one of many laws of the fascist era which the Italian republic has not repealed nor revised.

Naturally, the producers of the Casanova film raised a vigorous protest. They got assitance from other film companies, who feared it might sometime happen to them. They also got support from individuals and groups that objected to such arbitrary censorship as a matter of principle.

The government agency stood its ground. The Hon. Oscar Scalfaro, Christian Democratic member of the chamber of deputies, who holds the title, under-secretary to the prime minister for theatrical performances, went on the radio to defend the censorship order. Scalfaro said protests had come to his agency from 14 different Italian cities. He said that because of the general nature of the protest, he was only doing his duty when he ordered the film reviewed by an appeal commission, which ruled against it.

But a newspaper replied that all the protests emanated from the powerful lay organization known as Catholic Action, and that they contained a total of only about 600 signatures. The producers of the film said, caustically, that they doubted if these 600 constituted any vast stratum of public opinion.

Now, under the Italian government's table of organization, the agency that reviews and censors films and other theatrical productions is directly responsible to the prime minister himself. So there was no cabinet minister standing between Mr. Scelba and this tempest about the Casanova movie.

At this time, Scelba was spending long hours at the government bench in the senate, working for ratification of the European Union military treaty. He had painstakingly worked out a compromise on farm tenancy contracts that had temporarily averted a split in his government coalition. He was preparing for his official visits to Canada and the United States.

In the middle of all this, he had to concern himself with a movie about the adventures of Casanova. At the moment, Scelba has received a delegation of the protesting groups and promised sympathetic consideration of their case. The report is that he will order a new examination of the film and the censorship regulations.

The last comparable ruckus in Rome that I can recall concerned not a film itself, but the advertising for a film.

Shortly before last Christmas, workmen began to construct a rather large stage at one side of Rome's famous square, the Piazza del Popolo. And most passers-by said, "Aha, how nice, a scene of the nativity."

But instead of the virgin Mary and the Christ child, the scene turned out to be Gina Lollobrigida — or rather a life-sized doll image of Gina — riding, barefoot and bareback, on a little donkey. It was an advertisement for Gina's new film, "Pane, Amore e Gelosia" (Bread, Love and Jealousy), which was to have its premier in Rome.

The howl of protest was considerable. But mostly it was directed not against the fact that such an effort had been made to publicize a movie rather than the Christmas. It was directed against Gina's low-cut blouse. Eventually, Miss Lollobrigida herself joined in the protest. The affair quieted down when the sponsors agreed to drape a shawl across the doll image of Gina.

The unsuspecting Gina was riding a donkey again recently when a verbal storm blew up behind and about her. As a matter of fact, Gina was riding a 20-year-old donkey into Paris, followed by 200 news reporters. The object, once again, was to publicize the film, "Bread, Love and Jealousy," and apparently the affair was a success, even though the donkey seemed more interested in a bunch of carrots and cabbages than in the honor of transporting Miss Lollobrigida.

Anyhow, at about that moment, an enterprising movie reporter back in Rome was digging up a surprising bit of news. You may know that the first film in the current series was Miss Lollobrigida and Vittorio De Sica was called, "Pane, Amore e Fantasia," and circulated in Ameria as "Bread, Love and Dreams."

It had considerable success, so it was not long until the second one, "Bread, Love and Jealousy," made its appearance. And it had been widely rumored that a third film, "Pane, Amore e Casa Mia" (Bread, Love and Home) would be forthcoming.

But the bombshell dropped by this Rome journalist in the newspaper, Il Messaggero, purported to set the record straight. The third film would not be "Pane, Amore e Casa Mia," at all, but "Pane, Amore e Nostalgia" (Bread, Love and Nostalgia). And here was the bombshell: Gina Lollobrigida would not play her accustomed role in the new film. She would be replaced by Sophia Loren.

The story said that Gina had demanded about half a billion lire — or $800,000 — to play in the third film of the series. It said she based this demand on the fact that the first film — "Bread, Love and Dreams" — had earned a billion, 100 million lire, and the second one had earned about as much.

The article said the film company was surprised by Gina's request and had attempted to find a compromise figure. Failing in this, the company had obtained the services of Miss Loren.

Repercussions — loud ones — were not long in coming. Miss Lollobrigida rushed home from Paris to declare that she had never even dreamed of asking half a billion lire or anything like that sum. Money had nothing to do with her refusal; the reasons were strictly artistic. She was convinced that the plan to continue the "Bread, Love..." series was only a "commercial speculation," and she wanted nothing to do with it. She was much attached to the role of the "bersagliera," which she had played in the first two films, but she feared that if she continued to do the role she would become typed, and be damaged as an actress.

Well, what about Sophia Loren in the role?

"She imitates me always," said Gina. "But I would like to engage her in a real fight in the artistic field." If Sophia played the role, the "opportune moment" would come for what Gina called "just comparisons."

Then it was Sophia Loren's turn. It had been rumored that Sophia had signed to play the "bersagliera" for 25 million lire, whereas Gina had received 30 million for the first film and double that for the second.

Miss Loren wished to set the record straight. First of all, she hadn't yet signed any contract for a "Bread, Love" picture. Second, and more important, she would never wish to play the role of the "bersagliera," as a substitute for Gina, whom she described as "one of my colleagues."

After all, said Miss Loren, she had created her own personage — that of the "pizzaiola," or pizza-maker — in the successful film, "The Gold of Naples." Now if anyone wished her to continue playing the "pizzaiola," she might be interested.

By this time, the "scandaletto," as the newspapers called it — the little scandal — was subsiding. Gina said she actually had been offered 70 million lire for the third film, and the producers said this was correct. On their part, they wished to emphasize that the profits reported for the first two "Bread, Love" pictures were gross and not net. The latest word is that Miss Loren will play her "pizzaiola" role in the third "Bread, Love" film, and that De Sica's role, too, will be changed somewhat from the one he assayed with Miss Lollobrigida in the other two.

One wag suggested that the third picture be called, "Pane, Amore e la Bella Sophia," in honor of Miss Loren. And Il Messaggero, the newspaper that started the "scandaletto" in the first place, now admitted that it had dissolved like a soap bubble.

In the middle of the Lollobrigida-Loren business, who should arrive in Naples, fresh from America and Hollywood, but Anna Magnani? And if you listened hard enough in Rome, you could hear voices saying that she was the only real actress of the lot anyway.

Vittorio De Sica's role in the Gina-Sophia scandaletto was a minor one. The noted actor-producer also figured in a minor way in one of two announced retirements that have attracted much attention recently.

One involved Beniamino Gigli, the Italian operatic tenor, whom many critics call the greatest since Caruso. Gigli is now 65 years old and in the 41st year of his singing career. He made his retirement announcement in London during a strenuous concert tour that will also take him to the United States and Canada. It was a strange kind of retirement announcement.

The interviewer said Gigli spoke with a voice full of emotion. He described his decision as a "tremendous" and "sorrowful" one that required great will power. But then it turned out that Gigli intends to retire only from the operatic stage and concert tours. He said:

"I will continue to sing for the radio, television, motion pictures, and for any occasions on which people wish still to hear my voice, and especially in our beautiful Italian songs."

Then Gigli made a remark that under less solemn circumstances might have sounded like a broad hint:

"Suppose," he said, "that tomorrow, De Sica, for example, heard that Gigli is retiring, and decided to make a biographical film about me. I certainly would not refuse to sing for it."

The other prominent retirement announcement seemed much more final. It concerned the retirement of the former Italian bicycle racing champion, Gino Bartali. Bartali now is 40 years old and had been racing 23 years. During that time, he won 153 victories in national or international competition and in the course of them he bicycled the equivalent of 16 trips around the world.

The Italian sports writers pulled all stops in reporting Gino's retirement, for he was a national sports hero in a way that Americans, who have never gotten very excited about cycling, would find it hard to understand.

To an Italy battered and beaten in World War II, Bartali's victories against all comers in the Tour de France, or the Giro d'Italia restored a necessary measure of self-respect in the early postwar years. One journalist recalled the time when a tense parliamentary debate was threatening to erupt in violence. But some wise politician intervened to announce that Bartali had won an Alpine stretch of the Tour de France — and legislators of all political faiths jumped up in a shouting tribute to Gino that broke the tension and saved the day.

In addition to his professional prowess, Bartali was ever a gentleman, a family man, and devoutly religious. In the stories about his retirement, no one pointed up any contrasts between Gino and his longtime rival, Fausto Coppi. This wasn't necessary, for Fausto is having both woman and financial trouble at the moment, and his contributions to the Air of Italy were getting quite as much newspaper space as the fact that Bartali had racked up his bicycle.

Well, I don't know whether you will consider any of these things important or not. But they are a part of what I have chosen to call "L'aria d'Italia," the air — or the atmosphere — of Italy at this moment. And I think you would agree, at least, that they help make Italy anything but a dull place.

Graham Hovey reporting. This Letter from Italy was recorded in Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters — and this is the NAEB Network.

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Graham Hovey — Letter from Italy No. 23
NAEB Network
Recorded in Rome, March 15, 1955
Tape runs: 14:00

(First of two on possible resurgence of fascism in Italy).

This is Graham Hovey, recording in Rome a Letter from Italy for the network of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters. These programs are produced with the cooperation of Radiotelevisione Italiana.

At times, I get the uneasy feeling that much of the current political reporting from Italy for America is out of focus. For years now, we Americans have been getting a steady flow of articles and broadcasts about the Communist threat to this country. We have heard far less about the threat of a resurgence of Fascism.

Yet, many intelligent Italians, whose implacable opposition to communism is a matter of record, will tell you that a revival of fascism constitutes the more serious short-range threat to the young Italian democracy. And some of these Italians wonder why Americans concern themselves so little with this Fascist threat.

I always reply that our concern with Italian communism is natural for several reasons. We have good reason to believe that the Italian Communist party is not basically different from other Communist parties, excepting that of Yugoslavia. That is, we believe Palmiro Togliatti and Company are bound hand in glove with Moscow and the Cominform; that the Italian Communists therefore are a part of a worldwide conspiracy. That fact alone would make them much more dangerous from our point of view than the Italian Fascists, who have no such international organization; who are not tied to a great power which menaces the United States and the free world.

Secondly, the Communists and their allies have a demonstrated voting strength far beyond anything shown thus far by the Fascists. In the last national election, the Communists and fellow-traveling Socialists together polled more than 35 per cent of the votes for the Italian Chamber of Deputies and won a total of 218 seats. The neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement — or MSI — got less than six per cent of the votes and captured only 29 seats.

Even if the Fascist vote percentage were lumped with that of the right-wing Monarchist party, with which it is sometimes allied, the total would fall far below that of the Communists and Left Socialists.

My Italian friends admit the validity of these arguments, and many of them concede that the greater long-range threat to democracy in Italy is posed by the Communists.

But they also warn that the strength of the Fascist idea or Fascist tactics in Italy cannot be measured by the number of votes a neo-Fascist party managed to poll in an election two years ago. For they say that Fascism above everything else is a state of mind — and that many Italians who think in Fascist ways actually hold membership in other parties, and probably would have little to do with the MSI, the neo-Fascist group.

These Italians say the real threat of fascism in Italy, therefore, is posed not by the MSI, with occasional help from the Monarchists, but by fascist or totalitarian sentiment existing, say, in the Christian Democratic party's right wing, or even in the Liberal party, or in Italians outside any party at the moment.

These arguments came back to me in a hurry on a recent evening, during fleeting moments when I almost found myself trapped in the middle of a squad of young Fascist storm troopers on their way to attack and bomb Communist party headquarters in Rome.

I use my words advisedly here: I deliberately said a squad of young Fascist storm troopers. These young fanatics were in a kind of uniform — all of them wore gray-green

blouses of the type that first made its appearance at the funeral of the old Fascist marshal, Rodolfo Graziani, a couple of months ago.

This was a vastly different kind of mob from the gangs of schoolboys who tied up traffic on Rome's Via del Corso to demonstrate for the return of Trieste to Italy a year and a half ago. Those youngsters were loosely organized, even if they were ordered around rather effectively — and some of them were just along for the ride.

These uniformed young men of the recent incident sang "To Arms, We Are Fascists," and other songs of the Mussolini era. They were well-organized. They had arrived at their jump-off point in two huge tourist busses. They knew exactly what they intended to do.

They hurled rocks through the windows of the Communist book store just below party headqu rters on Rome's Via Botteghe Oscure — the "Street of the Dark Shops." They exploded their crude bombs, made from chimney pipe and tin cans — and one of them, a 24-year-old by the name of Mario Giunfrida, blew off his left forearm in the process.

They put a wooden hammer and sickle and a red flag up in one of the shattered windows of the bookstore, soaked them with gasoline, and set fire to them. Then they scattered leaflets of the MSI — the neo-Fascist party — over the street in a literal shower, and ran off about the time the police were arriving. All ran off, that is, except young Giunfrida, who was rushed to a hospital in a police ambulance and remained in critical condition for many hours.

Now the neo-Fascist party — the MSI — is nothing if not obvious. Its almost complete lack of subtlety and political sophistication is one of the reasons why even Italians who fear fascism greatly do not take the MSI itself too seriously.

Thus, the Fascist newspaper, Il Secolo, openly exulted over the incident. It said that "no one who wishes to call himself Italian has the right to be astonished or, worse, scandalized," by the mob action. These were simply reactions, it said, of patriotic young Italians to the provocations of the Communists and the inertia of the democratic government.

And the director of the party propaganda apparatus, Ernesto De Marzio, said the episode demonstrated that the country "has reacquired the capacity of reaction."

Il Secolo complained bitterly in a front-page editorial because the Italian radio and the Italian press association, in their news reports on the affair, had referred to the instigators as "terrorists."

There are newspapers in Rome that list themselves as independent and have no truck with the MSI, as such, while still following in substantial measure the Fascist line. These papers were too clever to take an open stand in favor of the violence committed by the young Fascists. They deplored the violence, while accepting the line that the Communists were really to blame because of their provocative acts over a long period, and especially in the senate during recent debate on the European Union military treaty.

Now the Communist provocation, in parliament and in the party press and propaganda, was certainly very great — no doubt about that. The Communists work practically every hour of every session of both senate and chamber of deputies to discredit the whole institution of parliament and parliamentary democracy. In that respect, they behave exactly as the Fascists do, and the end goal of the two extreme groups is identical. There is nothing whatever to distinguish the behavior in parliament of the Communists from the Fascists, and any objective observer would have to agree with this statement. Each group is doing its utmost to create in the country the impression that democratic parliamentary government cannot cope with the situation in Italy — and their unofficial, unholy alliance for this purpose probably is having some effect on the citizenry.

And in official party propaganda, too, it would be difficult to judge that one group is more irresponsible or untruthful than the other — although Communist propaganda is more in evidence around Rome and generally seems to be more skilfully conceived and executed.

But when it comes to riots and violence in the squares of Italy, the Fascists have been the greater offenders against law and order and public security in the last few years — and I underscore the last few years. In early postwar years, the Communists provoked riots and lawless demonstrations almost on a regular schedule. But in recent years, the Communists have been following, most of the time, the so-called "soft" line of Palmiro Togliatti. They have generally shunned violence in the squares in their effort to seem respectable enough to attract middle class voters. And generally, when the interior ministry's "celere," or jeep-equipped flying squads, have been called out in the last few years, it has been to cope with activities of the neo-Fascists.

Although Fascist activites are prohibited by law, the government until now has not taken these demonstrations too seriously. It felt that it might be unwise to make too much over them; that government action might be exactly what the Fascists wanted, exactly what they could exploit best, in a propaganda way.

And anyhow, observers of these affairs generally felt that they were not the old Fascist-type demonstrations of the 1920s, but rather the loosely-organized exhibitions of young publicity-seekers.

This last episode was quite another matter. For the first time, some Italians who had taken neo-Fascism lightly, admitted that it reminded them very much of the 1920s. For it was a semi-military squad of 60-odd young men in uniform that carried out the assault against Communist headquarters. The police investigation established beyond doubt that the affair was well-planned in advance, and executed according to orders — except, of course, for the explosion that blew off a part of young Gionfrida's arm.

Now even though a Fascist party is illegal, under Italian law, it almost certainly would be useless to attempt to put the MSI out of business in the courts. If Fascism is an idea, or, as I put it earlier, a state of mind, it cannot be legislated or prosecuted out of existence no matter how strict the law. And anyhow, any such action would be stoutly opposed by many Italians who have no sympathy for Fascism. They would feel it hypocritical to outlaw the MSI while taking no action against a Communist party that they are convinced is actually an instrument of Soviet Russian foreign policy.

But another Italian law prohibiting private military, or quasi-military, organizations seems to make much more sense.

And a good many thoughtful Italians are asking why the government should not enforce this law to the hilt against the organization that carried out the recent incident. For the fact is that the existence of such a Fascist organization has been no mystery for many weeks. As I indicated earlier, its members made an open appearance during the funeral ceremonies for Marshal Graziani, dressed in their grey-green blouses, black ties, and carrying fascist trappings. And on that occasion, under specific instructions from the Fascist party, posted openly all over Rome, these would-be storm troopers raised their arms in the familiar Fascist salute, as the funeral procession passed.

One of Italy's most responsible journalists says this new Fascist militia has taken the name, "Guard of the Labara," meaning the guard of the old Roman military standard, which the Fascists used as a trapping. And this journalist says, ominously, that the new organization is little different from the old Fascist militia in its early days.

There is no doubt, incidentally, that the Communists, too, have such a quasi-military organization, commanded by their guerrilla warfare expert, Luigi Longo. But government police and carabinieri have harrassed the Communist organization at every opportunity, and have, in fact, captured a great many of its hidden stores of arms.

Now, some of you may be saying, in effect: why not let the Fascists roam; after all, they are fighting the Communists, aren't they? And it is necessary to report that the leaflets showered on the Street of the Dark Shops by the young Fascist terrorists did attack the Communists in part for their opposition to the European Union treaty, which both the Italian government and our government support.

But the question, why not let the Fascists go, so long as they are fighting Communists has a familiar and ominous ring for anyone familiar with the rise of Italian fascism in the 1920s. And the answer to that question can be found partly in the history of that period and partly in the rather obvious desires of the Communists themselves.

First of all, perhaps, it should be said that this attitude is exactly what the Fascists are trying to cultivate. They are out to prove not only that they are more militantly anti-Communist than anyone else, but that actually they are the only really effective counterforce against the Reds. And here again, we find that the Fascist and Communist objectives coincide.

On the record it seems obvious that the Communists, too, would like very much to create the feeling that their only real opponents are Fascists. That is because the Communists are quite convinced that they can win any longrange fight against the Italian Fascists — by whatever means it becomes necessary to employ.

Naturally, the Communists hint or charge outright that anyone who really opposes them is a Fascist. But their behavior always suggests one thing above all else: The Communists are convinced that their real enemy — the enemy who has the capacity to deal with them effectively and decisively — is not the Fascists at all, but an effective democratic government; a government capable of carrying out the moderate economic and social reforms to which it is pledged; a government capable of enforcing the income tax laws; a government ready and willing to maintain law and order against any transgressors. This, above everything else, is what the Communists cannot tolerate; what they cannot compete against.

As for the Fascists, as I said earlier, they are nothing if not obvious. The battle against communism is, for them, only the first step; the initial pretext, adopted as much as anything else for tactical reasons — to win support from people rightly concerned about communism. But their target is actually much broader, and they proclaim this openly in advertisements for their party paper, Il Secolo. They shout that their objective is twofold: to defeat communism and to bring down the quadripartito. That term refers to the four middle-road democratic parties who make up the present government; the only four parties that stand foursquare for democracy in Italy.

Most political observers I know believe the Communist assessment is correct; that the Communists would win any longrange fight in which their principal opponents were the Fascists. But even if they were wrong, and the Fascists took over Italy, it is necessary to ask ourselves this: Would a strutting, boasting, bullying Fascist regime in Italy really constitute an effective and reliable ally for America and the free world in the struggle against Communism?

The threat to the things America stands for in Italy comes from two directions. The recent Fascist-inspired events in Rome prove that all over again. But it seems to this reporter that in this year, 1955 — which marks the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Italy from 20 years of Fascism — we can hardly remind ourselves of this stark fact often enough. And so, perhaps you can understand why I have gotten the feeling in recent months that much of the political reporting out of Italy for America was more than slightly out of focus.

Graham Hovey, signing another Letter from Italy. This program was recorded in Rome studios of Radiotelevisione Italiana for the National Association of Educational Broadcasters — and this is the NAEB Network.

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make 1 + 6
copies if possible

for Siegel ✓ 7/20
Hovey ✓

(Hold rest for requests)
combine + label as
much as possible
get in as possible

REACTIONS TO LETTER FROM ITALY

No. 1 - WNAD

"I just listened to your program, "Letter From Italy" of today, and being an Italian very much interested in what is going on in my native land, I want to express to you my pleasure for a really wonderful and objective reportage of the political situation in Italy today. I receive regularly "The Couiere dillo Lene" and I'm glad to say that your broadcast is the only one, that report exactly and without any particular political leaning or preferences, as I can compare in my newspaper.

"In almost five years of residence in this country this is the first time I have heard any such program, and again I want to express my appreciation."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Eraldo Carugati
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
918 East Drive

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No. 2 - WOSU

"A word of commendation for the program "Letter From Italy" is long overdue. WOSU has carried the program regularly since it became available through the NAEB Network. We have been very favorably impressed both with the content and presentation of the series. Mr. Hovey has filled a real need in our station's effort to provide authoritative background information about important events and areas of the world. His direct, conversational manner and his clear, interesting presentation of ideas make the program enjoyable as well as profitable listening.

"On behalf of our staff and many listeners who heard the program I wish to thank the NAEB, Mr. Hovey and all those who cooperated in any way in making the program possible."

Sincerely,

/s/ W. H. Ewing
W. H. Ewing
Program Supervisor

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No. 3 - WUOM

"Just a word to let you and NAEB know how much we appreciate the opportunity to broadcast LETTER FROM ITALY. I think NAEB has done a fine job in seeing that these reports are mailed out promptly so that they are still timely when used on

the local station. This on-the-spot type of reporting seems to have been much neglected in recent years by the commercial networks. It is the responsibility of educational stations to continue and improve this sort of program during peace as well as war-time. There is certainly popular demand and need for such programs, and anything NAEB can do to keep them going will certainly reflect well in the long run on educational broadcasting in general.

"Mr. Hovey's narrations are well prepared and well delivered. Like all "new" commentators in any given area, he will necessarily take a while to become popular and familiar to the general audience. Frequency and continuity here will definitely add to his prestige and that of any station."

Cordially,

/s/ E. G. Burrows
Program Director

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No. 4 - WNAD

"Some weeks ago, I wrote headquarters to express our extreme delight over the broadcasting of the series, LETTER FROM ITALY. I assure you that it is again our pleasure to spotlight this very unique radio series which we have carried for some time through the facilities of the NAEB Network.

"To begin with, one of the best criteria for judging radio programs is the reaction of our own staff. Hearing and working with so many and varied types of programs, they assume what might be readily called a "neutral attitude" towards things in general. However, in the case of LETTER FROM ITALY so many of the staff have conveyed to me the fact that they are fascinated by this program and listen in their offices and workshops to each of the broadcasts. In my estimation, that is high praise.

"Then there is our faculty. Members of various departments but most especially the languages, literature and history have dropped by my office or stopped me on the campus to congratulate us on the fact that we are carrying LETTER FROM ITALY. Their reasoning is to the effect that direct word is to be had at various times from France, England, etc. but this is the first and only time that such a program series has endeavored to give interesting facts and comments about Italy and things Italian.

"We are also pleased to note many comments from listeners over our five-state coverage area regarding the series — all of which leads us to believe that Mr. Hovey is doing an excellent job in interpreting Italy to us. And may we add that we are most insistent that the series be continued. It will continue to occupy an important spot in our weekly schedule of offerings to the people of Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas and Kansas."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John W. Dunn
John W. Dunn, Director
Educational Broadcasting
Services

No. 5 - WSUI

"I should like to comment on the NAEB program "Letter From Italy." Graham Hovey has a good eye for facts and for color, and the extent to which he can recreate the Italian scene for the American people by simple narrative is remarkable. It uses color without losing content; it avoids both dullness and pandering. Throughout the year I have had occasion to refer to it as a model program of its type.

"We will certainly carry 'Letter From Italy' so long as it is available, and I should like to recommend that you continue to offer it."

Sincerely,

/s/ Lee Eitzen
Lee Eitzen
Program Director

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No. 6 - KUOM

"Since last Fall we have been broadcasting 'Letter From Italy' on a weekly basis as a regular feature of our daily 15-minute "Background of the News" series.

"It is our opinion that Mr. Hovey's excellent reports on current developments in Italy are providing much in the way of a better understanding of the Italian people today. Mr. Hovey is a brilliant reporter with an unusual knowledge of the historical background of Italy which adds a valuable sense of perspective to his on-the-spot coverage. We certainly hope that this outstanding series will continue indefinitely."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Northrop Dawson, Jr.
Northrop Dawson, Jr.
Acting Manager

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No. 7 - WUOT

"I should like to take this opportunity to tell you, and to express to Harry Skornia and to Graham Hovey, Sy Siegel, and to all others who conceived, participated in, and/or produced 'Letter From Italy,' our appreciation for this fine program.

"In comparing it with some of the programs from the commercial networks, I felt we stood up very well, and when I could compare it on the basis of similar material (that is, when Italian problems were treated) I felt that 'Letter From Italy' more often than not was substantially superior.

"A feature such as this lends stature to our schedule--and we feel it would do so for any station's schedule--and we shall continue to air it until it is discontinued."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Jack
Jack K. Westbrook
Program Director

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No. 8 - KPFA

".....Personally, for the record, and as station manager, I want to say that my reaction to the series was very favorable. I felt, first of all, that the conception of a series of programs of this nature is an excellent one. What I was able to hear of the programs that we presented left me with an impression that they were very well executed, and they were definitely blessed with a welcome vitality....."

Best wishes,

/s/ Chuck
Charles Levy
Station Manager

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No. 9 - KWAX

"I wish to compliment the NETWORK on the fine selection of programs it offered during the school year. I would appreciate a list of your offerings for next fall.

"Response here has been heaviest to such programs as Letter from Italy and Famous French Composers. Please include more of such programs in your fall series."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E. A. Kretsinger
E. A. Kretsinger

No. 10 - KMUW-FM

"I am happy to tell you how much we appreciated the fine work you people have been doing this past year. We have particularly appreciated the International Series we have had this year. Of special value I feel were those series dealing with contemporary foreign affairs. We found "A Letter From Italy" to be particularly interesting and worthwhile.

"We certainly hope that such a series will be continued in the future."

Yours truly,

/s/ George D. Goodrich
Manager of KMUW-FM
University of Wichita

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No. 11 - WFIU

"This is in response to your request for reactions to the Letter from Italy series.

I'm sorry to report that we have received no audience reaction to the series, and we have it on at a relatively good time: Thursdays at 7:45.

However, it's my personal opinion that the series is a valuable one, one that should definitely be continued. The commentary is, I think, of particular value, although there are some "dating" problems. What are needed are more programs of this sort dealing with the various nations in the news.

Our news director, Marvin Alisky, who is particularly interested in European politics, considers the show interesting, and worth running. His feeling is that the series should cover to a greater extent the contemporary political scene in Italy, and make use of various interviews. On the whole, though, he considers the series a good one.

Sorry, we can't provide you with more comments; as I said before, I definitely think we should have more series of this sort."

Mark Munn

/s/ Mark Munn
Continuity Director

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No. 12 - WGBH

"I would like to put on record something which I have felt for some time concerning Radio Italiana series LETTER FROM ITALY.

"This is a most illuminating series on Italian life and politics. Radio Italiana and Mr. Hovey are to be commended. Hovey is a top-flight journalist; his commentaries are executed with fine editorial judgement, balance and taste. Above all he has an eye for the "human" in Italian life. I think this series has helped our listeners to understand better the Italian people and their problems.

"Keep it coming!"

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Ralph J. Tangney
Ralph J. Tangney
Program Manager

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No. 13 - KUOW

"We have been carrying the program, "Letter from Italy," on KUOW regularly each week since its first broadcast here on February 5, 1954.

"All of us here have been very pleased with the program, and feel that it provides us with a fine show that fits very well and appropriately into the overall program policy of our non-commercial, educational station.

"We have never sought written comment from our listeners about the specific program, and most of what we have heard about it has been verbal. However, all comment has been favorable, and there has been enough such comment that we consider it a privilege to broadcast "Letter from Italy" and sincerely hope that the program will continue to be available to us in the future.

"You will note from the enclosure that we have "Letter from Italy" scheduled at a good broadcast time within a block of programs of which we are very proud."

Yours truly,

/s/ Ken Kager
Production Manager

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No. 14 - KMUW

"Station KMUW is indeed proud of the fine programs we receive from N.A.E.B. We feel that the international programs are especially beneficial for audience, bringing the real understanding from the nations abroad.

"Two of the shows I have particularly in mind are: "Letter From Italy," and "Asia Reports." We are certainly hoping to continue with these programs throughout the forthcoming year.

"Thank you for reading this, but I feel it is quite important that I inform you of the feelings of KMUW, a member of the N.A.E.B. Network."

Yours very truly,

/s/ Bill Dunlap
Bill Dunlap
Program Director, KMUW

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No. 15 - WILL

"NAEB Radio Network Manager, John Holt, was asking me about the series of programs, Letter From Italy. Since he asked me, I'd like to put my thoughts on paper.

"I believe the series is the type of program that we need more of on all radio, and in particular on our educational stations. I think the series by Graham Hovey is typically good of the kind that we all should do more of on our educational stations. I cannot help but feel that Graham Hovey is a "doubly good" product of a good idea. He's a good U.S.A. representative in Italy; he's doing an especially good job in creating a better understanding of Italy in the U.S.A.

"WILL has received a number of comments on the series of programs, according to our mail count record, but we do not have them in file or I'd transmit copies of some of them to you, along with my remarks."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Frank E. Schooley
Frank E. Schooley, Director
University Broadcasting

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No. 16 - WUOA

"Your request concerning our reactions to "Letter from Italy" has been referred to me for reply.

"We have not received direct comments on this series from our listeners. They usually mention the type of program they enjoy rather than specific titles. Our general schedule of international programs has received much favorable comment.

"I personally think that "Letter from Italy" series has well interpreted some important phases of economic and political problems in Italy. Graham Hovey has done a very creditable job in providing us timely programs from mid-Europe.

"I should like to have a series concerning Italian customs, traditions, every day life--similar to the BBC series "London Column", which I think would help our listeners better understand the background to current issues in that country. Such documentaries might take considerably more time, yet they would be of wider interest perhaps.

"Please let me know if we can be of further help."

Sincerely,

/s/ Walt Whitaker
Walt Whitaker
Program Director

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No. 17 - WFBE

"Program series, such as LETTER FROM ITALY, give a station's radio audience a kind of listening experience which is not provided by any other broadcasting service. The broadcasts form a friendly link with the Italian people, making their problems and their progress more interesting and important to American listeners.

"We hope NAEB can continue to bring this and similar series from other nations that our people may grow in understanding and appreciation of other cultures."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Ola B. Hiller
(Miss) Ola B. Hiller, Manager

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No. 18 - WOI

"Regarding Letter from Italy, we broadcast it regularly up to the week of July 5, when the summer package began. I dropped it at that time because the summer offering list indicated there may not be a full 13 week series. During the time we did broadcast it, however, mail response was nil.

"In view of the present urgency, I have arranged to incorporate the series covering Hovey's trip through southern Italy in our afternoon "Women's Forum" program. World affairs frequently form the basis for the material presented on the "Women's Forum", so the Hovey Commentaries should reach a receptive audience there.

"I will pass on to you immediately any listener reactions; I am only sorry I cannot offer you something more concrete at the moment."

Best regards,
/s/ Dick
Richard F. Vogl

Reactions to LETTER FROM ITALY

No. 19 - WRTI

"A brief note in regard to the letter from Italy series carried by WRTI-FM here in Philadelphia. Unfortunately, at the end of the school year, we cleared away all of the letters which had been written to us during the year in preparation for the resuming of our broadcasting in the fall.

"However, our program director tells me that we received a number of letters in regard to the Letter from Italy series, primarily from Italian people and people of Italian ancestry living in this area. All were very complimentary."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John B. Roberts/pa
John B. Roberts, Director
Radio and Television Division

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No. 20 - WKAR

"I have your note about the mail response for the Letter From Italy series.

"I am sorry to inform you that we have had no listener reaction to the series, and we have aired it consistantly on AM, feeling the program was of great merit.

"We feel Mr. Hovey is doing an excellent job throughout, and hope that his commentaries will continue for a long time to come.

"Thank you for all your cooperation, and please assure Mr. Hovey we also appreciate his cooperation."

Sincerely,

/s/ Larry Frymire
Assistant Manager

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No. 21 - WUNC

"Now that we have left the air for a few weeks there is time for me to write you in regard to several of the NAEB programs which have been particularly well received here.

"I think perhaps the two most popular categories are news and music. I realize that the number of music programs is steadily increasing, and I should like to urge that programs similar to the "Letter From Italy" series be continued.

Reactions to LETTER FROM ITALY

"Graham Hovey's handling of the "Letter From Italy" series was indeed excellent, and through programs such as these we can not only provide a real news service, but we can also help quite a bit in this ever present program of world understanding.

"Please pass along my congratulations to all of those concerned with arranging for the "Letter From Italy" program."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ John Young
John Young
Manager

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No. 22 - WUSC

"I am sorry to be so late in answering your query about Letter From Italy. Actually I have nothing to report on that particular program. If I had you would have received it immediately of course. No listener has singled out that particular program to praise or criticise in letter or phone call.

"Of the programs we are using American Adventure and Document Deep South draw the greatest favorable response. Our classical music, which comprises about 75% of current programming, is our best drawing card and I use it to attract listeners to the programs which demand and provoke thought.

"I'm sorry I had nothing to report on Letter. I personally have enjoyed it when I have been able to listen, which is not frequently.

"The most typical comment we get from listeners might be paraphrased thus, "Until WUSC-FM came on the air in Columbia we seldom listened to the radio. You are our only consistent source of good music, and our only source of mature spoken material." Inasmuch as much of our "good music" and almost all of the spoken material is NAEB material I think this speaks very highly of the National Association of Educational Broadcasters. As a matter of fact if it were not for the NAEB I should be hard put to it to do any real educational broadcasting at all. Keep up the good work."

Gratefully,
/s/ Ernest E. Lent, Jr.
Ernest E. Lent, Jr.
Director, WUSC-FM

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No. 23 - KEPS

"I left Portland for Seattle early this a.m. with your letter concerning "Letter from Italy" clutched in my paw! You see the station closed July 1 and no one is there to get the mail, but I dashed by before leaving in order to take

Reactions to LETTER FROM ITALY

a quick look at anything important. I'm not near a typewriter now, but here are the comments I remember and I made some phone calls on my way out of the city and here are the reports:

"Enjoyed the informal style of this series."
"Like the editing of the news the way this announcer handled it."
"This series gave me an excellent picture of the Italian scene. I wish I had been able to hear more of the broadcasts."
"I learned much from the reporting of the Italian cabinet crisis."
"The programs on the Italian parliament sessions were excellent."
"My favorite program in this intelligently handled series was the one in which the three NAEB fellowship men shared the broadcast. I found their pooled points of view extremely stimulating."

"Now, John, I don't know if the above comments written out this way will help, but no typewriter, no secretary and being vacation-bound at long last, they're the best I can muster. May I add my hearty endorsement of all of them. "KEPS was proud to offer this fine series. We all need to learn more about our 'neighbors across the Atlantic.' Any series which contributes to our greater understanding and perception such as this one did is of great value to us and to the communities our stations serve." I hope, John, this scrawled resume will help. I'm ashamed of this "mess," but couldn't ignore your plea!

"Now of great importance to me is your notice saying you will substitute Americans to Remember on 6 programs--! That is horrible. We have duplicated special manuals for the series--spent lots of money and paper and time--rearranged the series order and Columbus comes first in October. Special date, time and broadcast title lists have all been duplicated and issued school-system wide--DON'T do this to me--PLEASE!!!! Send us the original list--PLEASE. Did you know that the tape series didn't follow the sequence of the list in the manual--that the tapes were all numbered differently? That threw us off--so we rearranged the whole thing ourselves to fit our dates best. I'll air mail this special today to you. Sorry I got my mail so late."

Sincerely,

/s/ Pat
Patricia L. Green, Mgr.

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No. 24 - WBAA

"A belated answer to your recent request for evidences of listener response to the REPORT FROM ITALY series.

Reactions to LETTER FROM ITALY

"As far as I know we have had none here at WBAA. I am sorry that this is the case but so it seems to be. We like the series and use it regularly and I have heard several people mention it in casual conversation. But I have no letters or other things to send you."

Sincerely,

/s/ Jim
James S. Miles,
Director,
WBAA

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No. 25 - KOAC

"It is with regret that I report KOAC unable to furnish specific letters regarding the LETTER FROM ITALY series on the N.A.E.B. Network.

"I can report KOAC's own hearty response to the series which we feel has been of genuine merit and worth in our educational broadcasting. We can also tell you of a number of marginal comments which were placed on a recent audience study questionnaire KOAC has been conducting. Many N.A.E.B. programs including LETTER FROM ITALY were singled out by listeners for special praise. Such comments indicate how much value our listeners place on network broadcasts including those such as this one which come from other countries.

"Please express KOAC's sincere appreciation of the series in your comments from Headquarters."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Jimmie
James M. Morris
Program Manager

No. 26 - WBKY

"This is to commend the NAEB series "Letter from Italy". It is our opinion, bolstered by comments from listeners, that the quality and content of these informational programs place them in an important relation to our over-all programming.

"We're glad of the opportunity to receive and broadcast these programs and hope that they will be continued for a long time."

Cordially,

/s/ Len Press
O. Leonard Press
Program Supervisor